[1]
NATIONAAL COMITE 4 EN 5 MEI INTERVIEWT THIERRY BAUDETVOOR VRIJHEIDSBOEK EN NOEMT HEM ”INSPIREREND”/NORMALISERING FASCISME UIT ONVERWACHTE HOEKASTRID ESSED6 MEI 2019
https://www.astridessed.nl/nationaal-comite-4-en-5-mei-interviewt-thierry-baudet-voor-vrijheidsboek-en-noemt-hem-inspirerend-normalisering-fascisme-uit-onverwachte-hoek/
[2]
[IN YOUTUBE FILMPJE TEKST WILDERS]
””Duizenden Arabische mannen hebben de afgelopen tijd honderden vrouwen sexueel aangevallen, vernederd, verkracht.Alle vrouwen zijn loslopend wild.Testosteronbommen heb ik de daders genoemd.”……..” Overal waar de onverantwoorde Open Deur politie zoals premier Rutte en kanselier Merkel de rode loper wordt uitgerold voor deze testosteronbommen”0.37-0.47
”Wat de PVV betreft is het duidelijk:Onze grenzen moeten dicht.Dicht voor alle asielzoekers en alle immigranten uit islamitische landen.Maar zolang dat niet gebeurt, zolang de islamitische testosteronbommen als een Zwaard van Damocles boven de Nederlandse vrouwen hangen, stel ik voor, dat we mannelijke asielzoekers opsluiten in de AZC’s.2.29-2.50”
[KLIK OP LINK VAN MIJN ARTIKEL EN ZIE HET YOUTUBE FILMPJE]
HETZE PVV LEIDER WILDERS TEGEN VLUCHTELINGEN/”TESTOSTERONBOMMEN”ASTRID ESSED4 OCTOBER 2020
[3]
VOLKSKRANTNEDERLAND IS MEDEPLICHTIG AAN DOOD VAN DUIZENDEN VLUCHTELINGEN OP ZEE
Het Europese grensagentschap Frontex redt geen vluchtelingen meer, maar stuurt hun bootjes terug naar Libië, waar ze onder vreselijke omstandigheden gevangen zitten. Het is tijd om de Nederlandse steun aan dit beleid op te zeggen.
Liever tien op de bodem van de zee dan één aan land. Zes jaar na de vluchtelingencrisis is dat de stand van zaken aan de Europese grens. Kreten van mensen in verdrinkingsnood worden door Europese kustwachten genegeerd. Reddingsboten liggen aan de ketting, de bemanning wordt strafrechtelijk vervolgd. Wie via de landsgrenzen probeert de Europese Unie te bereiken, bevindt zich ook in levensgevaar: Griekse en Kroatische grenswachten schieten met scherp en gebruiken excessief geweld om mensen tegen te houden.
Nog liever dan op de bodem van de zee ziet de EU dat vluchtelingen en andere migranten worden teruggestuurd naar landen in de regio. Libië is zo’n grensland dat bereid is om voor grof geld bootjes op volle zee terug te slepen. In dat land woedt ook een burgeroorlog en mensenhandel tiert er welig. De Libische kustwacht krijgt van de EU geld, trainingen en dure boten om zoveel mogelijk mensen van de Middellandse Zee terug te brengen naar Libië. Daar gaat het linea recta van de haven naar detentiecentra, waar mensen voor onbepaalde tijd worden vastgehouden in omstandigheden die kamp Moria (Lesbos) op een vakantiepark doen lijken.
Marteling en slavernij
Tbc en schurft, ondervoeding, marteling, slavernij, seksueel misbruik en moord komen regelmatig voor. Kinderen worden er ook opgesloten, soms jarenlang. Mensenhandelaren zijn kind aan huis, ze komen er slaven kopen. Fabrice Leggeri, directeur van Frontex (het grensagentschap van de EU), gaf toe dat de omstandigheden weliswaar slecht zijn, maar in ieder geval te verkiezen boven de dood. Maar als op de Middellandse Zee de Libische kustwacht nadert, springen mensen van boord – ze verdrinken liever.
Frontex wisselde zijn reddingsboten vorig jaar in voor drones en helikopters. In de jaren daarvoor redde de organisatie tienduizenden mensen het leven. Wie in de buurt is van een schip in nood, is namelijk verplicht drenkelingen te redden. De opvarenden moeten vervolgens naar de dichtstbijzijnde veilige haven gebracht worden, en als veilig is Libië niet te kwalificeren. Frontex moest bootvluchtelingen dus naar Europa brengen, en dat was niet de bedoeling. Nu is Frontex alleen nog maar aanwezig in de lucht, om boten met vluchtelingen te spotten en de locatie door te geven aan de Libische kustwacht. Wel zo makkelijk.
WAT INTERNATIONALE MEDIA ZEGGEN OVER FRONTEX
In mei kwam The Guardian met het nieuws dat zeker 2.000 migranten om het leven zijn gekomen door illegale ‘pushbacks’ van Europese lidstaten, ondersteund door Frontex. In de krant zegt voormalig adjunct-directeur Gil Arias Fernández dat het grensagentschap ‘een oogje dicht doet bij schendingen van mensenrechten.’
Het Duitse magazine Der Spiegel meldt dat in Frontex, dat over een miljardenbudget beschikt, een ‘angstcultuur’ heerst onder directeur Fabrice Leggeri. En dat er in het geheim wordt gecommuniceerd met de Libische grenspolitie, om posities van bootjes door te geven.
Er loopt ook een onderzoek naar Frontex door Europees antifraudebureau Olaf. Volgens het Franse Le Monde is dit niet de enige reden dat het Europees Parlement de financiën over 2019 niet heeft goedgekeurd. ‘Dat komt ook doordat veel vragen en kritische opmerkingen onbeantwoord blijven.’
Dit beleid is niet alleen Europees. Nederland strijdt al jaren voor nog harder, afschrikwekkender en dodelijker migratiebeleid. Met de financiering van Frontex, het regelen van de Turkije-deal en steun aan de Libië-deal, maar ook door te weigeren om mensen uit kampen en boten over te nemen. Medeplichtigheid aan onmenselijke leefomstandigheden in kampen, geweld door grenspolitie, marteling en slavernij in door de EU betaalde detentiecentra, dat alles neemt ook ónze overheid daarbij voor lief.
Toen de Europese Commissie een voorstel deed om een einde te maken aan het criminaliseren van reddingswerkers werd daartegen in de Tweede Kamer een motie ingediend door Forum voor Democratie: een meerderheid van onder andere andere VVD en CDA stemde voor. Het redden van mensenlevens moet volgens onze volksvertegenwoordigers worden verboden, want redden zou een aanzuigende werking hebben. Media besteedden er nauwelijks aandacht aan. Misschien omdat het zwarte en gekleurde mensen zijn, vaak moslim, arm en zonder de juiste papieren, wier levens op het spel staan?
