A spokesperson for the Afghan Taliban on Tuesday condemned a US military strike on a residential house in Kabul, in which the US claimed al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed. Chinese experts said the so-called anti-terrorist action is a violation of the territorial sovereignty of Afghanistan and may be a strategy to gain political points at the upcoming midterm elections.
The spokesperson for Afghan Taliban Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed on Tuesday in a statement that the airstrike on a house in the Shirpur area in Kabul was carried out by US drones, and called it “a clear violation of international principles and the Doha Agreement,” which the US signed with the Taliban in 2020 that led to the withdrawal of US forces.
US President Joe Biden announced on Monday that the US “successfully concluded an airstrike in Kabul that killed the emir of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri,” and claimed that “now justice has been delivered,” according to a White House statement.
The US did not alert Taliban officials ahead of the strike, reported CNN.
The White House statement claimed that none of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s family members were hurt, and there were no civilian casualties.
Al-Zawahri was on the balcony of his house on Sunday when two Hellfire missiles were launched from an unmanned drone killing him, according to AP News.
However, doubts are raised on the authenticity of such claims. Li Wei, an expert on national security at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, said the drone attack in a densely populated area could have caused damage to surrounding buildings or even casualties among local residents considering the large impact of the Hellfire missiles.
Experts said the US military attack was a violation of the territorial sovereignty of Afghanistan.
“Any military activities and strikes within the territory of a country without first informing its government will constitute a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country no matter what the legitimacy is,” Li told the Global Times on Tuesday.
The Taliban’s statement said Afghanistan “strongly condemns this attack on any cause.”
The US has once again openly trampled on Afghan territorial sovereignty after its troops’ withdrawal in 2021, which proved that the country has “never really changed” despite its commitment. The strike aimed to show that it still has unmatched influence in Afghan affairs and to expunge the humiliation of having to leave Afghanistan, said a Beijing-based expert on international affairs who requested anonymity.
“The two-decade US-led war in Afghanistan is one of the main reasons why the country is still vulnerable to terrorism. The political chaos and economic depression in Afghanistan have made the whole country and even the region spin out of control for a long time, which has become a hotbed of terrorism and led to Afghanistan becoming a stronghold for many terrorist organizations,” said the expert.
Some experts suspect the airstrike against Ayman al-Zawahiri came because the critical US midterm elections are close. The country has historically conducted anti-terrorism operations as a political tool to serve its political interests at home, Li said.
Li added the solutions to eradicating terrorism come from addressing Afghan domestic issues, such as economic issues and people’s livelihoods, which the US is responsible for.
The US is widely criticized in the world for illegally freezing $7 billion Afghan central bank assets. The international community has urged the US to unfreeze and return the money that belongs to the Afghan people in full to help overcome the humanitarian crisis in the country especially after a massive earthquake in June.
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4) Did international law require the U.S. to get permission from the Taliban to conduct an airstrike in Afghanistan?
Afghanistan’s Taliban have alleged the United States is blocking their way to securing international recognition for the Islamist group’s new government in Kabul.
The insurgent-turned-ruling group seized power last August and installed an all-male interim administration following the end of almost 20 years of U.S.-led foreign military intervention in the war-torn South Asian country.
“As far as recognition by foreign countries is concerned, I think the United States is the biggest obstacle,” chief Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said when asked to explain whether his group’s policies or any country was responsible for the delay in winning the legitimacy.
“It [America] does not allow other countries to move in this direction and has itself not taken any step on this count either,” he said, while responding to reporters’ questions via a Taliban-run WhatsApp group for reporters.
Mujahid claimed that the Taliban had met “all the requirements” for their government to be given diplomatic recognition.
He asserted all countries, including the United States, need to realize that political engagement with the Taliban is in “everyone’s interest.” It would allow the world to formally discuss “the grievances” they have with the Taliban.
Mujahid insisted Taliban leaders “want better” bilateral ties with the U.S. in line with the agreement the two countries signed in Doha, Qatar, in February 2020. Washington also needs to move toward establishing better ties with Kabul, he said.
“We were enemies and fighting the United States so long as it had occupied Afghanistan. That war has ended now.”
No recognition
No country has yet recognized the Taliban as legitimate rulers of the country, mainly over their harsh treatment of Afghan women and girls. The group is also being pressed to govern the country through a broad-based political system where all Afghan groups have their representation to ensure long-term national stability.
Since taking control of Afghanistan 10 months ago, the Taliban have suspended secondary education for most teenage girls and prevented female staff in certain government departments from returning to their duties.
The Ministry for Vice and Virtue, tasked with interpreting and enforcing the Taliban’s version of Islam, has ordered women to wear face coverings in public. Women are barred from traveling beyond 70 kilometers unless accompanied by a male relative.
The Taliban have rejected calls for removing the curbs on women and Mujahid also defended them. “The orders… regarding women are in accordance with [Islamic] Shariah, and these are the rules of Shariah,” he asserted.
The Taliban are “religiously” obliged to implement Islamic Sharia to counter practices that Islam prohibits, Mujahid said, without elaborating.
“Hopefully Afghan women will also not make demands for things that are against the principles of Islam.”
Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors and regional countries also have urged Taliban authorities to ease their restrictions on women before they could consider opening formal ties with Kabul.
“[An] inclusive ethnopolitical government should be the first step toward this. We make no secret of this, and we say so outright to our Afghan partners,” Zamir Kabulov, Russian special envoy for Afghanistan, said earlier this week, when asked whether Moscow was close to giving the Taliban legitimacy.
Additionally, scholars in many Islamic countries have disapproved of the Taliban’s ban on female education and other policies limiting women’s access to public life.
Al-Qaida presence
Mujahid claimed neither al-Qaida nor any of its members are present in the country, saying they all left Afghanistan for their native countries after the October 2001 U.S.-led military invasion.
Washington blames leaders of the terrorist network for plotting the September 11, 2001, attacks on America from the then-Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.
At the time, only three countries — Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — had recognized the Taliban. During their rule from 1996-2001, the group had completely banned women from public life and girls from receiving an education, leading to Afghanistan’s diplomatic isolation.
Mujahid reiterated Kabul’s resolve that it will not allow anyone to threaten the U.S. and its allies by using Afghan soil. “We are ready for this, but only if further steps are taken to build mutual trust and strengthen political ties.”
A United Nations report said last month the Taliban continued to maintain close ties with al-Qaida, pointing to the reported presence of the network’s “core leadership” in eastern Afghanistan, including its leader, Ayman al-Zawahri.
The report noted, however, that neither al-Qaida nor the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) “is believed to be capable of mounting international attacks before 2023 at the earliest, regardless of their intent or of whether the Taliban acts to restrain them.”
President Joe Biden’s assassination of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan was illegal under both U.S. and international law. After the CIA drone strike killed Zawahiri on August 2, Biden declared, “People around the world no longer need to fear the vicious and determined killer.” What we should fear instead is the dangerous precedent set by Biden’s unlawful extrajudicial execution.
In addition to being illegal, the killing of Zawahiri also occurred in a moment when the United Nations had already determined that people in the U.S. had little to fear from him. As a United Nations report released in July concluded, “Al Qaeda is not viewed as posing an immediate international threat from its safe haven in Afghanistan because it lacks an external operational capability and does not currently wish to cause the Taliban international difficulty or embarrassment.”
Just as former president Barack Obama stated that “Justice has been done” after he assassinated Osama bin Laden, Biden said, “Now justice has been delivered” when he announced the assassination of Zawahiri.
Retaliation, however, does not constitute justice.
Targeted, or political, assassinations are extrajudicial executions. They are deliberate and unlawful killings meted out by order of, or with acquiescence of, a government. Extrajudicial executions are implemented outside a judicial framework.
The fact that Zawahiri did not pose an imminent threat is precisely why his assassination was illegal.
Zawahiri’s Assassination Violated International Law
Extrajudicial executions are prohibited by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the United States has ratified, making it part of U.S. law under the Constitution’s supremacy clause. Article 6 of the ICCPR states, “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” In its interpretation of Article 6, The UN Human Rights Committee opined that all human beings are entitled to the protection of the right to life “without distinction of any kind, including for persons suspected or convicted of even the most serious crimes.”
“Outside the context of active hostilities, the use of drones or other means for targeted killing is almost never likely to be legal,” tweeted Agnès Callamard, UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. “Intentionally lethal or potentially lethal force can only be used where strictly necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life.” In order to be lawful, the United States would need to demonstrate that the target “constituted an imminent threat to others,” Callamard said.
Moreover, willful killing is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, punishable as a war crime under the U.S. War Crimes Act. A targeted killing is lawful only when deemed necessary to protect life, and no other means (including apprehension or nonlethal incapacitation) is available to protect life.
Zawahiri’s Assassination Violated U.S. Law
The drone strike that killed Zawahiri also violated the War Powers Resolution, which lists three situations in which the president can introduce U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities:
First, pursuant to a congressional declaration of war, which has not occurred since World War II. Second, in “a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” (Zawahiri’s presence in Afghanistan more than 20 years after the September 11, 2001, attacks did not constitute a “national emergency.”) Third, when there is “specific statutory authorization,” such as an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).
In 2001, Congress adopted an AUMF that authorized the president to use military force against individuals, groups and countries that had contributed to the 9/11 attacks “in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”
Zawahiri was one of a small circle of people widely believed to have planned the 2001 hijacking of four airplanes, three of which were flown into the Pentagon and World Trade Center buildings. But since he did not pose “an immediate international threat” before the U.S. targeted him for assassination, he should have been arrested and brought to justice in accordance with the law.
In spite of the Biden administration’s claim that no civilians were killed during the strike on Zawahiri, there has been no independent evidence to support that assertion.
The assassination of Zawahiri came nearly a year after Biden launched an illegal strike as he withdrew U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Ten civilians were killed in that attack. The U.S. Central Command admitted the strike was “a tragic mistake” after an extensive New York Times investigation put a lie to the prior U.S. declaration that it was a “righteous strike.”
Biden declared that although he was withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan, he would mount “over-the-horizon” attacks from outside the country even without troops on the ground. We can expect the Biden administration to conduct future illegal drone strikes that kill civilians.
The 2001 AUMF has been used to justify U.S. military actions in 85 countries. Congress must repeal it and replace it with a new AUMF specifically requiring that any use of force comply with U.S. obligations under international law.
In addition, Congress should revisit the War Powers Resolution and explicitly limit the president’s authority to use force to that which is necessary to repel a sudden or imminent attack.
Finally, the United States must end its “global war on terror” once and for all. Drone strikes terrorize and kill countless civilians and make us more vulnerable to terrorism.
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BBC
AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI: HOW US STRIKE COULD
KILL AL QAEDA LEADER-BUT NOT HIS FAMILY
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-62400923
Just over an hour after sunrise on 31 July, long-time al-Qaeda boss Ayman al-Zawahiri walked out onto the balcony of a downtown Kabul compound – reportedly a favourite post-prayer activity of the veteran Egyptian jihadist.
It would be the last thing he would do.
At 06:18 local time (01:38 GMT), two missiles slammed into the balcony, killing the 71-year-old but leaving his wife and daughter unscathed inside. All the damage from the strike appears to be centred on the balcony.
But in this case, here’s how the type of missile, and a close study of Zawahiri’s habits, made it happen – and why more strikes could follow.
Laser accuracy
The type of missile used was key – and these were said by US officials to be drone-fired Hellfires – a type of air-to-surface missile that has become a fixture of US counter-terrorism operations overseas in the decades since the 11 September 2001 attacks.
The missile can be fired from a variety of platforms, including helicopters, ground vehicles, ships and fixed wing aircraft – or, in Zawahiri’s case, from an unmanned drone.
The US is believed to have used Hellfires to kill Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad in early 2020, and the British-born Islamic State jihadist known as “Jihadi John” in Syria in 2015.
Among the main reasons for the Hellfire’s repeated use is its precision.
When a missile is launched from a drone, a weapons operator – sometimes sitting in an air-conditioned control room as far away as the continental US – sees a live video stream of the target, which the drone’s camera sensors feed back via satellite.
Using a set of “targeting brackets” on the screen, the camera operator is then able to “lock up” the target and point a laser at it. Once the missile is fired, it follows the path of that laser until striking the target.
There are clear, sequential procedures the crew operating the drone must follow before taking action, to minimise the risk of civilian casualties. In past US military or CIA strikes, this has included calling on military lawyers for consultations before the order to fire is given.
Professor William Banks, an expert on targeted killings and the founder of the Syracuse University Institute for Security Policy and Law, said that officials would have had to balance the risk of civilian deaths with the value of the target.
The Zawahiri strike, he added, “sounds like a model application” of the process.
“It sounds like they were very careful and deliberate in this instance to find him in a location and at a time when they could hit just him and not harm any other person,” Prof Banks said.
In the case of the Zawahiri strike, it has been suggested, but not confirmed, that the US also used a relatively unknown version of the Hellfire – the R9X – which deploys six blades to slice through targets using its kinetic energy.
In 2017, another al-Qaeda leader and one of Zawahiri’s deputies, Abu Khayr al-Masri, was reportedly killed with an R9X Hellfire in Syria. Photos of his vehicle taken after the strike showed that the missile had cut a hole in the roof and shredded its occupants, but without signs of an explosion or any further destruction to the vehicle.
US tracked Zawahiri’s ‘balcony habit’
Details are still emerging about what intelligence the US gathered before launching the Kabul strike.
In the aftermath of the attack, however, US officials said they had enough information to understand Zawahiri’s “pattern of life” at the house – such as his balcony habit.
This suggests US spies had been watching the house for weeks, if not months.
Marc Polymeropoulos, a former senior official at the CIA, told the BBC that it is likely that a variety of intelligence methods were used before the strike, including spies on the ground and signals intelligence.
Some have also speculated that US drones or aircraft took turns monitoring the location for weeks or months, unheard and unseen from the ground below.
“You need something that’s near certainty that it is the individual, and it also has to be done in a collateral free environment, meaning no civilian casualties,” he said. “It takes a lot of patience.”
The Zawahiri strike, Mr Polymeropoulos added, benefited from the US intelligence community’s decades of experience tracking down individual al-Qaeda figures and other terrorist targets.
“We are outstanding at this. It’s something that the US government has gotten very good at over 20 years,” he said. “And Americans are far safer for it.”
However, US operations of this kind do not always go according to plan. On 29 August 2021, a drone strike on a car just north of Kabul airport, intended to target a local branch of the Islamic State group, killed 10 innocent people instead. The Pentagon acknowledged that a “tragic mistake” had been made.
Bill Roggio, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies who has been tracking US drone strikes for many years, said that the Zawahiri strike was likely “much more difficult” than previous killings to execute, given the absence of any US government presence or assets nearby.
Past drone strikes against nearby Pakistan, for example, were flown from Afghanistan, while strikes against Syria would have been conducted from friendly territory in Iraq.
“[In those places] it was far easier for the US to reach those areas. It had assets on the ground. This was far more complicated,” he said. “This is the first strike against al-Qaeda or the Islamic State in Afghanistan since the US left. This isn’t a common occurrence.”
Could this happen again?
Mr Roggio said he “wouldn’t be surprised” if similar strikes against al-Qaeda targets take place in Afghanistan again.
“There is no dearth of targets,” he said. “The potential next leaders [of al-Qaeda] will very likely be moving to Afghanistan, if they’re not there already.”
“The question is if the US still has the ability to do this with ease, or is it going to be a difficult process?” he added.
EINDE ARTIKEL BBC
Reacties uitgeschakeld voor Noten 30 t/m 33/Kritiek op twee Volkskrant artikelen
A new intelligence assessment of the Al Qaeda threat was prepared after a drone strike killed Ayman al-Zawahri, the group’s leader. But some outside counterterrorism specialists said it was overly optimistic.
WASHINGTON — American spy agencies have concluded in a new intelligence assessment that Al Qaeda has not reconstituted its presence in Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal last August and that only a handful of longtime Qaeda members remain in the country.
The terror group does not have the ability to launch attacks from the country against the United States, the assessment said. Instead, it said, Al Qaeda will rely on, at least for now, an array of loyal affiliates outside the region to carry out potential terrorist plots against the West.
But several counterterrorism analysts said the spy agencies’ judgments represented an optimistic snapshot of a complex and fast-moving terrorist landscape. The assessment, a declassified summary of which was provided to The New York Times, represents the consensus views of the U.S. intelligence agencies.
“The assessment is substantially accurate, but it’s also the most positive outlook on a threat picture that is still quite fluid,” said Edmund Fitton-Brown, a former top U.N. counterterrorism official.
The assessment was prepared after Ayman al-Zawahri, Al Qaeda’s top leader, was killed in a C.I.A. drone strike in Kabul last month. The death of al-Zawahri, one of the world’s most wanted terrorist leaders, after a decades-long manhunt was a major victory for President Biden, but it raised immediate questions about al-Zawahri’s presence in Afghanistan a year after Mr. Biden withdrew all American forces, clearing the way for the Taliban to regain control of the country.
Republicans have said that the president’s pullout has endangered the United States. The fact the Qaeda leader felt safe enough to return to the Afghan capital, they argue, was a sign of a failed policy that they predicted would allow Al Qaeda to rebuild training camps and plot attacks despite the Taliban’s pledge to deny the group a safe haven. Last October, a top Pentagon official said Al Qaeda could be able to regroup in Afghanistan and attack the United States in one to two years.
Administration officials have pushed back on the most recent criticisms, noting a pledge Mr. Biden made when he announced al-Zawahri’s death.
“As President Biden has said, we will continue to remain vigilant, along with our partners, to defend our nation and ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorism,” Adrienne Watson, a spokeswoman for the White House’s National Security Council, said in an email on Saturday.
Yet some outside counterterrorism specialists saw the new intelligence assessment as overly hopeful.
A U.N. report warned this spring that Al Qaeda had found “increased freedom of action” in Afghanistan since the Taliban seized power. The report noted that a number of Qaeda leaders were possibly living in Kabul and that the uptick in public statements by al-Zawahri suggested that he was able to lead more effectively after the Taliban seized power.
This seems like an overly rosy assessment to the point of being slightly myopic,” Colin P. Clarke, a counterterrorism analyst at the Soufan Group, a security consulting firm based in New York, said of the intelligence analysis. He added that the summary said “little about the longer-term prospects of Al Qaeda.”
Al-Zawahri’s death has once again cast a spotlight on Al Qaeda, which after Osama bin Laden’s death in 2011 has largely been overshadowed by an upstart rival, the Islamic State. Many terrorism analysts said Saif al-Adel, a senior Qaeda leader wanted by the F.B.I. in the bombings of two United States embassies in East Africa in 1998, was likely to succeed al-Zawahri. He is believed to be living in Iran.
“Basically, I find the I.C. assessment convincing,” said Daniel Byman, a professor at Georgetown University, referring to the U.S. intelligence community and its new analysis of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Mr. Byman has in the past voiced skepticism about a resurgent Qaeda threat.
But other counterterrorism experts disagreed. One point of dispute involved claims in the intelligence summary that Al Qaeda had not reconstituted its threat network in Afghanistan and that al-Zawahri was the only major figure who sought to reestablish Al Qaeda’s presence in the country when he and his family settled in Kabul this year.
“Zawahri was THE leader of Al Qaeda, so his being protected by the Taliban while he provided more active guidance to the group was in of itself reconstitution,” Asfandyar Mir, a senior expert at the United States Institute of Peace, wrote in an email.
“This approach fails to account for the group Al Qaeda is today and the fact that even a small number of core leaders can leverage Afghanistan to politically direct the group’s affiliate network,” Mr. Mir wrote. “Al Qaeda doesn’t need large training camps to be dangerous.”
Some counterterrorism experts also took issue with the government analysts’ judgment that fewer than a dozen Qaeda members with longtime ties to the group are in Afghanistan, and that most of those members were likely there before the fall of the Afghan government last summer.
“Their numbers of active, hard-core Al Qaeda in AfPak make no sense,” said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, referring to Afghanistan and Pakistan. “At least three dozen senior Qaeda commanders were freed from Afghan jails a year ago. I very much doubt they have turned to farming or accounting as their post-prison vocations.”
Mr. Hoffman said that Qaeda operatives or their affiliates had been given important administrative responsibilities in at least eight Afghan provinces. He suggested the timing of the government assessment was “to deflect attention from the disastrous consequences of last year’s shambolic withdrawal from Afghanistan.”
The intelligence summary also said that members of the Qaeda affiliate in Afghanistan, formerly known as Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, or AQIS, were largely inactive and focused mainly on activities like media production.
But a U.N. report in July estimated that the Qaeda affiliate had between 180 to 400 fighters — “primarily from Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Pakistan” — who were in several Taliban combat units.
“We know from a range of sources that AQIS participated in the Taliban’s insurgency against the U.S. as well as operations against ISIS-K,” Mr. Mir said, referring to the Islamic State’s branch in Afghanistan, a bitter rival of Al Qaeda.
There was broad agreement on at least two main points in the intelligence summary, including that Al Qaeda does not yet have the ability to attack the United States or American interests aboard from Afghan soil.
The U.N. report in July concurred with that judgment, explaining that Al Qaeda “is not viewed as posing an immediate international threat from its safe haven in Afghanistan because it lacks an external operational capability and does not currently wish to cause the Taliban international difficulty or embarrassment.”