Aanzuigende werking
Wetenschappelijk onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat de aanwezigheid van reddingsboten geen aanzuigende werking heeft, maar wel tot minder doden leidt. Het criminaliseren van reddingswerkers is op geen enkele manier te verenigen met mensenrechtenverdragen. En toch zijn dood en verderf inmiddels volledig ingeburgerde beleidsmiddelen om irreguliere migratie tegen te gaan. Nederland is op oorlogspad en gebruikt de levenloze lichamen van verdronken mensen als vogelverschrikkers in de heilige strijd tegen migratie, opdat het aangespoelde lijk de potentiële gelukszoeker ontmoedigt.
Marteling, slavernij en moord zijn dus weer helemaal in. Onze regeringsleiders laten het vuile werk wel over aan de Libiërs – die oer-Hollandse VOC mentaliteit. Maar daarmee ontkomen we er niet aan dat de overheid met ons belastinggeld uit eigenbelang slavernij, marteling en dood – allemaal misdaden tegen de mensheid – financiert. We kunnen niet zeggen dat we het niet wisten.
[4]
EU EN TURKIJE SLUITEN DEAL OVER VLUCHTELINGEN/BRIEF AANDE NEDERLANDSE EUROPARLEMENTARIERSASTRID ESSED23 MEI 2016
[5]
NOSDENEMARKEN WIL ASIELZOEKERS BUITEN EUROPAGAAN OPVANGEN3 JUNI 2021
https://nos.nl/artikel/2383484-denemarken-wil-asielzoekers-buiten-europa-gaan-opvangen
Het Deense parlement heeft een wet aangenomen die het mogelijk maakt asielzoekers buiten Europa op te vangen. Denemarken zegt dat het al gesprekken voert met meerdere niet-Europese landen waar asielzoekerscentra ingericht kunnen worden.
Het is nog onduidelijk om welke landen het gaat, maar in Deense media worden onder meer Egypte, Eritrea en Ethiopië genoemd als locaties. In april liet de regering weten dicht bij een overeenkomst te zijn met Rwanda.
Het EU-land voert al een streng asielbeleid en scherpt dat met deze nieuwe wet verder aan. Migranten die zich melden aan de grens kunnen straks naar een locatie buiten Europa worden gevlogen. Als hun asielaanvraag daar wordt goedgekeurd, krijgen ze het recht om in dat gastland te blijven, maar een verblijf in Denemarken behoort niet tot de mogelijkheden.
Voorstanders van het plan hopen dat de wet bijdraagt aan het verder afremmen van migratie. “Als je asiel aanvraagt in Denemarken, weet je dat je naar een land buiten Europa wordt gestuurd”, zegt een woordvoerder van de sociaaldemocratische regeringspartij. “Dus we hopen dat mensen stoppen met het aanvragen van asiel in Denemarken.”
‘Krankzinnig en absurd’
De Europese Commissie reageert bezorgd. “Deze wet is niet mogelijk binnen de bestaande EU-regels,” zegt een woordvoerder. “Het recht op een asielaanvraag is fundamenteel in de EU. Het verwerken van asielverzoeken buiten de EU roept fundamentele vragen op over zowel toegang tot asielprocedures als het recht op bescherming voor vluchtelingen.”
Ook internationale organisaties laten zich kritisch uit over de wet. Een hoge functionaris van VN-vluchtelingenorganisatie UNHCR vreest voor een domino-effect. Ook andere Europese landen zouden met dergelijke wetgeving kunnen komen.
“Dit is krankzinnig en absurd”, zegt vluchtelingenorganisatie Refugees Welcome tegen persbureau AP. “Denemarken wil gewoon van vluchtelingen af.”
[6]
ETHIOPIA/HUMAN RIGHTS WATCHWORLD REPORT/EVENTS OF 2020
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/ethiopia
The security and human rights situation in Ethiopia deteriorated as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed struggled to maintain order amid growing unrest and political tensions. The rights landscape was defined by ongoing abuses by government security forces, attacks on civilians by armed groups, deadly violence along communal and ethnic lines, and a political crisis.
The government postponed national elections in March citing Covid-19-related health risks. Several opposition parties condemned the decision. National elections are now slated to be held sometime in 2021. Relations between the federal government and Tigray regional officials worsened after the region held elections in September in defiance of the federal government’s directive. On November 4, Abiy ordered the military to take action against the ruling party in Tigray, in retaliation for what he described as an attack by Tigray regional forces on a federal military base, triggering significant clashes between regional and federal forces. The fighting raised concerns that the phone and internet communication blackout, as well restrictions on air and road access, threatened relief operations to communities at risk.
The June 29 assassination of popular Oromo singer Hachalu Hundessa triggered protests, a heavy-handed security force response, large-scale property destruction, and violence by civilian assailants that targeted minority communities in Oromia. The attacks heightened existing social and political tensions, which were further exacerbated by the arrest of dozens of members of opposition parties in July for their alleged connection with the violence.
In southern and western Oromia, government counterinsurgency campaigns against armed rebel groups resulted in serious human rights violations and abuses against local communities committed by all sides.
Schools were closed due to the pandemic until at least September 2020, affecting over 26 million children.
Little progress was made into ensuring justice for past and recent abuses, including investigations into the deadly October 2019 violence. The national human rights commission issued several critical statements and visited detainees in the capital and in Oromia. Institutional reforms, notably around the security sector, and truth, reconciliation, and accountability—key commitments made earlier in the Abiy administration and all of which are key to dealing with heightened political and ethnic tensions—were limited.
Conduct of Security Forces, Attacks by Armed Groups
Since January, government security forces, including Ethiopian National Defense and Oromia regional police forces, carried out abusive counterinsurgency operations in western and southern Oromia region. The fighting by all sides undermined the ability of humanitarian actors to operate in insecure areas.
Reports of extrajudicial killings, mass arrests and detentions, and violence against ethnic Oromo civilians, including medical professionals, accused of supporting or being sympathetic to the armed rebel group the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), were widespread. On June 3, after coming under attack by unidentified groups, regional security forces stormed into Nekemte Specialized Hospital, threatened staff into treating two wounded regional police officers and temporarily interrupted health services.
Armed groups operating in the area also carried out attacks against officials, police, and civilians, including killings and lootings. The enforced disappearance of over a dozen Amhara university students, allegedly abducted by armed groups in western Oromia in December 2019, stoked anger at the government over its inaction and lack of transparency. On November 1, after federal forces left the area, unidentified armed groups attacked mainly ethnic Amhara residents in Guliso village in western Oromia, resulting in dozens killed and property damage.
In the aftermath of Hachalu’s killing, security forces used excessive force against protesters and mourners gathered in different towns in Oromia and in Addis Ababa in June and July. A heavy security force presence established in many Oromia towns carried out abusive operations against Oromo communities. On August 17, protests broke out in eastern Oromia in response to the continued detention of prominent Oromo opposition leaders Jawar Mohammed and Bekele Gerba. In August, security forces arrested, beat, and used excessive force against scores of protesters, and allegedly killed over 40 people in eastern Oromia.
Following the arrest of local officials and activists, protests erupted on August 9-12 in Sodo, capital of Wolaita zone, in Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR). In response, security forces beat and shot at crowds, and reportedly killed over 16 people.
Ethnic and Communal Violence
Longstanding grievances and increasing polarization over historical and complex questions about land, politics, and identity, led to deadly violence among ethnic communities in 2020.
Violence on 22 university campuses in 2019, mainly in the Oromia and Amhara regions, continued in the first half of the year, prompting an estimated 35,000 students to flee.
In January, conflict between Amhara and Oromo groups erupted in Harar over the use of the old national flag and decorations during the Orthodox Christian celebrationEpiphany, resulting in an unknown number of casualties and the destruction of property.
Afar and Somali communities routinely clashed over border demarcations and access to land and resources, claiming civilian lives on both sides. Fighting since January reportedly resulted in 35,5000 displaced—half of the conflict-induced displacements recorded in the country between January and June 2020.
Hachalu’s killing triggered one of the deadliest periods of unrest. Over 170 people were killed, some by security forces, others in attacks by civilian assailants who also looted and burned the businesses and homes of ethnic Amharas and other minority communities, causing significant property destruction and the displacement of over 9,000 people. In some cases, security forces failed to intervene in time to protect lives and property or participated in the looting.
Violence by armed groups, and among ethnic-Gumuz, Agew, Amhara, and other communities in the Metekel zone of the Benishangul-Gumuz region, intensified in April, causing residents to flee. Yet, authorities in Benishangul-Gumuz and Amhara region began returning thousands of internally displaced people within Metekel in April. Attacks by armed groups escalated in August and September, targeting security forces, officials, and residents, including ethnic Amharas, resulting in scores killed, kidnappings, property destruction, and renewed displacement.
Due Process Rights and Fair Trial Standards
On February 29, police arrested Abdi Regassa and eight other members of Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Though the eight members were later released, Abdi Regassa’s whereabouts remained unknown for several months. He continues to be detained on an unclear basis and without charge at time of writing.
On March 27, Oromia police and intelligence officials arrested journalist Yayesew Shimelis following his comments about the government’s response to Covid-19. Police accused Yayesew of disseminating false information and refused to comply with two court bail orders for his release.
Following the late June violence, authorities arrested over 9,000 people, including government critics and journalists. In several high-profile cases, authorities appealed or seemed to ignore bail orders, requested more time to investigate, or transferred suspects between police authorities, some with overlapping jurisdictions, without informing relatives or counsel.
In September, authorities charged prominent opposition figures Jawar Mohammed, Bekele Gerba, and Eskinder Nega under the criminal code and under the newly enacted terrorism law for their suspected involvement in the unrest.
Freedom of Expression, Media, and Association
On January 3, the government shut down internet and phone connections for three months in western Oromia, significantly restricting freedom of expression and hampering the delivery of essential services, including amid a global health pandemic. Connectivity was restored on March 31.
On June 30, following Hachalu’s killing, authorities imposed a nationwide three-week internet shutdown. The shutdown impacted the communication and coordination of humanitarian agencies and limited access to information and critical reporting. Officials also arrested over a dozen journalists and media workers and launched independent investigations into several media outlets. Similarly, on November 4, internet and phone connectivity was cut in the Tigray region after the federal government ordered troops to respond to an alleged attack by Tigray forces on a military base in the area.
In January, parliament approved a law on hate speech and disinformation, taking effect on March 23. Rights groups warned that the law contained overbroad and vague language that could have a chilling effect on free expression and access to information online. In May, journalist Yayesew Shimelis was the first person charged under it.
On April 8, Ethiopia declared a five-month state of emergency, giving authorities sweeping powers to respond to Covid-19. The regulations limited gatherings to four people, suspended suspects’ right to appear before a judge within 48 hours, and broadly restricted media reporting on Covid-19 news if reporting could “cause terror and undue distress among the public.”
Refugees
In January, the Ethiopian government unofficially changed its asylum policy, which for years granted all Eritrean asylum seekers refugee status as a group, and began only registering some categories of new arrivals at the Eritrea border, excluding others, particularly unaccompanied children. The fighting between federal government forces and Tigray regional forces sparked concerns by humanitarian actors of the risk to vulnerable groups in Tigray regional state, including 100,000 IDPs and 96,000 refugees.
Key International Actors
Ethiopia enjoyed support from international actors and most of its regional neighbors, due to its role as host of the African Union (AU), its contributions to United Nations peacekeeping and regional negotiations and counterterrorism efforts, and migration partnerships with Western countries.
The European Union has been trying to boost its relations with Ethiopia. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Addis in December 2019, the first place she officially visited outside Europe.
In February, the EU high representative and several commissioners visited Ethiopia, reaffirmed EU support for Ethiopia’s reform efforts, and promised to deploy an EU electoral observation mission for the March elections, which was later postponed. EU high officials visited the country again in October, reiterating their support for the country’s reforms, though raising concerns over the “more complicated” situation.
In February, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Ethiopia, reiterated US support for Ethiopia’s domestic reforms, and emphasized the importance of holding free and fair elections.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) committed US$3 billion in investment and assistance and is financing large-scale infrastructure and development initiatives.
Two years after Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a peace agreement, issues around the agreement remain unsettled, and the borders remain heavily fortified.
Relations with Egypt remained rather tense due to Egypt’s concerns that Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) would divert water from the Nile River. Although negotiations under AU auspices resolved some concerns of the parties, disagreements related to drought mitigation and dispute resolution remained unsolved. On September 2, the US said it would suspend around $100 million in aid to Ethiopia, reportedly over the lack of progress on the dam talks, in which the US had played an earlier role in mediating.
Then UN special rapporteur on freedom of expression, David Kaye, visited Ethiopia in December 2019, the first official mission by any mandate holder to the country since 2006. In a June report, the special rapporteur welcomed steps to reform previous laws restricting freedom of expression but remained concerned by significant penalties in the media law and vague provisions in the hate speech and disinformation law.
Following the late June unrest, UN special procedures, the EU and US Senate and House Representatives, issued statements of concern surrounding the violence and unrest. The UN called for a transparent and independent investigation into the singer’s death, while the AU called for an independent investigation into the events, underscoring growing global concerns over Ethiopia’s human rights situation.
Escalating tensions and clashes in the Tigray region prompted an urgent international response urging de-escalation and dialogue, including from the UN secretary-general, the German foreign minister, the UN high commissioner for human rights, the AU, and the regional body, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
ERITREA/HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
WORLD REPORT 2021
Two years on from the peace deal with Ethiopia, Eritrea’s leadership has increased its regional and international diplomatic engagement, but without improving the plight of Eritreans through critical human rights reforms.
Eritrea’s government remains one of the world’s most repressive, subjecting its population to widespread forced labor and conscription, imposing restrictions on freedom of expression, opinion, and faith, and restricting independent scrutiny by international monitors.
Eritrea remains a one-man dictatorship under President Isaias Afewerki, with no legislature, no independent civil society organizations or media outlets, and no independent judiciary. Elections have never been held in the country since it gained independence in 1993, and the government has never implemented the 1997 constitution guaranteeing civil rights and limiting executive power.
In response to Covid-19, Eritrean authorities increased pervasive controls and movement restrictions on its population. From March, the government prohibited citizens, except those engaged in “essential developmental and security” tasks, from leaving their homes, unless for procuring food and medical emergencies.