And government analysts as well as outside terrorism experts agreed that Al Qaeda in Afghanistan would, in the short term, most likely call upon a range of affiliates outside the region to carry out plots.
None of these affiliates pose the same kind of threat to the American homeland that Al Qaeda did on Sept. 11, 2001. But they are deadly and resilient. The Qaeda affiliate in East Africa killed three Americans at a U.S. base in Kenya in 2020. A Saudi Air Force officer training in Florida killed three sailors and wounded eight other people in 2019. The officer acted on his own but was in contact with the Qaeda branch in Yemen as he completed his attack plans.
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“Al Qaeda is not viewed as posing an immediate international threat from its safe haven in Afghanistan because it lacks an external operational capability and does not currently wish to cause the Taliban international difficulty or embarrassment,” the U.N. report concluded.”
THE NEW YORK TIMES
AL-ZAWAHIRI’S DEATH PUTS THE FOCUS BACK ON AL-QAEDA
The terrorist network has lost eight of its top leaders in recent years. But it has more total fighters than it did on Sept. 11, 2001.
WASHINGTON — No terrorist group, not even the Islamic State, has had the notoriety and immediate name recognition of Al Qaeda.
But the killing of the group’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, in a C.I.A. drone strike early Sunday marks a pivotal inflection point for the global organization. Eight of its top leaders have been killed in the past three years, and it is unclear who will succeed al-Zawahri.
Yet Al Qaeda is in more countries and has more total fighters than it did on Sept. 11, 2001, when it attacked the United States. Some of its franchises that have sprung up since then, particularly in Somalia and the Sahel region of West Africa, are ascendant, seizing
swaths of territory from weak governments and spending millions of dollars on new weapons, despite a decade’s effort to weaken and contain them.
None of these affiliates pose the same kind of threat to the American homeland that Al Qaeda did on Sept. 11. But they are deadly and resilient. The Qaeda affiliate in East Africa killed three Americans at a U.S. base in Kenya in 2020. A Saudi officer training in Florida killed three sailors and wounded eight other people in 2019. The officer acted on his own but was in contact with the Qaeda branch in Yemen as he completed his attack plans.
And as al-Zawahri’s presence in Kabul suggests, Al Qaeda and its leaders feel confident moving around Afghanistan, now that the Taliban are back in control of the country, counterterrorism officials said.
“The question isn’t what this does to Al Qaeda, but what does this do to the witches’ brew of terrorists in Afghanistan?” said Brian Katulis, the vice president for policy at the Middle East Institute.
Al Qaeda is not the only global terrorist network in transition. A risky predawn raid in northwest Syria in early February by U.S. Special Operations forces resulted in the death of the Islamic State’s overall leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi. ISIS fighters have reverted to a guerrilla war since the last remnant of its caliphate, or religious state, in Syria was seized by U.S.-backed Syrian Kurds in 2019.
But al-Zawahri’s death puts the focus back on Al Qaeda, which had largely been overshadowed by its upstart Islamic State rival, also known as ISIL, after Osama bin Laden’s death in 2011. Many terrorism analysts said Saif al-Adel, a senior Qaeda leader wanted by the F.B.I. in the bombings of two United States embassies in East Africa in 1998, was likely to succeed al-Zawahri. He is believed to be living in Iran.
“The international context is favorable to Al Qaeda, which intends to be recognized again as the leader of global jihad,” a U.N. report concluded in July. “Al Qaeda propaganda is now better developed to compete with ISIL as the key actor in inspiring the international threat environment, and it may ultimately become a greater source of directed threat.”
Afghanistan
No country is under greater U.S. scrutiny for a comeback by Al Qaeda than Afghanistan. In announcing al-Zawahri’s death on Monday, President Biden said the strike would help ensure that Afghanistan could no longer “become a terrorist safe haven” or a “launching pad” for attacks against the United States.
But the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country last August put pressure on the military and spy agencies to watch for a Qaeda resurgence with only limited informant networks on the ground and drones flying from the Persian Gulf on “over the horizon” surveillance missions.
This spring, another U.N. report cautioned that Al Qaeda had found “increased freedom of action” in Afghanistan since the Taliban seized power. The report noted that a number of Qaeda leaders were possibly living in Kabul and that an increase in public statements and videos by al-Zawahri suggested that he was able to lead more effectively and more openly after the Taliban took control.
But the intelligence shared by U.N. member nations in the July report indicated that Al Qaeda did not pose the same immediate threat as the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan.
“Al Qaeda is not viewed as posing an immediate international threat from its safe haven in Afghanistan because it lacks an external operational capability and does not currently wish to cause the Taliban international difficulty or embarrassment,” the U.N. report concluded.
Somalia
The wealthiest and most lethal Qaeda affiliate today is Al Shabab, the franchise in Somalia and the rest of East Africa, military and counterterrorism officials said.
According to the most recent U.N. report, Al Shabab currently has 7,000 to 12,000 fighters and is spending approximately $24 million a year — a quarter of its budget — on weapons and explosives, and increasingly on drones.
And the threat is getting worse. “It is my judgment that due to a lack of effective governance and counterterrorism pressure, Al Shabab has only grown stronger and bolder over the past year,” Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, the head of the Pentagon’s Africa Command, told the Senate in March.
In the latest sign of trouble, almost 500 Shabab fighters crossed into eastern Ethiopia last month and clashed with Ethiopian forces along the border, General Townsend said.
In May, Mr. Biden signed an order authorizing the Pentagon to redeploy hundreds of Special Operations forces inside Somalia — largely reversing a decision by President Donald J. Trump to withdraw nearly all 700 ground troops who had been stationed there.
In addition, Mr. Biden approved a Pentagon request for standing authority to target about a dozen suspected leaders of Al Shabab. Since Mr. Biden took office, airstrikes in Somalia have largely been limited to those meant to defend partner forces facing an immediate threat.
Together, the decisions by Mr. Biden resurrected an open-ended American counterterrorism operation that amounted to a low-grade war through three administrations.
Military officials said the total number of U.S. troops having a “persistent presence” in Somalia would be capped at around 450. That will replace a system in which U.S. troops trained and advised Somali and African Union forces during short visits.
The Biden administration’s strategy in Somalia is to try to reduce the threat from Al Shabab by suppressing its ability to plot and carry out complicated operations, such as the attack on a U.S. air base at Manda Bay, Kenya, in January 2020 that killed three Americans.
West Africa
In the Sahel, the vast arid region south of the Sahara, militants from both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have been fighting local governments in countries like Mali and Burkina Faso for years.
Despite the arrival of French troops and a U.N. peacekeeping force, militants spread across Mali and then to neighboring nations. In Burkina Faso, to the south, nearly two million people have been displaced by the conflict.
Countries on the Gulf of Guinea, like Benin and Ivory Coast, have also suffered sporadic attacks as the violence seeps south. The Qaeda affiliate, known as JNIM, trains recruits in Burkina Faso before redeploying them “to their countries of origin,” the July U.N. report said.
Syria
The most serious terrorism concerns in Syria focus on the thousands of Islamic State fighters in the country’s northeast.
American counterterrorism officials have voiced alarm in recent years about a Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Hurras al-Din, that they say is plotting attacks against the West by exploiting the chaotic security situation in the country’s northwest and the protection inadvertently afforded by Russian air defenses shielding Syrian government forces.
But recent U.S. airstrikes, such as one in June in Idlib Province that the military said killed Abu Hamzah al Yemeni, one of the group’s senior leaders, have eased some of the worries.
Yemen
For more than a decade, Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen was one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations on the planet. The group spent years inventing explosives that were difficult to detect, including trying to disguise bombs in devices like cellphones. It has tried at least three times to blow up American airliners, without success.
But several of the group’s leaders have been killed in recent years, damaging its ability to orchestrate or carry out operations against the West, American and European counterterrorism specialists say.
Clashes with rival Islamic State and Houthi rebel fighters in Yemen have also weakened the group, whose full name is Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP. Even though the group has been diminished, intelligence and counterterrorism officials warn that the organization remains dangerous.
Reacties uitgeschakeld voor Noten 27 en 28/Kritiek op twee Volkskrant artikelen
”You know, al-Zawahiri was bin Laden’s leader. He was with him all the — the whole time. He was his number-two man, his deputy at the time of the terrorist attack of 9/11. He was deeply involved in the planning of 9/11, one of the most responsible for the attacks that murdered 2,977 people on American soil. For decades, he was a mastermind behind attacks against Americans, including the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, which killed 17 American sailors and wounded dozens more.
He played a key role — a key role in the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 and wounding over 4,500 others.
He carved a trail of murder and violence against American citizens, American service members, American diplomats, and American interests. And since the United States delivered justice to bin Laden 11 years ago, Zawahiri has been a leader of al Qaeda — the leader. ”
THE WHITE HOUSE
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT BIDEN ON A SUCCESFUL COUNTERTERRORISM
”It is important to distinguish between reprisals, acts of revenge, and retaliation. Acts of revenge are never authorized under international law, while retaliation and reprisals are foreseen by humanitarian law.”
Reprisals are measures of pressure that derogate from the normal rules of international law: they are carried out by a State in response to unlawful acts committed against it by another State and are intended to force that State to respect the law. Reprisals may also be carried out in response to an attack. The question of the legality of reprisals has been in debate since conventional (positive) international law—which includes the UN Charter—posited that States are prohibited from using force, except in case of individual or collective self-defense (Art. 51 of the UN Charter).
In times of conflict, reprisals are considered legal under certain conditions: they must be carried out in response to a previous attack, they must be proportionate to that attack, and they must be aimed only at combatants and military objectives.
Humanitarian law hence forbids all reprisals against civilian persons and objects protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols. These include wounded, sick, or shipwrecked persons; medical or religious personnel, units, transports, or material; prisoners of war; civilian persons or civilian objects; cultural property or places of worship; objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population; the natural environment; works and installations containing dangerous forces; and buildings and material used for the protection of the civilian population (GCI Art. 46; GCII Art. 47; GCIII Art. 13; GCIV Art. 33; API Arts. 20 and 51–56).
It is important to distinguish between reprisals, acts of revenge, and retaliation. Acts of revenge are never authorized under international law, while retaliation and reprisals are foreseen by humanitarian law.
Measures of retaliation are acts by which a State responds to unfriendly, but lawful, acts by another State (for instance, reciprocal expulsion of diplomats).
Reprisals must always be proportionate to the attacks to which they are responding and must never aim at civilians or protected objects. If these conditions are not respected, then it is an act of revenge.
Conditions of Reprisals under Customary IHL
Under customary international humanitarian law, the use of reprisals is subjected to strict conditions. Those conditions are provided for in the study on the rules of customary international humanitarian law published by the ICRC in 2005.
Rule 145: Where not prohibited by international law, belligerent reprisals are subject to stringent conditions in international armed conflicts.
Rule 146: Belligerent reprisals against persons protected by the Geneva Conventions are prohibited in international armed conflicts.
Rule 147: Reprisals against objects protected under the Geneva Conventions and Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property are prohibited in international armed conflicts.
Rule 148: Parties to non-international armed conflicts do not have the right to resort to belligerent reprisals. Other countermeasures against persons who do not or who have ceased to take a direct part in hostilities are prohibited.
In case of reprisals, military commanders have the duty to implement the precautionary measures foreseen by international law with regard to methods of warfare. Humanitarian law specifies the individual responsibility of each member of the armed forces with regard to such actions.
The ICTY considered that customary international law prohibits reprisals against civilian population and goods (ICTY Trial Chamber, Martic Case , 8 March 1996, paras. 15–17). This is due to the fact that humanitarian law is a law that protects individuals—as human beings—rather than States. Therefore, violations of humanitarian law by a party may not justify in return reprisals against a civilian population (ICTY Trial Chamber, Kupreskic Case , 17 January 2000, paras. 527–36).
For Additional Information: Kalshoven, Frits. Belligerent Reprisals . Leiden: Martinus Nijioff, 2005.
Nahlik, Stanislaw-Edward. “From Reprisals to Individual Penal Responsibility.” In Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead; Essays in Honor of Frits Kalshoven , edited by Astrid J. M. Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja, 165–76. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991.
Obradovic, Konstantion. “Prohibition of Reprisals in Protocol I: Greater Protection for War Victims.” International Review of the Red Cross 320 (September–October 1997): 524–28.
[26]
”“Outside the context of active hostilities, the use of drones or other means for targeted killing is almost never likely to be legal,” tweeted Agnès Callamard, UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.”
#Iraq: The targeted killings of Qasem Soleiman and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis are most lokely unlawful and violate international human rights law: Outside the context of active hostilities, the use of drones or other means for targeted killing is almost never likely to be legal (1)
#Iraq: The targeted killings of Qasem Soleiman and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis are most lokely unlawful and violate international human rights law: Outside the context of active hostilities, the use of drones or other means for targeted killing is almost never likely to be legal (1)
Reacties uitgeschakeld voor Noten 24 t/m 26/Kritiek op twee Volkskrant artikelen
Our hypocrisy on war crimes makes a rules-based world, one that abides by international law, impossible.
The branding of Vladimir Putin as a war criminal by Joe Biden, who lobbied for the Iraq war and staunchly supported the 20 years of carnage in the Middle East, is one more example of the hypocritical moral posturing sweeping across the United States. It is unclear how anyone would try Putin for war crimes since Russia, like the United States, does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. But justice is not the point. Politicians like Biden, who do not accept responsibility for our well-documented war crimes, bolster their moral credentials by demonizing their adversaries. They know the chance of Putin facing justice is zero. And they know their chance of facing justice is the same.
We know who our most recent war criminals are, among others: George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, General Ricardo Sanchez, former CIA Director George Tenet, former Asst. Atty. Gen. Jay Bybee, former Dep. Asst. Atty. Gen. John Yoo, who set up the legal framework to authorize torture; the helicopter pilots who gunned down civilians, including two Reuters journalists, in the “Collateral Murder” video released by WikiLeaks. We have evidence of the crimes they committed.
But, like Putin’s Russia, those who expose these crimes are silenced and persecuted. Julian Assange, even though he is not a US citizen and his WikiLeaks site is not a US-based publication, is charged under the US Espionage Act for making public numerous US war crimes. Assange, currently housed in a high security prison in London, is fighting a losing battle in the British courts to block his extradition to the United States, where he faces 175 years in prison. One set of rules for Russia, another set of rules for the United States. Weeping crocodile tears for the Russian media, which is being heavily censored by Putin, while ignoring the plight of the most important publisher of our generation speaks volumes about how much the ruling class cares about press freedom and truth.
If we demand justice for Ukrainians, as we should, we must also demand justice for the one million people killed—400,000 of whom were noncombatants—by our invasions, occupations and aerial assaults in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan. We must demand justice for those who were wounded, became sick or died because we destroyed hospitals and infrastructure. We must demand justice for the thousands of soldiers and marines who were killed, and many more who were wounded and are living with lifelong disabilities, in wars launched and sustained on lies. We must demand justice for the 38 million people who have been displaced or become refugees in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, the Philippines, Libya, and Syria, a number that exceeds the total of all those displaced in all wars since 1900, apart from World War II, according to the Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs at Brown University. Tens of millions of people, who had no connection with the attacks of 9/11, were killed, wounded, lost their homes, and saw their lives and their families destroyed because of our war crimes. Who will cry out for them?
Every effort to hold our war criminals accountable has been rebuffed by Congress, by the courts, by the media and by the two ruling political parties. The Center for Constitutional Rights, blocked from bringing cases in US courts against the architects of these preemptive wars, which are defined by post-Nuremberg laws as “criminal wars of aggression,” filed motions in German courts to hold US leaders to account for gross violations of the Geneva Convention, including the sanctioning of torture in black sites such as Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib.
Those who have the power to enforce the rule of law, to hold our war criminals to account, to atone for our war crimes, direct their moral outrage exclusively at Putin’s Russia. “Intentionally targeting civilians is a war crime,” Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said, condemning Russia for attacking civilian sites, including a hospital, three schools and a boarding school for visually impaired children in the Luhansk region of Ukraine. “These incidents join a long list of attacks on civilian, not military locations, across Ukraine,” he said. Beth Van Schaack, an ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice, will direct the effort at the State Department, Blinken said, to “help international efforts to investigate war crimes and hold those responsible accountable.”
This collective hypocrisy, based on the lies we tell ourselves about ourselves, is accompanied by massive arms shipments to Ukraine. Fueling proxy wars was a specialty of the Cold War. We have returned to the script. If Ukrainians are heroic resistance fighters, what about Iraqis and Afghans, who fought as valiantly and as doggedly against a foreign power that was every bit as savage as Russia? Why weren’t they lionized? Why weren’t sanctions imposed on the United States? Why weren’t those who defended their countries from foreign invasion in the Middle East, including Palestinians under Israeli occupation, also provided with thousands of anti-tank weapons, anti-armor weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, helicopters, Switchblade or “Kamikaze” drones, hundreds of Stinger anti-aircraft systems, Javelin anti-tank missiles, machine guns and millions of rounds of ammunition? Why didn’t Congress rush through a $13.6 billion package to provide military and humanitarian assistance, on top of the $1.2 billion already provided to the Ukrainian military, for them?
Well, we know why. Our war crimes don’t count, and neither do the victims of our war crimes. And this hypocrisy makes a rules-based world, one that abides by international law, impossible.
This hypocrisy is not new. There is no moral difference between the saturation bombing the US carried out on civilian populations since World War II, including in Vietnam and Iraq, and the targeting of urban centers by Russia in Ukraine or the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. Mass death and fireballs on a city skyline are the calling cards we have left across the globe for decades. Our adversaries do the same.
The deliberate targeting of civilians, whether in Baghdad, Kyiv, Gaza, or New York City, are all war crimes. The killing of at least 112 Ukrainian children, as of March 19, is an atrocity, but so is the killing of 551 Palestinian children during Israel’s 2014 military assault on Gaza. So is the killing of 230,000 people over the past seven years in Yemen from Saudi bombing campaigns and blockades that have resulted in mass starvation and cholera epidemics. Where were the calls for a no-fly zone over Gaza and Yemen? Imagine how many lives could have been saved.
War crimes demand the same moral judgment and accountability. But they don’t get them. And they don’t get them because we have one set of standards for white Europeans, and another for non-white people around the globe. The western media has turned European and American volunteers flocking to fight in Ukraine into heroes, while Muslims in the west who join resistance groups battling foreign occupiers in the Middle East are criminalized as terrorists. Putin has been ruthless with the press. But so has our ally the de facto Saudi ruler Mohammed bin Salman, who ordered the murder and dismemberment of my friend and colleague Jamal Khashoggi, and who this month oversaw a mass execution of 81 people convicted of criminal offenses. The coverage of Ukraine, especially after spending seven years reporting on Israel’s murderous assaults against the Palestinians, is another example of the racist divide that defines most of the western media.
World War II began with an understanding, at least by the allies, that employing industrial weapons against civilian populations was a war crime. But within 18 months of the start of the war, the Germans, Americans and British were relentlessly bombing cities. By the end of the war, one-fifth of German homes had been destroyed. One million German civilians were killed or wounded in bombing raids. Seven-and-a-half million Germans were made homeless. The tactic of saturation bombing, or area bombing, which included the firebombing of Dresden, Hamburg and Tokyo, which killed more than 90,000 Japanese civilians in Tokyo and left a million people homeless, and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which took the lives of between 129,000 and 226,000 people, most of whom were civilians, had the sole purpose of breaking the morale of the population through mass death and terror. Cities such as Leningrad, Stalingrad, Warsaw, Coventry, Royan, Nanjing and Rotterdam were obliterated.
It turned the architects of modern war, all of them, into war criminals.
Civilians in every war since have been considered legitimate targets. In the summer of 1965, then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara called the bombing raids north of Saigon that left hundreds of thousands of dead an effective means of communication with the government in Hanoi. McNamara, six years before he died, unlike most war criminals, had the capacity for self-reflection. Interviewed in the documentary, “The Fog of War,” he was repentant, not only about targeting Vietnamese civilians but about the aerial targeting of civilians in Japan in World War II, overseen by Air Force General Curtis LeMay.
“LeMay said if we’d lost the war, we’d all have been prosecuted as war criminals,” McNamara said in the film. “And I think he’s right…LeMay recognized that what he was doing would be thought immoral if his side had lost. But what makes it immoral if you lose, and not immoral if you win?”
LeMay, later head of the Strategic Air Command during the Korean War, would go on to drop tons of napalm and firebombs on civilian targets in Korea which, by his own estimate, killed 20 percent of the population over a three-year period.
Industrial killing defines modern warfare. It is impersonal mass slaughter. It is administered by vast bureaucratic structures that perpetuate the killing over months and years. It is sustained by heavy industry that produces a steady flow of weapons, munitions, tanks, planes, helicopters, battleships, submarines, missiles, and mass-produced supplies, along with mechanized transports that ferry troops and armaments by rail, ship, cargo planes and trucks to the battlefield. It mobilizes industrial, governmental and organization structures for total war. It centralizes systems of information and internal control. It is rationalized for the public by specialists and experts, drawn from the military establishment, along with pliant academics and the media.