The coastal Danakali region, predominantly inhabited by Afar communities—cross-border pastoralists—was especially affected by border closures. Media reported that the government intercepted camel convoys bringing foodstuffs from Djibouti and Ethiopia, a key food supply for local Afar communities. The government has also confiscated Afari fishing boats, thereby preventing access to food and income.
In September, the government ignored its own restrictions on movement, its ban on public transport, and its school closures, by channeling thousands of school students to the infamous Sawa military camp where all secondary school students must complete their schooling and simultaneously undergo military training.
Positively, Eritrea took part in the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) review. Although a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), it refused to cooperate with or grant access to the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea and publicly attacked her mandate.
Unlawful, Abusive Detentions
Mass roundups and prolonged arbitrary arrests and detentions without trial or appeal remain common.
Many detainees, including government officials and journalists arrested in 2001 after they questioned Isaias’s leadership, are held incommunicado. In June, a daughter of journalist Dawit Isaak told media he was alive, but without substantiating the assertion. Ciham Ali Abdu, daughter of a former information minister, has been held for seven years since her arrest age 15. Former finance minister and critic of the president, Berhane Abrehe, remains in incommunicado detention since September 2018.
Prisoners often do not know why they are being detained. Relatives are seldom informed of prisoners’ whereabouts, sometimes learning of their fate only when a body is returned.
Authorities hold detainees in inhumane conditions. Facilities are overcrowded and unsanitary, made worse by Covid-19 restrictions that denied many detainees vital food parcels and sanitary products their families would have provided. For months, the government ignored calls by international rights actors to release those unlawfully detained to decongest detention facilities in response to Covid-19.
Eritrea has long criminalized consensual homosexual conduct; the 2015 penal code mandates imprisonment for five to seven years.
Indefinite Military Conscription and Forced Labor
The government took no steps to reform the country’s national service system. It continued to conscript Eritreans, most men and unmarried women, indefinitely into military or civil service for low pay and with no say in their profession or work location. Conscripts are often subjected to inhuman and degrading punishment, including torture, without recourse. Conscientious objection is not recognized; it is punished. Discharge from national service is arbitrary and procedures opaque.
For secondary students, some under 18, conscription begins at Sawa. Students are under military command, are subjected to harsh military punishments and discipline, and female students have reported sexual harassment and exploitation. Dormitories are crowded and health facilities very limited.
The government continued to conscript youth, some perceived as seeking to evade conscription during mass round-ups.
No conscripts, including students, were released from Sawa during 2020, despite the risk of exposure to Covid-19. And, despite calls for reforms, including the separation of schooling from compulsory military training, in September the government again bused students to Sawa, forcibly channeling thousands of young people into national service.
The government assigns conscripts to military duties but many are assigned to civil service jobs or work on agricultural or construction projects. In February, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Canadian mining company, Nevsun, accused of using conscript forced labor at its Bisha mine could be sued in Canada for human rights abuses in Eritrea. In October, the parties announced they had agreed to a settlement in the case but the terms remained confidential.
The government continued to rely on poorly trained national service teachers, which affects quality of primary and secondary education, and teacher retention. Conscripted teachers have no say about where they will be assigned, the subjects they will teach, or the length of their assignment.
Some conscript pay was increased but it remains inadequate to support a family.
Freedom of Religion
The government “recognized” only four religious denominations: Sunni Islam, Eritrean Orthodox, Roman Catholicism, and Evangelical (Lutheran) churches.
Eritreans affiliated with “unrecognized” faiths have faced imprisonment and have often been forced to renounce their religion, including by being tortured. In September and October, two nongovernmental organizations reported the release of as many as 69 “non-recognized” Christians, some detained for over a decade—possibly due to fears of Covid-19 infection—on condition they signed property deeds to hold them liable for future behavior. But the government still arrested people because of religious practices, including during wedding celebrations.
None of the 52 Jehovah’s Witnesses long incarcerated in Mai Serwa have been released, including three jailed since 1994 because of their conscientious objections to military service.
Even “recognized” religions faced restrictions. A Catholic Church delegation led by the archbishop of Addis Ababa was refused entry at the Asmara airport and deported. The Orthodox patriarch deposed by the government in 2007 and expelled from the church in 2019 because of “heresy” remained under house arrest.
In November 2019, 21 Muslims were reportedly arrested in Mendafera and Adi Quala, including a local imam; the whereabouts of many remains unknown. Media reported that peaceful demonstrators arrested in 2017 and early 2018 for protesting the government takeover of Al Diaa Islamic school were released in August; officials of the school remain incarcerated.
In January, Finn Church Aid, one of the very few nongovernmental organizations based in Eritrea, ended its activities after the government suddenly stopped its teacher training project, which aimed to recruit teachers outside the national service system.
Refugees
Eritrea’s ongoing rights crisis continues to drive thousands of Eritreans into exile, with many children and youth escaping conscription.
In the first three months of 2020, 9,436 Eritreans fled to Ethiopia alone, a third of whom were children. In January, the Ethiopian government unofficially changed its asylum policy, which for years granted all Eritrean asylum seekers refugee status as a group, only registering some categories of new arrivals at the Eritrea border, excluding others, notably unaccompanied children.
Among those fleeing Eritrea were four football players participating in a tournament in Uganda in November 2019. Some footballers defected at tournaments in 2015 and 2009.
Israeli authorities continued to systematically deny the asylum claims of the roughly 32,000 Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers in the country. However, in April, Israel’s Supreme Court struck down a law that permitted the confiscation of a portion of their salaries.
Key International Actors
More than two years after the Eritrea and Ethiopia declared peace, their border remains demarcated and Ethiopia has not withdrawn from Badme, the Eritrean village that triggered the 1998 war. In 2019, Eritrea unilaterally closed the border. In March 2020, Ethiopia shut the border because of pandemic-related fears.
After having been sued by a European human rights organization and criticized by the European Parliament for funding the procurement of material for the construction of a road in Eritrea that employs conscript forced labor, the European Union announced it would fund “no more roads.” It also announced it would be conducting a review of its “dual-track” approach in Eritrea, which de-linked political and development policy with its development arm focused on job creation activities, and its political arm reportedly raising human rights issues. In contrast, a subsidiary of a state-owned Chinese company remains involved in building a 134-kilometer road.
In 2013, Human Rights Watch documented how a state-owned construction company, which regularly used forced conscript workers built part of the Bisha mine’s infrastructure.
Two mining companies that provide 20 percent of the country’s income are 60 percent owned by Chinese firms, and 40 percent by the government.
The development of a massive 50 percent Australian company-owned potash development project, the Colluli potash project in the Danakali region, moved ahead. In May, the special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Eritrea reported allegations that the military had been clearing local Afar communities off their land around Colluli since 2017.
The Global Partnership for Education, a global education donor, awarded a US$17.2 million grant to Eritrea, despite ongoing human rights abuses in the country’s education sector.