Industrial war destroys existing value systems that protect and nurture life, replacing them with fear, hatred, and a dehumanization of those who we are made to believe deserve to be exterminated. It is driven by emotions, not truth or fact. It obliterates nuance, replacing it with an infantile binary universe of us and them. It drives competing narratives, ideas and values underground and vilifies all who do not speak in the national cant that replaces civil discourse and debate. It is touted as an example of the inevitable march of human progress, when in fact it brings us closer and closer to mass obliteration in a nuclear holocaust. It mocks the concept of individual heroism, despite the feverish efforts of the military and the mass media to sell this myth to naïve young recruits and a gullible public. It is the Frankenstein of industrialized societies. War, as Alfred Kazin warned, is “the ultimate purpose of technological society.” Our real enemy is within.
Historically, those who are prosecuted for war crimes, whether the Nazi hierarchy at Nuremberg or the leaders of Liberia, Chad, Serbia, and Bosnia, are prosecuted because they lost the war and because they are adversaries of the United States.
There will be no prosecution of Saudi Arabian rulers for the war crimes committed in Yemen or for the US military and political leadership for the war crimes they carried out in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya, or a generation earlier in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The atrocities we commit, such as My Lai, where 500 unarmed Vietnamese civilians were gunned down by US soldiers, which are made public, are dealt with by finding a scapegoat, usually a low-ranking officer who is given a symbolic sentence. Lt. William Calley served three years under house arrest for the killings at My Lai. Eleven US soldiers, none of whom were officers, were convicted of torture at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. But the architects and overlords of our industrial slaughter, including Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Gen. Curtis LeMay, Harry S. Truman, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Lyndon Johnson, Gen. William Westmoreland, George W. Bush, Gen. David Petraeus, Barack Obama and Joe Biden are never held to account. They leave power to become venerated elder statesmen.
The mass slaughter of industrial warfare, the failure to hold ourselves to account, to see our own face in the war criminals we condemn, will have ominous consequences. Author and Holocaust survivor Primo Levi understood that the annihilation of the humanity of others is prerequisite for their physical annihilation. We have become captives to our machines of industrial death. Politicians and generals wield their destructive fury as if they were toys. Those who decry the madness, who demand the rule of law, are attacked and condemned. These industrial weapons systems are our modern idols. We worship their deadly prowess. But all idols, the Bible tells us, begin by demanding the sacrifice of others and end in apocalyptic self-sacrifice.
BBC
AFGHANISTAN WAR: UN SAYS MORE CIVILIANS KILLED BY
ALLIES THAN INSURGENTS
30 JULY 2019
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49165676
Afghan and US forces have killed more civilians in Afghanistan in the first half of 2019 than insurgents did, UN figures show.
The unprecedented figures for January to June come amid a ferocious US air campaign against the Taliban.
Some 717 civilians were killed by Afghan and US forces, compared to 531 by militants, the UN said.
The latest data has been revealed as Washington and the Taliban continue negotiations over US troop withdrawals.
The US military has rejected Unama’s findings, saying its own collection of evidence was more accurate and that its forces in Afghanistan “always work to avoid harm to civilian non-combatants”. But it did not give its own figures for civilian casualties.
It comes after a report by the UN in April, which reached a similar conclusion for the first three months of 2019. The latest data shows that this unprecedented trend is continuing.
What else does this latest report say?
Ground engagements remained the leading cause of civilian casualties overall, accounting for one-third of the total, followed by improvised explosive bombings and aerial operations.
However the UN says that total civilian casualties are down. There were 3,812 deaths and injuries in the first six months of 2019, the lowest total for the first half of a year since 2012.
Despite the decrease in casualties, the toll on civilians remains “shocking and unacceptable,” Unama said. It documented 985 civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) from insurgent attacks that had deliberately targeted civilians from 1 January to 30 June.
“Parties to the conflict may give differing explanations for recent trends, each designed to justify their own military tactics,” said Richard Bennett, Unama’s head of human rights.
“The fact remains that only a determined effort to avoid civilian harm, not just by abiding by international humanitarian law but also by reducing the intensity of the fighting, will decrease the suffering of civilian Afghans,” he added.
What’s the reaction?
Patricia Gossman, associate Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said civilians were paying a “terrible price” as a result of air strikes and night raids that appeared meant to pressure the Taliban in negotiations.
“Although US military officers in Kabul repeatedly claim to take civilian casualties seriously, they do not conduct adequate investigations to determine accurate numbers or understand targeting errors,” she told the BBC, adding that Afghan government investigations were “even worse”.
“The usual claim – that the Taliban hide among civilians – is not an excuse for killing and injuring civilians in such numbers, and in any case is no excuse for what in some cases may amount to war crimes.”
The Afghan government said in a statement that protecting civilians and providing aid to the injured and displaced was a priority.
What is the current situation in Afghanistan?
Fighting continues with daily violence around the country.
The US and the Taliban have been holding peace talks in the Gulf state of Qatar, but the American military is simultaneously carrying out an intense air campaign against the militant group.
The Taliban, who were driven from power by US forces in 2001, are refusing to formally negotiate with the Afghan government until a timetable for the US withdrawal is agreed upon.
On Monday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo revealed that President Donald Trump wants forces in Afghanistan reduced by the 2020 US presidential election.
The existence of an unofficial deadline has deepened fears in Kabul that Washington may rush into a deal with the Taliban in a bid to win over US voters, and ignore any concerns from its Afghan government partners.
EINDE ARTIKEL
BBC
AFGHANISTAN: US ADMITS KABUL DRONE STRIKE
KILLED CIVILIANS
18 SEPTEMBER 2021
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-58604655
The US has admitted that a drone strike in Kabul days before its military pullout killed 10 innocent people.
A US Central Command investigation found that an aid worker and nine members of his family, including seven children, died in the 29 August strike.
The youngest child, Sumaya, was just two years old.
The deadly strike happened days after a terror attack at Kabul airport, amid a frenzied evacuation effort following the Taliban’s sudden return to power.
It was one of the US military’s final acts in Afghanistan, before ending its 20-year operation in the country.
US intelligence had tracked the aid worker’s car for eight hours, believing it was linked to IS-K militants – a local branch of the Islamic State (IS) group, US Central Command Gen Kenneth McKenzie said.
The investigation found the man’s car had been seen at a compound associated with IS-K, and its movements aligned with other intelligence about the terror group’s plans for an attack on Kabul airport.
At one point, a surveillance drone saw men loading what appeared to be explosives into the boot of the car, but these turned out to be containers of water.
Gen McKenzie described the strike as a “tragic mistake”, and added that the Taliban had not been involved in the intelligence that led to the strike.
The strike happened as the aid worker – named as Zamairi Ahmadi – pulled into the driveway of his home, 3km (1.8 miles) from the airport.
The explosion set off a secondary blast, which US officials initially said was proof that the car was indeed carrying explosives. However the investigation has found it was most likely caused by a propane tank in the driveway.
One of those killed, Ahmad Naser, had been a translator with US forces. Other victims had previously worked for international organisations and held visas allowing them entry to the US.
Relatives of the victims told the BBC the day after the strike that they had applied to be evacuated, and had been waiting for a phone call telling them to go to the airport.
In a statement, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said: “We now know that there was no connection between Mr Ahmadi and Isis-Khorasan, that his activities on that day were completely harmless and not at all related to the imminent threat we believed we faced.
“We apologise, and we will endeavour to learn from this horrible mistake.
The horrific consequences of the US military’s miscalculation have drawn questions about the accuracy of future counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan with a US presence no longer on the ground.
This catastrophe exposed the dreadful human cost of a war that inflicted a lot of damage from the air for years.
That it should take place just as the Americans ended their 20-year occupation will cast an even darker stain on the chaotic US exit.
But for some in the region, it is a particularly stark example of the ongoing dangers of drone warfare.
When the US started to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, the Taliban managed to seize control of the country within about two weeks in a lightning-fast offensive.
President Ashraf Ghani fled to the United Arab Emirates, and Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, fell on 15 August.
It sparked a mass evacuation effort from the US and its allies, as thousands of people tried to flee. Many were foreign nationals or Afghans who had worked for foreign governments.
There were scenes of panic and chaos at Kabul airport, and some people fell to their deaths after trying to cling to US military planes as they took off.
The security situation was further heightened after a suicide bomber killed up to 170 civilians and 13 US troops outside the airport on 26 August. IS-K said it had carried out the attack.
Many of those killed had been hoping to board evacuation flights leaving the city.
More than 124,000 foreigners and Afghans were flown out of the country beforehand. But some people were unable to get out in time, and evacuation efforts are ongoing.
Once the news cycle moves on from the Kabul assassination, it will be business as usual for the US, the Taliban and even al-Qaeda itself.
At first glance, the July 31 killing of al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri by a US drone attack in Kabul, Afghanistan, appears to be the most significant setback the group has experienced since the death of its founder, Osama bin Laden, in 2011.
However, throughout the decade he administered al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri worked to ensure the organisation has all the necessary tools in place to survive his death. As such, while the operation that eliminated one of the organisers of the 9/11 attacks is undoubtedly a major win for the current US administration, it is unlikely to debilitate the group.
Indeed, the fallout from this targeted assassination will be minimal for al-Qaeda. Al-Zawahiri, seen by many as nothing other than a “grey bureaucrat”, can easily be replaced by someone with a similar managerial mindset. He may even be replaced by someone more charismatic, boosting the group’s allure among current and would-be members alike.
On the international level, the drone attack in Kabul will undoubtedly have an effect on the US’s relationship with the Taliban, as well as the future of Washington’s drone operations. However, it is unlikely that it will lead to any significant change or mark a turning point in the regional let alone global status quo.
Impact on al-Qaeda
A terror group tends to survive the death of its leader if it possesses a functioning organisational bureaucracy, an enduring ideology, and communal support. Al-Qaeda benefits from all three.
First, it has a robust operational bureaucracy. Al-Zawahiri did not possess the charisma of his predecessor. But after bin Laden’s death, he created an extensive, self-sufficient bureaucratic system, with clear chains of command, that ensured the group’s fate is not tied to any single leader, including himself. During al-Zawahiri’s tenure, al-Qaeda adopted an expansion model which can best be described as “franchising”. Under his command, the group expanded its reach from Mali to Kashmir with the addition of numerous largely autonomous and financially self-sufficient branches or “franchises”. As these branches are able to continue operations without much intervention from the central command, the death of any leader is unlikely to cause the network to disintegrate.
Second, al-Qaeda adheres to a violent ideology that does not depend on a leader for its articulation or propagation. The set of ideas that guide the group existed long before al-Qaeda, and will undoubtedly continue to be supported by some in zones of failing governance or alienation after its elimination. Al-Zawahiri was no ideologue. And he knew that he did not need to be one to ensure the group’s expansion and longevity. Al-Qaeda’s ideology will continue to attract support no matter what happens to its leaders.
Third, under al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda enjoyed significant communal support in areas where it has been active. The late al-Qaeda chief was a pragmatist who castigated as counterproductive the ideological rigidity and excesses of the likes of ISIL founders Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Unlike them, al-Zawahiri encouraged the group he controlled to cooperate with, rather than fully dominate, locals and local armed groups. This strategy allowed al-Qaeda to expand its reach. In Syria, its affiliate, Ha’yat Tahrir al-Sham, still endures to this day thanks at least in part to Zawahiri’s policies. Likewise in sub-Saharan Africa, during al-Zawahiri’s tenure, al-Qaeda affiliates entrenched their presence by forming local political alliances and garnering support from clan leaders, nomads and farmers. This communal support is unlikely to die solely due to al-Zawahiri’s killing.
Al-Qaeda faced the most significant challenge in its history during al-Zawahiri’s tenure – it was not a US drone raid or the assassination of a leader but the emergence of a breakaway faction in the form of ISIL, which not only recruited members from al-Qaeda, but created a rival, state-centric narrative that undermined al-Zawahiri’s bureaucratic, decentralised vision of a terrorist network.
Given that al-Qaeda managed to survive the existential challenge posed by ISIL, there is no reason to doubt it will also manage to endure the loss of its most recent leader.
Implications for Doha agreement
The US did not find al-Zawahiri in some hidden cave complex in a hard-to-access rural area of Afghanistan. He was found, and killed, in a suburban district of Kabul. This caused many to question whether the Taliban or at least some elements within the group, knew of or facilitated his presence there.
The 2020 Doha Agreement made the American and NATO withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan contingent on the Taliban’s assurances that the nation would not serve as a haven for al-Qaeda or ISIL to launch attacks against the US.
In this regard, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken accused the Taliban of violating the Agreement, by “hosting and sheltering” al-Zawahiri in Kabul, while the Taliban condemned the drone raid, also calling it a violation of the Agreement. These statements are reminiscent of those exchanged in 2011 between the US and Pakistan after bin Ladin was found and killed in a residential district of Abbottabad.
Back then, the US and Pakistan managed to find a way to continue with the modus vivendi they established after airing their grievances. We are likely to witness the same between the US and the Taliban after al-Zawahiri’s killing. Once they are done expressing their grievances about what happened, they will continue with their cautious relationship because they share a common foe: The Islamic State in Khorasan Province, ISKP (ISIS-K), the Afghanistan affiliate of ISIL. As the Biden administration is currently occupied with deterring China and Russia, it still needs the Taliban to deter ISIL, or to at least keep the peace in Afghanistan.
Drone assassinations to continue
Compared with the Trump administration, the number of US drone attacks dramatically dropped during Biden’s tenure – an apparent acknowledgement by the current administration that such raids contribute to grievances that fuel violence, conflict and anti-US sentiments in the long term.
The 2020 assassination of Iran’s Qassim Soleimani in Iraq, for example, deprived it of a charismatic leader and allowed then President Trump to score some easy points with his base at home, but failed to in any way break Iran’s sway over Iraq. In fact, it achieved little more than strengthening anti-US resolve in both countries.
The current US president and those in his administration are undoubtedly aware of this. Nevertheless, the killing of al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan shows that even Biden is unable to resist the temptation of the short-term political gains provided by such high-profile, low-risk drone assassinations.
All this indicates that once the news cycle moves on from al-Zawahiri’s demise, the actors involved will likely continue with business as usual. Al-Qaeda will appoint a new leader and continue operations, the US and the Taliban will hold on to the modus vivendi they established under the 2020 Doha Agreement despite increased tensions, and the US will continue to use drones across the Muslim world, regardless of the negative long-term impact of such operations.
[23]
THE WHITE HOUSE
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT BIDEN ON A SUCCESFUL COUNTERTERRORISM
THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, on Saturday, at my direction, the United States successfully concluded an airstrike in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed the emir of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
You know, al-Zawahiri was bin Laden’s leader. He was with him all the — the whole time. He was his number-two man, his deputy at the time of the terrorist attack of 9/11. He was deeply involved in the planning of 9/11, one of the most responsible for the attacks that murdered 2,977 people on American soil.
For decades, he was a mastermind behind attacks against Americans, including the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, which killed 17 American sailors and wounded dozens more.
He played a key role — a key role in the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 and wounding over 4,500 others.
He carved a trail of murder and violence against American citizens, American service members, American diplomats, and American interests. And since the United States delivered justice to bin Laden 11 years ago, Zawahiri has been a leader of al Qaeda — the leader.
From hiding, he coordinated al Qaeda’s branches and all around the world — including setting priorities, for providing operational guidance that called for and inspired attacks against U.S. targets.
He made videos, including in recent weeks, calling for his followers to attack the United States and our allies.
Now justice has been delivered, and this terrorist leader is no more.
People around the world no longer need to fear the vicious and determined killer. The United States continues to demonstrate our resolve and our capacity to defend the American people against those who seek to do us harm.
You know, we — we make it clear again tonight that no matter how long it takes, no matter where you hide, if you are a threat to our people, the United States will find you and take you out.
After relentlessly seeking Zawahiri for years under Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump, our intelligence community located Zawahiri earlier this year. He had moved to downtown Kabul to reunite with members of his immediate family.
After carefully considering the clear and convincing evidence of his location, I authorized a precision strike that would remove him from the battlefield once and for all.
This mission was carefully planned and rigorously minimized the risk of harm to other civilians. And one week ago, after being advised that the conditions were optimal, I gave the final approval to go get him, and the mission was a success. None of his family members were hurt, and there were no civilian casualties.
I’m sharing this news with the American people now, after confirming the mission’s total success through the painstaking work of our counterterrorism community and key allies and partners.
My administration has kept congressional leaders informed as well.
When I ended our military mission in Afghanistan almost a year ago, I made the decision that after 20 years of war, the United States no longer needed thousands of boots on the ground in Afghanistan to protect America from terrorists who seek to do us harm.
And I made a promise to the American people that we’d continue to conduct effective counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and beyond.
We’ve done just that.
In February, our forces conducted a daring mission in Syria that eliminated the emir of ISIS.
Last month, we took out another key ISIS leader. Now we have eliminated the emir of al Qaeda. He will never again — never again allow Afghanistan to become a terrorist safe haven because he is gone, and we’re going to make sure that nothing else happens. You know, it can’t be a launching pad against the United States. We’re going to see to it that won’t happen.
This operation is a clear demonstration that we will, we can, and we’ll always make good on the sol- — solemn pledge.
My administration will continue to vigilantly monitor and address threats from al Qaeda, no matter where they emanate from.
As Commander-in-Chief, it is my solemn responsibility to make America safe in a dangerous world. The United States did not seek this war against terror. It came to us, and we answered with the same principles and resolve that have shaped us for generation upon generation: to protect the innocent, defend liberty, and we keep the light of freedom burning — a beacon for the rest of the entire world.
Because this is the great and defining truth about our nation and our people: We do not break. We never give in. We never back down.
Last year, on September 11th, I once more paid my respects to Ground Zero in New York City, at that quiet field in Shanksville, at the Pentagon — and at the Pentagon.
Standing at the memorial at Ground Zero, seeing the names of those who died forever etched in bronze, is a powerful reminder of the sacred promise we made as a nation: We will never forget.
The memorial also bears a quotation from Virgil: “No day shall erase you from the memory of time.” “No day shall erase you from the memory of time.”
So we continue to mourn every innocent life that was stolen on 9/11 and honor their memories.
To the families who lost fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, friends and co-workers on that searing September day, it is my hope that this decisive action will bring one more measure of closure. No day shall erase them from the memory of time.
Today and every day, I am so grateful to the superb patriots who serve the United States intelligence community and counterterrorism communities. They never forget. Those dedicated women and men who tirelessly worked every single day to keep our country safe and to prevent future tragedies — it is thanks to their extraordinary persistence and skill that this operation was a success. They have made us all safer.
And to those around the world who continue to seek to harm the United States, hear me now: We will always remain vigilant, and we will act. And we will always do what is necessary to ensure the safety and security of Americans at home and around the globe.
Today, we remember the lost. We commit ourselves to the safety of the living. And we pledge that we shall never waver from defending our nation and its people.
Thank you, all. And may God protect our troops and all those who serve in harm’s way.
We will never — we will never give up.
7:40 P.M. EDT
LAW AND THE AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI AIRSTRIKE: A DOZEN QS & A’S
This is the first of two posts that aim to give you perspectives on some of the law applicable to the airstrike that killed Ayman al-Zawahiri.
My post today offers some quick “shortbursts” on a number of legal issues the strike suggests, and it will be followed by a separate post by Lawfire®favorite, Brian Lee Cox. Brian will give us a ‘deep dive’ on his take on selected legal topics the al-Zawahiri strike raises.
There are two limfacs to keep in mind: 1) to my knowledge, the U.S. government (USG) has not released a formal legal opinion about the strike, and 2) except where indicated otherwise, the posts rely entirely on media reports for the facts. As we know, the first reports can be wrong. With those caveats, here are some preliminary views for your consideration:
1) Who was Ayman al-Zawahiri?
In announcing the strike, President Biden described Ayman al-Zawahiri as the “emir“ of al-Qaeda, the foreign terrorist organization identified by the U.S. as responsible for the 9/11 attacks. As Osama Bin Laden’s deputy at the time, al-Zawahiri was the President informs, “deeply involved” in the planning of the operation. Accordingly, the President found him to be “one of the most responsible for the attacks that murdered 2,977 people on American soil.”
After Bin Laden was killed in a U.S. raid 11 years ago, al-Zawahiri became the leader of al-Qaeda. Here’s what the President says al-Zawahiri has being doing since taking over the terrorist organization:
From hiding, he coordinated al Qaeda’s branches and all around the world — including setting priorities, for providing operational guidance that called for and inspired attacks against U.S. targets. He made videos, including in recent weeks, calling for his followers to attack the United States and our allies.
2) Was al-Zawahri a lawful target under international law?
The Washington Postreports a “senior official” as explaining:
Government lawyers confirmed the legal basis for the operation, which is standard procedure for drone strikes. Zawahiri had a “continuing leadership role in al-Qaeda” and had participated in and supported terrorist attacks, the senior official said. He was deemed a lawful target.
Let’s unpack this a bit. As I said in my post about the killing of Osama Bin Laden, not every terrorist is targetable under the Law of Armed Conflict or “LOAC” (sometimes called International Humanitarian Law or IHL). Its application is generally limited to conflicts of sufficient scope and intensity to warrant treatment under a “war” legal regime.
Other terrorists are covered by international human rights law (IHRL), which is essentially a law enforcement legal construct. (Professor Geoff Corn and his co-authors have an excellent chart – found here – in their text, The Law of Armed Conflict: An Operational Approach, which compares and contrasts the two legal frameworks).