[7]
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
EGYPT: RAB’A KILLINGS LIKELY CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY
No Justice a Year Later for Series of Deadly Mass Attacks on Protesters
(Cairo) – The systematic and widespread killing of at least 1,150 demonstrators by Egyptian security forces in July and August 2013 probably amounts to crimes against humanity, Human Rights Watch said today in a report based on a year-long investigation. In the August 14 dispersal of the Rab’a al-Adawiya sit-in alone, security forces, following a plan that envisioned several thousand deaths, killed a minimum of 817 people and more likely at least 1,000.
The 188-page report, “All According to Plan: The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt,” documents the way the Egyptian police and army methodically opened fire with live ammunition on crowds of demonstrators opposed to the military’s July 3 ouster of Mohamed Morsy, Egypt’s first elected civilian president, at six demonstrations between July 5 and August 17, 2013. While there is also evidence that some protesters used firearms during several of these demonstrations, Human Rights Watch was able to confirm their use in only a few instances, which do not justify the grossly disproportionate and premeditated lethal attacks on overwhelmingly peaceful protesters.
“In Rab’a Square, Egyptian security forces carried out one of the world’s largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history,” said Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch. “This wasn’t merely a case of excessive force or poor training. It was a violent crackdown planned at the highest levels of the Egyptian government. Many of the same officials are still in power in Egypt, and have a lot to answer for.”
Human Rights Watch released a video showing the events as they unfolded in Rab’a Square on August 14, including first-hand accounts by witnesses and victims.
The authorities have failed to hold even a single low-level police or army officer accountable for any of the killings, much less any official responsible for ordering them, and continue to brutally suppress dissent. In light of the continued impunity, an international investigation and prosecutions of those implicated are needed, Human Rights Watch said. States should further suspend military and law enforcement aid to Egypt until it adopts measures to end its serious rights violations.
Human Rights Watch interviewed more than 200 witnesses, including protesters, doctors, local residents, and independent journalists, visited each of the protest sites during or immediately after the attacks began, and reviewed physical evidence, hours of video footage, and statements by public officials. Human Rights Watch wrote to relevant Egyptian ministries soliciting the government’s perspective on these events, but received no responses.
The report includes a detailed examination of the planning and execution of the dispersal of the protest at Rab’a al-Adawiya Square, where from July 3 to August 14, tens of thousands of largely peaceful Morsy supporters, including women and children, held an open-ended sit-in demanding Morsy’s reinstatement. Human Rights Watch used satellite photographs from one night of the sit-in, August 2, to estimate that approximately 85,000 demonstrators were in the square that night.
On August 14, security forces attacked the Rab’a protest encampment from each of its main entrances, using armed personnel carriers (APCs), bulldozers, ground troops, and snipers. Security forces gave little to no effective warning and opened fire into large crowds, leaving no safe exit for nearly 12 hours. Security forces fired on makeshift medical facilities and positioned snipers to target whoever sought to enter or exit Rab’a hospital. Towards the end of the day, the central stage, field hospital, mosque, and first floor of Rab’a hospital were set ablaze, probably by security forces.
One protester, a businessman, described the scene:
They immediately fired tear gas and live fire. It was so intense; I can’t even describe it. It was not like the other times before, one or two at a time. It was raining bullets. I smelled the gas and immediately saw people being hit and falling down around me. I have no idea how many people were hit. We didn’t hear any warnings, nothing. It was like hell.
Human Rights Watch documented 817 people killed in the Rab’a dispersal alone. Given strong evidence of additional deaths compiled by Rab’a survivors and activists, additional bodies taken directly to hospitals and morgues without accurate record or known identity, and individuals still missing, it is likely that more than 1,000 were killed in Rab’a. Police detained more than 800 protesters from the sit-in, some of whom they beat, tortured, and, in several cases, summarily executed, six witnesses told Human Rights Watch.
EINDE STATEMENT HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
[8]
TROUW
DE BURGEROORLOG IN TIGRAY BEGINT STEEDS MEER TE LIJKEN OP DE RWANDESE
GENOCIDE
23 MAART 2021
Een jaar nadat de Ethiopische premier Abiy Ahmed de Nobelprijs voor de vrede ontving, wordt hij mede verantwoordelijk gehouden voor gruwelijke oorlogsmisdaden in de afvallige regio Tigray. ‘Hij kan zelfs medeplichtig zijn aan genocide.’
Enkele berichten uit de Ethiopische provincie Tigray waar al meer dan vier maanden een burgeroorlog woedt.
9 november 2020. Het stadje Humera aan de grens met Eritrea wordt met artillerievuur bestookt. Burgers zijn doelwit en slaan op de vlucht.
9 november 2020. In het plaatsje May Cadera worden circa 600 mensen met machetes en hakmessen op straat gedood.
19 november 2020. De stad Aksum wordt met mortiergranaten onder vuur genomen vanaf een heuvel. De bommen vallen op woonwijken.
28 november 2020. Woonwijken in de hoofdstad van Tigray, Mekele worden zwaar gebombardeerd door het Ethiopische leger: 27 doden en honderd gewonden.
28 en 29 november 2020. Honderden ongewapende burgers worden in Aksum standrechtelijk geëxecuteerd. De stad wordt door Eritrese troepen volledig geplunderd.
29 januari 2021. Het Ayder ziekenhuis in Mekele behandelde al 750 vrouwen die verkracht zijn door soldaten.
11 februari 2021. Het ziekenhuis in Adrigat heeft 74 slachtoffers van verkrachting behandeld.
4 – 7 maart 2021. Executies en verkrachtingen in Wukro door Eritrese en Ethiopische troepen. Zo zouden ook nonnen van het klooster van Wukro zijn verkracht.
7 maart 2021. In de stad Azeba openden Eritrese soldaten het vuur op bezoekers van de markt.
Deze nieuwsberichten en voorbeelden uit rapporten over Tigray, de noordelijke Ethiopische provincie waar een burgeroorlog woedt, zijn slechts een greep uit een veel groter aantal. Afzenders: Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, VN-mensenrechtenorganisaties, de Ethiopische Commissie voor Mensenrechten en ngo’s. De data zijn gebaseerd op getuigenverklaringen van overlevenden, berichten van buitenlandse hulpverleners ter plaatse, satellietbeelden en opgevangen communicatie tussen Eritrese en Ethiopische troepen in het gebied door Amerikaanse inlichtingendiensten.
Kwalificaties als misdaden tegen de menselijkheid, oorlogsmisdaden, etnische zuiveringen en zelfs genocide vallen. Vergelijkingen met de misdrijven in het voormalige Joegoslavië, zoals in Srebrenica, en de massamoord op de Tutsi’s in Rwanda, dringen zich op.
Het begint op 4 november vorig jaar als het Ethiopische leger de opstandige deelstaat Tigray binnenvalt. Tigray wordt geleid door de TPLF, de partij die Ethiopië 29 jaar met dictatoriale hand bestuurde maar in 2018 aan de kant werd geschoven. Abiy Ahmed werd de nieuwe premier van Ethiopië en beloofde de ramen en deuren van het land open te zetten. Vrijheden lonkten.