Though not without controversy, I believe the best view of the law today is that non-State terrorists who are members of an organized armed group engaged in a conflict (of sufficient scope and intensity to trigger LOAC applicability), are lawfully subject to LOAC’s more permissive targeting rules, that is, much the same rules to which members of traditional militaries are subject in State-on-State conflicts. In other words, the mere status of being a member of certain armed groups can be sufficient to make a person lawfully targetable.
To be clear, any civilian who “directly participates in hostilities” – even if they do not belong to an armed group – loses protection from direct attack during such participation. However, membership in certain non-State armed groups engaged in armed conflict can alone provide a separate legal basis for targeting.
The Department of Defense (DoD) Law of War (LoW) Manual puts it this way: “[B]elonging to an armed group makes a person liable to being made the object of attack regardless of whether he or she is taking a direct part in hostilities.”
Further, the Manual (¶ 5.8.2.1) adds this about those who are members of such entities:
The U.S. approach has been to treat the status of belonging to a hostile, non-State armed group as a separate basis upon which a person is liable to attack, apart from whether he or she has taken a direct part in hostilities. Either approach may yield the same result: members of hostile, non-State armed groups may be made the object of attack unless they are placed hors de combat.
The Manual adds this important clarification that such persons “may be made the object of attack at all times, regardless of the activities in which they are engaged at the time of attack.” So, for example, a member of a hostile, non-State armed group who is standing without a weapon on a balcony of a safe house could be the object of lawful attack.
The existence of an armed conflict is critical. But the U.S. has long taken the position that it is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda (see here), and it’s been reiterated in Congressional testimony after the 2021 withdrawal, as well as in judicial filings last fall.
For its part, al-Qaeda essentially declared war on the U.S. via fatwas issued by Osama Bin Laden in 1996 and 1998. and has never backed away from that position. Just last fall CNN reported that al-Qaeda operatives said the “war against the US will be continuing on all other fronts unless they are expelled from the rest of the Islamic world.”
In short, al-Zawahiri’s status as a member of al-Qaeda makes him lawfully subject to attack.
3) Is there any other basis under international law that could justify the strike?
Yes. Article 51 of the UN Charter permits member nations to use force in self-defense in the event of an “armed attack” – even if there is no pre-existing armed conflict.
The U.S. and many – perhaps most – countries also subscribed to the principle of anticipatory self-defense which essentially means that force can be used in self-defense prior to an “imminent” attack. Depending upon the circumstances, striking a key individual may be the best way to preclude an attack.
“Imminence” is not necessarily interpreted strictly in a temporal sense. As the Army’s 2022 Operational Law Handbook explains, the “U.S. analyzes a variety of factors when determining whether an armed attack is imminent,” including “the likelihood that there will be other opportunities to undertake effective action in self–defense that may be expected to cause less serious collateral injury, loss, or damage.”
The Handbook notes that it is the U.S. position that “the absence of specific evidence of where an attack will take place or of the precise nature of an attack does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is imminent for purposes of the exercise of the right of self–defense, provided that there is a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that an armed attack is imminent.”
Did al-Zawahiri present a current threat? The President characterized al-Zawahiri as a “vicious and determined killer” who, as the leader of an organization with a well-documented track record for horrifying violence, was “calling for his followers to attack the United States and our allies.”
In addition, the The Hill reports that on NBC’s Today show National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said the strike “undoubtedly made the United States safer” and offered this explanation: “We do believe he was playing an active role at a strategic level in directing al Qaeda and in continuing to pose a severe threat against the United States and American citizens everywhere.”
Such facts seem sufficient, even in the absence of evidence about a specific forthcoming attack, to find that al-Zawahiri represented a threat that met the criteria for the application of anticipatory self-defense.
That said, in my view, it is unnecessary to do an “imminence” analysis since I believe al-Zawahiri’s status as a member of al-Qaeda is – alone – sufficient legal justification for the strike.
4) Did international law require the U.S. to get permission from the Taliban to conduct an airstrike in Afghanistan?
Thus, the legal rationale for the unpermitted penetration of Afghanistan’s airspace would seem to based on the “unwilling or unable“ proposition in international law. This allows a threatened state to take action in self-defense (to include anticipatory self-defense) in another state without that state’s permission if it is “unwilling or unable” to take action to neutralize the threat that exists within its borders.
The Secretary of State appeared to allude to the concept in his remarks about the al-Zawahiri strike. He pointed out the Taliban’s “unwillingness or inability to abide by their commitments” made when the U.S. withdrew in August of 2021 in accordance with the Doha agreement.
That agreement required the Taliban, the Secretary said, to “not allow Afghan territory to be used by terrorists to threaten the security of other countries.” Obviously, the presence of al-Zawahiri living openly in Kabul showed that the Taliban was “unwilling or unable” to address the threat he posed to the “security of other countries.“
5) Did the President have the legal authority under domestic U.S. law to strike al-Zawahiri?
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Plainly, given al-Qaeda’s established involvement in 9/11, its current leader qualifies under this authorizing resolution. Though some scholars chafe at the fact that the 2001 AUMF is still in force, it is and it applies here.
In addition, Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution designates the President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Though the exact scope of President’s Article II power is unsettled, it does appear that it would include authority to use force against al-Qaeda operatives.
6) Is ‘delivering justice’ itself a valid basis for the use of force?
In his remarks, President Biden said that in the killing of al-Zawahiri, “justice has been delivered.” That may have been one effect of the strike (and a desirable one), but ‘delivering justice’ in the form of killing al-Zawahiri should not be confused with the actual legal basis for the use of force against him.
Specifically, retribution, retaliation, punishment or their like are not themselves justifications for the use of force. As one scholar explains with respect to the use of military force in these situations: “unlike the criminal law, our ‘punishment’ of a hostile belligerent nation, terrorist group, or high value target cannot alone serve as its legal argument.”
To say that “justice” for previous wrongs was delivered by a use of force in this case is understandable and even expected; however, it is always essential that the use of force be formally grounded in appropriate legal rationale, such as the need to address a serious, ongoing threat.
7) Wasn’t this strike an assassination, and aren’t assassinations illegal?
No, it wasn’t an unlawful “assassination.” As the DoD LoW Manual puts it (¶ 5.7.4 ):
Military leaders are subject to attack on the same basis as other members of the armed forces. Similarly, leaders of non-State armed groups are also subject to attack on the same basis as other members of the group. There is no objection to making a specific enemy leader who is a combatant the object of attack. (Emphasis added.)
Allow me to elaborate a bit with an extract from a previous post:
In 1989 Hays Parks, then a Department of Defense official, wrote the definitive memorandum regarding the legal meaning of “assassination.” I very much encourage you to read the full text, but I’ll give you a few highlights.
Parks was opining on the application of Executive Order 12333’s prohibition on assassination, and explained that:
Peacetime assassination…would seem to encompass the murder of a private individual or public figure for political purposes, and in some cases…also require that the act constitute a covert activity, particularly when the individual is a private citizen. Assassination is unlawful killing, and would be prohibited by international law even if there was no executive order proscribing it.
But Parks drew a careful distinction between such slayings, and the killing of an individual combatant in wartime. He points out:
[C]ombatants are legitimate targets at all times, regardless of their duties or activities at the time of attack. Such attacks do not constitute assassination unless carried out in a “treacherous” manner, as prohibited by article 23(b) of the Annex to the 1907 Hague IV. While the term treacherous has not been defined, as previously noted it is not regarded as prohibiting operations that depend upon the element of surprise, such as a commando raid or other form of attack behind enemy lines.
Parks cites the many examples of lawful wartime killings of individuals, including the World War II operation that resulted in the death of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who masterminded the attack on Pearl Harbor.
In my view, “assassination” is not the legally correct way to describe the al-Zawahiri killing and – regardless – his death was not unlawful.
8) Some press reports say the U.S. put a “$25 million bounty on [al-Zawahiri’s] head” – is that legal?
A “bounty” on al-Zawahiri’s “head” may wrongfully suggest that there was a reward for killing him. As the DoD LoW Manual explains (¶ 5.26.3), “rewards may not be offered for the killing of enemy persons.” However, the rule does not “prohibit offering rewards for information that may be used by combatants to conduct military operations that attack enemy combatants.”
It is true that through the Rewards For Justice Program the U.S. Secretary of State may authorize rewards for information that:
Leads to the arrest or conviction of anyone who plans, commits, aids, or attempts international terrorist acts against U.S. persons or property
Prevents such acts from occurring
Leads to the identification or location of a key terrorist leader
Disrupts terrorism financing
According to the FBI, there was “a reward of up to $25 million for information leading directly to the apprehension or conviction of Ayman Al-Zawahiri.” Such a reward for information is completely legal, even if it ends up being used for targeting a belligerent.
9) Was the U.S. legally required to try to capture al-Zawahri?
As the answer above about the reward offered for information that could lead to al-Zawahiri’s arrest suggests, the U.S. did try to bring him into custody, but was unsuccessful.
In any event, the LOAC does not require an effort to capture a belligerent. The DoD LoW Manual (¶ 2.2.3.1) points out:
Some commentators have argued that military necessity should be interpreted so as to permit only what is actually necessary in the prevailing circumstances, such as by requiring commanders, if possible, to seek to capture or wound enemy combatants rather than to make them the object of attack. This interpretation, however, does not reflect customary international law or treaty law applicable to DoD personnel. (Emphasis added.)
LOAC expert Professor Michael Schmitt likewise rejects the notion as some have suggested, that LOAC or, as it is sometimes called, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) mandates any obligation to try to capture, even when operationally feasible. He adds:
My opposition to a capture-kill rule is also based on the fact that the enemy fighter generally has the means to achieve the same result by surrendering, since those who surrender are hors de combat and cannot be attacked; in other words, IHL already addresses the situation. A rule that prohibits an attack whenever the individual can be captured would shift the burden from the fighter to the attacker in a way that warfighting states would have been, and remain, unlikely to countenance.
The New York Timesreports that given the location of the safe house al-Zawahiri was using, “any sort of incursion by Special Operations forces would be prohibitively dangerous.” Consequently, to stop him with the least risk to friendly forces and civilians in the area, a precision airstrike was necessary.
[I]n self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives.
10) The President said only that al-Zawahiri was killed by an airstrike. If a remotely-piloted aircraft (RPA) was used, and it was piloted by a civilian, would that impact the legality?
No. There is nothing inherently unlawful about using RPAs (commonly referred to as drones) to conduct an otherwise lawful strike. Notably, over three-dozen countries now have armed drones, and the worldwide military drone market is expected to hit $26.12 billion by 2028. Drones do have limitations, but they are lawful weapons that certainly can be used in full compliance with LOAC.