De TPLF trok zich terug op haar thuisbasis in Tigray en verzette zich tegen alle vernieuwingen van Abiy. Tigray stevende af op autonomie. In het federale land, met tien deelstaten en circa tachtig volken, was dit voor het centrale gezag in Addis Abeba onverteerbaar. Toen TPLF-milities in de herfst van vorig jaar ook nog eens een basis van het Ethiopische leger aanvielen in Tigray, was de maat vol. Abiy stuurde troepen om Tigray in het gareel te dwingen.
Wrede paradox
Vanuit het zuidoosten rukte het Ethiopische leger op. Vanuit het zuidwesten vielen zwaarbewapende milities uit de buurdeelstaat Amhara Tigray binnen. In het noorden trokken zeker veertien Eritrese divisies de grens met Tigray over. Abiy had net vrede gesloten met buurland Eritrea na bijna dertig jaar koude oorlog, waarvan de eerste jaren met bittere strijd en veel doden. Hij kreeg er de Nobelprijs voor de Vrede voor, eind 2019. Inmiddels zijn er aanhoudende berichten dat ook Somalische eenheden vanuit het oosten Tigrayese milities aanvallen.
Op 28 november vorig jaar riep Abiy al de totale overwinning uit. Tigray was weer onder controle, maar tot op de dag van vandaag worden er nog steeds hevige gevechten gemeld én gruwelijke misdrijven tegen de bevolking. Het internet- en telefoonverkeer liggen al maanden vrijwel plat om pottenkijkers buiten te houden. “Het is een paradox”, zegt Kjetil Tronvoll. “Premier Abiy Ahmed kreeg de Nobelprijs voor de Vrede, en ruim een jaar later worden onder zijn leiding oorlogsmisdaden en misdaden tegen de menselijkheid gepleegd. Abiy kan zelfs medeplichtig zijn aan genocide.”
Hoogleraar Tronvoll is directeur van het Noorse Oslo Analytica, dat onderzoek doet naar vrede en conflicten, en bestudeert de ontwikkelingen in Ethiopië en Eritrea al dertig jaar. Hij volgt de berichten over de vele wreedheden op de voet. Het geweld in Tigray karakteriseert Tronvoll nog steeds als een burgeroorlog, omdat Eritrese troepen aan de zijde van het Ethiopische leger vechten, en dat geldt ook voor de Somalische militairen. “Het is een hopeloze en uitzichtloze burgeroorlog geworden. Ethiopië krijgt Tigray niet alleen eronder en heeft hulp van buurlanden en deelstaat Amhara nodig.”
Ondanks al die buitenlandse en binnenlandse troepen bieden de TPLF-milities in het bergachtige Tigray nog steeds hevige weerstand. Ze zouden 250.000 strijders onder de wapenen hebben. “Abiy zit nu machteloos in de hoek bij deze oorlog”, zegt Tronvoll. De premier van Ethiopië heeft geen greep op de situatie in Tigray, waar vooral Eritrese soldaten zich te buiten lijken te gaan aan oorlogsmisdaden. Die troepen worden aangestuurd door de Eritrese president, Isaias Afwerki, een dictator in Noord-Koreaanse stijl. Beide landen ontkennen tot de dag van vandaag de betrokkenheid van Eritrese eenheden op Ethiopisch grondgebied. En Afwerki heeft een broertje dood aan mensenrechten en oorlogsrecht.
Etnische zuiveringen
“De burgeroorlog in Tigray begon als een politiek territoriaal conflict, maar krijgt nu steeds meer de trekken van een etnisch conflict”, zegt Thijs Bouwknegt, historicus bij het Niod en gespecialiseerd in massageweld in Afrika. Hij is een kenner van de genocide in Rwanda die ruim 26 jaar geleden plaats had. De vergelijking met Rwanda wordt steeds pregnanter in Tigray.
“Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, en zelfs de nieuwe minister van buitenlandse zaken van de Verenigde Staten, Anthony Blinken, spreken al van etnische zuiveringen die gaande zijn in Tigray.” Curieus genoeg is het etnisch zuiveren van een gebied geen internationaal misdrijf op zich. “Maar zo’n zuiveringsproces gaat wel vaak gepaard met massaal geweld, zoals nu in Tigray, dus kan er sprake zijn van internationale misdrijven, zoals vervolging, verdrijving en massamoord”, aldus Bouwknegt.
“Genocide kent min of meer dezelfde daden als misdrijven tegen de menselijkheid, maar bij volkerenmoord gaat het om grootschalig en systematisch geweld tegen de burgerbevolking, daarbij komt het discriminerende oogmerk om een bepaalde nationale, etnische, religieuze of raciale groep geheel of gedeeltelijk te vernietigen. We horen berichten dat Eritrese troepen orders hebben om te doden en plunderen in Tigray. Soldaten zouden volgens getuigen, die het overleefd hebben, vertellen dat ze dit doen omdat zij Tigrayers zijn”, aldus Tronvoll.
Hij is er inmiddels van overtuigd dat er volop oorlogsmisdaden worden gepleegd. “Er komt steeds meer bewijs in de vorm van verklaringen van getuigen en slachtoffers, foto’s en video’s van gruwelijkheden. Ook zijn er satellietbeelden.” In het internationale humanitaire recht gaat het daarbij om de schaal waarop de misdrijven tegen burgers zijn gepleegd, de systematische manier en hoe wijdverbreid. “Het moet aangestuurd worden van bovenaf. Volgens hem maken Eritrese en Ethiopische troepen zich hier schuldig aan, net als de milities uit Amhara.”
De TPLF-milities doen dat niet. Tronvoll: “Die gaan hun eigen bevolking niet uitmoorden”. Hoewel het bloedbad in May Cadera op 9 november vorig jaar toegeschreven wordt aan paramilitairen uit Tigray, die daar 600 Amhaarse gastarbeiders zouden hebben gedood met kapmessen.
Scala aan systematische gebeurtenissen
Tronvoll moet zien dat dit wordt vastgesteld. “Dat de TPLF dit heeft gedaan kwam pas naar buiten toen milities uit Amhara May Cadera hadden ingenomen, dus dit kan ook propaganda zijn”, zegt Tronvoll.
Een scala aan systematische gebeurtenissen versterkt het idee van uitroeiing van een volk in Tigray. Artsen zonder Grenzen meldde dat het zorgstelsel in Tigray is ingestort door ‘doelbewuste aanvallen, vernielen en plunderen van de meeste ziekenhuizen’. Ook het uithongeren van de bevol-king – twee derde heeft inmiddels ernstig tekort aan voedsel – wordt gezien als een vorm van genocide. Al maanden is Tigray grotendeels afgegrendeld van de buitenwereld. Hulporganisaties kunnen maar zeer beperkt hun werk doen, zoals voedsel leveren.
Dan zijn er nog de vele berichten over verkrachtingen van vrouwen tot zeer jonge meisjes. De Ethiopische minister van vrouwenzaken heeft daar haar zorg over uitgesproken. “Het zijn ernstige misdrijven, die als het gepaard gaat met straffeloosheid, wel degelijk verder kunnen escaleren als er niet tegen wordt opgetreden”, zegt Bouwknegt.
Proces van dehumanisering
Er zouden zelfs rapporten zijn van mannen die gedwongen worden om meisjes uit de eigen familie te verkrachten, anders worden ze gedood, meldde de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Verenigde Naties tegen seksueel geweld in Conflicten, Pramilla Patten eerder al. Bouwknegt kent de verhalen ook. “Je zag dit ook in Rwanda, waar Tutsi-vaders of grootvaders hun dochters of kleindochters moesten verkrachten onder dwang van Hutu’s. Het is het demoraliseren en terroriseren van de burgerbevolking. Heel beangstigend en een proces van dehumanisering.”
Ondertussen duren al deze wreedheden onverminderd voort. Daarmee rijst de vraag: wie wordt hiervoor verantwoordelijk gehouden? Natuurlijk generaals, legercommandanten, soldaten, paramilitairen en burgermilities, maar de ogen zijn ook gericht op de politieke leiding.
“Juristen zullen stellen dat Abiy als minister-president eindverantwoordelijkheid draagt voor wat het leger doet. Hij moet er alles aan doen om excessief geweld en internationale misdrijven tegen burgers te voorkomen en in voorkomende gevallen de daders voor de rechter brengen”, zegt Bouwknegt.
Van alle bewijzen die al naar buiten zijn gekomen, meent Tronvoll dat de president van Eritrea, Afwerki, verantwoordelijk kan worden gehouden voor de misdaad der misdaden in Tigray: genocide.
Medeplichtig aan genocide
Potentieel is premier Abiy van Ethiopië medeplichtig aan genocide, denkt Tronvoll. “Als Abiy de Eritrese troepen om hulp heeft gevraagd in Tigray, hij bekend is met hun misdrijven daar en er niets tegen heeft ondernomen, dan helpt hij bij genocide en is Abiy medeplichtig.”
Uiteindelijk zal onderzoek moeten uitwijzen wat er werkelijk is gebeurd en op welke schaal. De druk op Ethiopië om dit toe te staan is hoog. Afgelopen donderdag kwam er een akkoord. De Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de VN voor mensenrechten, Michelle Bachelet, gaat samen met de redelijk onafhankelijk opererende Ethiopische Mensenrechtencommissie onderzoek doen in Tigray naar de klachten over oorlogsmisdaden. Ethiopië heeft gezegd mee te werken. Als er bewijs wordt geleverd voor oorlogsmisdaden en/of genocide, dan ligt er een probleem met de vervolging van verdachten. Zo erkennen Ethiopië en Eritrea het Internationale Strafhof (ICC) in Den Haag niet. Dan kunnen rechtszaken alleen in Ethiopië worden gevoerd.
Dat de man van de prestigieuze Nobelprijs voor de Vrede, Abiy Ahmed, de eindverantwoordelijke voor wat er in Tigray gebeurt, voor de rechter zal moeten verschijnen voor misdrijven tegen de menselijkheid, oorlogsmisdrijven of genocide, lijkt vooralsnog niet erg waarschijnlijk.
EINDE ARTIKEL
[10]
ZIE NOOT 6
[11]
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
RWANDA
EVENTS OF 2020
The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) continued to target those perceived as a threat to the government during 2020. Several high-profile government critics were arrested or threatened. Authorities failed to conduct credible investigations into the suspicious death in police custody of well-known singer and activist, Kizito Mihigo, in February.
Arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and torture in official and unofficial detention facilities continued. Fair trial standards were routinely flouted in many sensitive political cases, in which security-related charges are often used to prosecute prominent government critics.
Rwanda continued to host tens of thousands of refugees, mainly from neighboring countries, as well as several hundred asylum seekers transferred from Libya. In August, the government began implementing, with the United Nations refugee agency, the first organized voluntary repatriation of refugees from Rwanda to Burundi.
Political Space and Freedom of Expression
The arrest and detention of Paul Rusesabagina, a prominent critic of the RPF, which started as an enforced disappearance, raised grave concerns over his ability to receive a fair trial in Rwanda. Rusesabagina, who fled to Belgium in 1996 and is now a Belgian citizen, was living in the United States when he traveled from the US to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on August 27. He was forcibly disappeared on or about the evening of August 27 until the Rwanda Investigation Bureau (RIB) announced it had Rusesabagina in custody in Kigali, Rwanda, on August 31. Rusesabagina’s family members were not able to speak with him until September 8, and it is disputed whether he was able to hire lawyers of his choosing. His trial was ongoing at time of writing.
On February 17, police announced that Kizito Mihigo had been found dead in his cell at the Remera Police Station in Kigali in an alleged suicide, four days after his arrest near the border with Burundi. Shortly before his death, he told Human Rights Watch that he was being threatened and told to provide false testimony against political opponents, and that he wanted to flee the country because he feared for his safety. Rwandan authorities issued a statement on February 26 concluding that Mihigo died by strangulation in a probable suicide, but failed to make details of the investigation public or meet standards expected for an investigation into a death in custody. In 2015, Mihigo had been sentenced to 10 years in prison on allegations including the formation of a criminal gang, conspiracy to murder, and conspiracy against the established government or the president, but was released in September 2018 after a presidential pardon.
On December 27, 2019, the Rwandan Court of Appeal upheld the conviction of two former military officials, although the court reduced their sentences to 15 years each. Col. Tom Byabagamba and retired Brig. Gen. Frank Rusagara were sentenced to 21 and 20 years in prison respectively by the Military High Court of Kanombe in 2016, on charges including inciting insurrection and tarnishing the government’s image.
Prosecutors accused them of criticizing the government. The Court of Appeal failed to investigate allegations of torture and witness tampering made during the trial. After Byabagamba and Rusagara’s lawyers filed an application with the East African Court of Justice in February, new charges were brought against Byabagamba, who was then accused of attempting to bribe his way out of prison. Between April 15 and 17, 2020, three people connected to Byabagamba were arrested and accused of helping him escape. Two were released in April, and the third was released in July.
Throughout the year, the RIB carried out house searches, seized property, including electronic equipment, and repeatedly called in for questioning Victoire Ingabire, the former president of the FDU-Inkingi opposition party who formed a new party, the Dalfa-Umurinzi, in November 2019. In a trial concluded on January 23, 2020, seven members of Ingabire’s party were convicted of charges including complicity in forming or joining an irregular armed force, and handed sentences ranging from seven to ten years’ imprisonment.
Three others—Théophile Ntirutwa, Venant Abayisenga, and Léonille Gasengayire—were acquitted of all charges and released. After their release, they gave video interviews to local YouTube channels detailing their pretrial detention and alleging ill-treatment and torture, including in Kwa Gacinya, an unofficial detention facility in the Gikondo neighborhood of Kigali, and in Mageragere and Nyanza prisons.
Abayisenga was reported missing in June, and is feared forcibly disappeared, after going out to buy phone credit. Ntirutwa was rearrested following an attack at his shop in Rwamagana District on May 11. On May 18, Ntirutwa and three others at his shop at the time of the attack were charged with offenses including murder, theft, and “spreading false information with intent to create a hostile international opinion against the Rwandan State.” At time of writing, they were awaiting trial.
Freedom of Media
State interference and intimidation have forced many civil society actors and journalists to stop working on sensitive political or human rights issues. Most print and broadcast media continued to be heavily dominated by pro-government views. Independent civil society organizations are very weak, and few document and expose human rights violations by state agents.
In March, four bloggers who reported on alleged rapes by security forces and negative impacts of government directives to counter the spread of Covid-19 on vulnerable populations were arrested in circumstances that appeared retaliatory. In the months prior to their arrest, they also shared testimonies about a long-standing dispute with authorities over land evictions in Bannyahe, a poor neighborhood of Kigali.
On April 8, RIB and police agents arrested Valentin Muhirwa and David Byiringiro, two bloggers with Afrimax TV, in Kangondo II, a neighborhood of Kigali. Two residents said the bloggers had requested permission from the local leader to distribute food and goods after hearing about the population’s struggles, but RIB and police agents arrested the men, accusing them of violating government directives and organizing an unauthorized distribution.
On April 12, RIB tweeted confirmation of the arrest of Théoneste Nsengimana, the owner of Umubavu TV, for alleged fraud. RIB accused him of promising 20,000 Rwandan Francs (US$21) to people to say they were receiving assistance from abroad.
The Rwanda Media Commission said in a statement on April 13 that none of the detained bloggers were arrested in retaliation for their work and that online bloggers, such as those using YouTube, are not journalists and are “not authorized to interview the population.” Muhirwa and Byiringiro were released in April. Nsengimana, released in May, was awaiting trial at time of writing.
On April 15, Dieudonné Niyonsenga, also known as Cyuma Hassan, the owner of Ishema TV, was arrested with his driver, Fidèle Komezusenge. RIB accused Niyonsenga of violating the lockdown measures and giving Komezusenge an unauthorized press pass. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, they were charged with forgery and claiming to be journalists. Their trial was ongoing at time of writing.
Arbitrary Detention of Street Children
Transit centers in Rwanda are governed by a 2017 law establishing the National Rehabilitation Service, which states that anyone exhibiting “deviant behaviors” can be held for up to two months, without any other further legal justification or oversight. In January 2020, Human Rights Watch found that the new legislation provides cover for the police to continue to round up and arbitrarily detain children in deplorable and degrading conditions at Gikondo Transit Center. In February, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child called for a halt to arbitrary detention of children in transit centers in Rwanda, for investigations into allegations of ill-treatment—including beatings—and for amendments to the legal framework that regularizes this abuse.
Covid-19
Rwandan authorities reacted swiftly and aggressively to the threat of the global Covid-19 pandemic. Police arrested over 70,000 people for infractions related to the measures introduced in March to prevent the spread of Covid-19, including a curfew, the closure of bars of restaurants, and restrictions on movement. Authorities accused people of violating the measures and detained people in stadiums without due process or legal authority. Schools were closed for at least six months, starting in March, due to the pandemic, affecting about 3.4 million children.
International Justice
The arrest of Félicien Kabuga, one of the alleged masterminds of the Rwandan genocide, in France in May marked a major step toward justice for genocide victims and survivors. Kabuga is charged by an international war crimes court with genocide and related crimes during the 1994 genocide, and was living in France under a false identity at the time of his arrest.
Kabuga had evaded arrest since 1997, when he was first indicted by prosecutors with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). On September 30, 2020, a French court ordered Kabuga’s transfer to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), which was established to handle the outstanding functions of the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as those tribunals closed. The mechanism has branches in Arusha, Tanzania, and The Hague, the Netherlands.
In May, the IRMCT announced that the remains of another high profile genocide suspect— Augustin Bizimana, the minister of defense at the time of the killings—were identified in a grave in Pointe-Noire, Republic of Congo. He is thought to have died around August 2000. In 1998, the ICTR indicted Bizimana on 13 counts of genocide and other related crimes.
In August 2020, Rwandan judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant against Aloys Ntiwiragabo, the former head of military intelligence during the genocide, after media revealed in July that he was hiding in France. France opened a probe into alleged crimes against humanity by Ntiwiragabo after his whereabouts were revealed. Ntiwiragabo had previously been the subject of arrest warrants, including by the ICTR.
EINDE STATEMENT HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
[12]
”ZORGVULDIGE” PROCEDURE LEIDT TOT
DEPORTATIE EN DOOD VAN AFGHAANSE VLUCHTELING
Weer heeft het Nederlandse vluchtelingenbeleid een slachtoffer geëist. De Afghaanse vluchteling Nezam Azimi, die door de overheid in 2006 werd uitgezet, blijkt in de Afghaanse hoofdstad Kabul te zijn vermoord door de Taliban, na eerst te zijn ontvoerd en gemarteld.
Azimi had in 2001 in Nederland asiel aangevraagd, omdat hij zich verzette tegen de onderdrukking van vrouwen door de Taliban en daardoor problemen had gekregen met de moslimfundamentalisten. Zijn leven liep gevaar en hij moest vluchten. Maar zijn asielaanvraag werd afgewezen. Tijdens zijn jarenlange verblijf in Maastricht zette hij zich in voor de steungroep Vluchtalarm Maastricht en voor Amnesty International. Nadat hij uitgeprocedeerd raakte, vroeg Gerd Leers, de toenmalige burgemeester van Maastricht en de huidige minister van Immigratie en Asiel, aan de toenmalige minister van Vreemdelingenzaken Rita Verdonk om Azimi alsnog verblijfsrecht te geven. Tevergeefs, want ijzeren Rita, die later “getraumatiseerd” bleek door haar eigen misdaden, bleef bij haar besluit en stuurde Azimi de dood in.
“Nu is precies gebeurd waar wij altijd bang voor zijn geweest”, laat Paul Rutten van Vluchtalarm Maastricht weten. Azimi hield zich de afgelopen jaren in Afghanistan schuil voor de Taliban, die hem zochten. Omdat hij werk nodig had, kon hij niet langer meer ondergronds door het leven gaan. Zo werd hij ontdekt door de Taliban. De Nederlandse overheid is mede schuldig aan zijn dood, omdat men keihard weigerde om hem bescherming te bieden.
Leers zegt de dood van Azimi te betreuren. Maar als verantwoordelijk minister deporteert hij dag in dag uit vluchtelingen naar landen vol geweld en armoede. Daar maalt hij niet om. Zo biedt hij het Afghaanse meisje Sahar, die al 10 jaar in Nederland leeft, maar al te graag een enkele reis richting boerka aan. Ook de dood van Azimi rechtvaardigt de minister met de bekende mantra “regels zijn regels”. Hij wijst er namelijk op dat “de procedure destijds zorgvuldig was”. Met andere woorden: minister Leers van nu vindt dat burgemeester Leers van toen onzinnig bezig was toen hij met een brief aan Verdonk probeerde om Azimi in Nederland te houden.
Harry Westerink
[13]
UITGEZETTE ASIELZOEKER IN BAHREIN TOT LEVENSLANG VEROORDEELD/HARBERS, WAT ZIJT
GIJ VOOR EEN VENT
ASTRID ESSED
17 MAART 2019
[14]
ASTRID ESSED OVER DE WE ARE HERE GROEP AMSTERDAM
EINDE NOTEN