As a general rule, civilians are not prohibited by LOAC from participating in combat operations. However, in State-on-State conflicts, they would lose their protection against direct attack. That said, unprivileged belligerents like al-Qaeda terrorists do not have a legal right to attack anyone at any time.
11) The President said he authorized the strike after “carefully considering the clear and convincing evidence of [al-Zawahiri’s] location.” Is “clear and convincing” the standard of certainty that LOAC requires for operations?
No. LOAC generally employs a “reasonable military commander“ standard for decisions involving the use of force. The DoD LoW Manual (¶ 5.3) does, however, put it slightly differently:
Commanders and other decision-makers must make decisions in good faith and based on the information available to them. Even when information is imperfect or lacking (as will frequently be the case during armed conflict), commanders and other decision-makers may direct and conduct military operations, so long as they make a good faith assessment of the information that is available to them at that time.
In a 2018 essay,Michael J. Adams and Ryan Goodman relate the position of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on ‘reasonableness’ in targeting:
[The ICRC] explains that the law requires targeting decisions “must reflect the level of certainty that can reasonably be achieved in the circumstances” and that “in practice, this determination will have to take into account, inter alia, the intelligence available to the decision maker, the urgency of the situation, and the harm likely to result to the operating forces or to persons and objects protected against direct attack from an erroneous decision.”
Even in the law enforcement context, reasonableness is employed in judging use-of-force decisions. For example, in the 1989 case of Graham v. Connor, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded:
[The] “reasonableness” inquiry is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation.
The President’s use of a heightened standard of certainty appears to laudably reflect his determination to avoid civilian casualties. He said:
This mission was carefully planned and rigorously minimized the risk of harm to other civilians. And one week ago, after being advised that the conditions were optimal, I gave the final approval to go get him, and the mission was a success. None of his family members were hurt, and there were no civilian casualties.
Of course, LOAC requires “feasible” precautions be taken to avoid civilian harm. The DoD LoW Manual (¶ 5.2.3.2) elucidates this requirement:
The standard for what precautions must be taken is one of due regard or diligence, not an absolute requirement to do everything possible. A wanton disregard for civilian casualties or harm to other protected persons and objects is clearly prohibited. Feasible precautions are those that are practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.
Still, it appears that in his decision-making process for this strike the President went ‘above and beyond’ what the law might require.
12) Does LOAC require zero civilian casualties in attacks?
No. The DoD LoW Manual (¶ 5.10) explains the law this way:
• Combatants must take feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other persons and objects protected from being made the object of attack; and
• Combatants must refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. (Emphasis added.)
In short, civilian casualties, however unwanted, are nevertheless tolerated by LOAC even when it is clear in advance they will occur. Various policies of the U.S. and other countries may call for zero casualties in attacks, but the law does not.
Concluding thoughts
Although the death of al-Zawahiri is an important step in keeping America and its allies safe, there is little reason to think that the threat from al-Qaeda will disappear entirely
Unfortunately, it will take constant effort to keep the peril from it and other terrorists organization suppressed. Doing so will (often?) involve the use of lawful force.
As much as we may want to end “forever wars,” the melancholy truth is that the “enemy gets a vote.” Consequently, we must educate ourselves to the threat, as well as to an understanding of the applicable law, and commit ourselves to real vigilance.
Remember whatwe like to say on Lawfire®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!
In recent years the phrase “targeted killing” has commonly been used to refer to a deliberate lethal attack by government forces against a specific individual not in custody under the color of law. ”
Following the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush began a campaign of “targeted killings” against suspected members of al Qaeda and other armed groups. It has continued under the administration of President Barack Obama.
This Q&A focuses on legal and policy issues related to targeted killings, primarily attacks using unmanned aerial vehicles, known as drones, conducted by the US Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Human Rights Watch raised many of the issues addressed here in a December 2010 letter to President Obama.
Human Rights Watch calls upon the US government to clarify fully and publicly its legal rationale for conducting targeted killings and the legal limits on such strikes. To date it has not done so, which raises broader concerns, including among US allies, about the lawfulness of its actions and creates a dangerous model that may be followed by abusive governments. The government should explain why its attacks are in conformity with all applicable international law and make public information, including video footage, on how particular attacks comply with those standards. To ensure compliance with international law, the US government should conduct investigations of targeted killings where there is credible evidence of wrongdoing, provide compensation to all victims of unlawful attacks, and discipline or prosecute as appropriate those responsible for conducting or ordering illegal strikes. So long as the US does not demonstrate a readiness to hold the CIA to international legal requirements for accountability and redress, only the US armed forces should have command responsibility to conduct attacks using drones.
In recent years the phrase “targeted killing” has commonly been used to refer to a deliberate lethal attack by government forces against a specific individual not in custody under the color of law. It is not a technical legal term. Depending on the circumstances, a particular targeted killing may or may not be lawful under international law. For instance, a sniper shooting at an enemy general on the battlefield would normally be a lawful targeted killing. Targeted killings should be considered distinctly from the summary execution of anyone in custody, which is never lawful.
2. What international law is applicable to targeted killings?
The lawfulness of a targeted killing hinges in part on the applicable law, which is determined by the context in which it takes place. International humanitarian law (also known as the laws of war) is applicable during armed conflicts, whether between states or between a state and non-state armed groups. Hostilities between a state and an armed group are generally considered to be an armed conflict when violence reaches a significant threshold and the armed group has the capacity to abide by the laws of war. Rules of international humanitarian law are found in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its two Additional Protocols, the 1907 Hague Regulations, and the customary laws of war. Among other things, these rules regulate the conduct of hostilities, including the targeting of combatants, in all armed conflicts.
International human rights law is applicable at all times, but during armed conflict it may be superseded by the laws of war. International human rights law can be found in treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and authoritative standards such as the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Human rights law upholds the right to life and provides rules for law enforcement on when the use of lethal force is permissible. Outside of armed conflict, lethal force may only be used when strictly necessary to prevent imminent harm to life, when arrest is not reasonably possible.
3. What are the laws of war on targeted killings?
The laws of war permit attacks only against military objectives, such as enemy fighters or weapons and ammunition. Civilians are immune from attack, except those individuals “directly participating in the hostilities.” While the phrase “directly participating in hostilities” has various interpretations, it is generally accepted to include not only persons currently engaged in fighting, but also individuals actively planning or directing future military operations. For a specific attack on a military objective to be lawful, it must discriminate between combatants and civilians, and the expected loss of civilian life or property cannot be disproportionate to the anticipated military gain of the attack. Therefore, not all attacks that cause civilian deaths violate the laws of war, only those that target civilians, are indiscriminate or cause disproportionate civilian loss.
Parties to a conflict have a duty to investigate serious violations of the laws of war. The Geneva Conventions state that “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” Where there is credible evidence that an attack has violated the laws of war, the responsible party is obligated to investigate for possible war crimes and appropriately prosecute the perpetrators, or extradite them for prosecution elsewhere.
4. What is the international human rights law on targeted killings?
International human rights law permits the use of lethal force outside of armed conflict situations if it is strictly and directly necessary to save human life. In particular, the use of lethal force is lawful if the targeted individual presents an imminent threat to life and less extreme means, such as capture or non-lethal incapacitation, are insufficient to address that threat. The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides that the “intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.” This standard permits using firearms only in self-defense or defense of others “against the imminent threat of death or serious injury” or “to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life” and “only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives.” Under this standard, individuals cannot be targeted for lethal attack merely because of past unlawful behavior, but only for imminent or other grave threats to life when arrest is not a reasonable possibility.
Where there is evidence that a targeted killing might have violated international human rights standards, a state has an obligation to investigate. For instance, the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions state that “[t]here shall be thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of all suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions, including cases where complaints by relatives or other reliable reports suggest unnatural death.”
5. How many people have US forces killed in targeted killings in recent years?
There is no concrete, verifiable number of deaths from US targeted killings. The New America Foundation, which bases its figures on local and international media accounts, conducted a study of reported US drone strikes in northern Pakistan from 2004 to 2011, and concluded that the attacks killed between 1,680 and 2,634 alleged militants and civilians. Other independent monitors, such as the Bureau for Investigative Journalism, have provided similar figures.
US counterterrorism officials stated in May 2010 that since 2008 roughly 530 people had been killed in Pakistan by drone strikes, of whom more than 500 were “militants,” and “no more than 30” were civilians. This figure does not include US targeted killings before 2008; those in Yemen, where the media and Yemeni and US officials have reported dozens killed in at least 20 drone or other airstrikes since 2002; and those killed in other countries, such as Afghanistan and Somalia. In an August 2011 news article, unidentified CIA officers reportedly said that since May 2010 drones had killed more than 600 militants. Earlier in the year, John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, announced without corroborating information that in the preceding 12 months there had not been a single civilian death in drone strikes because of the “exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities we’ve been able to develop.”
6. Does using aerial drones in targeted killings affect the legal regime involved?
The use of unmanned aircraft or drones for targeted killings does not directly affect the legal analysis of a particular attack. Drones themselves and their weaponry of missiles and laser-guided bombs are not illegal weapons under the laws of war – they can be used lawfully or unlawfully depending on the circumstances. When used appropriately, drones offer certain advantages over manned aircraft or cruise missiles that can help to minimize civilian casualties in combat operations. Drones have enhanced surveillance capabilities that allow them to linger with a view of the target for long periods without risk to human operators. Drone operators are thus in theory better equipped to distinguish valid military targets from civilians who are immune from attack. As with other aerial attacks, drone operations may be hampered by poor intelligence or local actors’ manipulation, especially when operating outside of areas where US ground forces can direct them.
To date, the United States is known to have carried out targeted killings using drones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Some 40 other countries also possess basic drone technology, and the number is expected to expand significantly in coming years. Those drones are primarily used for surveillance. China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Russia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom either have or are currently seeking drones with attack capacity.
7. How has the US carried out targeted killings in Pakistan?
Aerial drone strikes by the US on suspected members of al Qaeda and the Taliban in northern Pakistan have been conducted at least since 2004, although the US does not officially acknowledge them. They escalated in 2011, with some 60 strikes taking place through the end of September. These strikes were carried out primarily by the CIA. It is not known to what extent they are hitting military targets in battle zones, causing disproportionate civilian loss compared to the expected military gain, or using lethal force in what are more properly law enforcement situations. As in previous years, these strikes were often accompanied by claims from local sources of large numbers of civilian casualties, but a lack of secure access to the areas has prevented independent verification. At the same time, the US government has made unverified claims that there have been no civilian casualties in the attacks. The US has not provided information – such as videotapes taken by drones of attacks – that would demonstrate the lawfulness of the attacks or refute claims of civilian casualties.
8. How has the US carried out targeted killings in Yemen?
The US reportedly has conducted at least 20 drone strikes and other aerial attacks against alleged al Qaeda militants and other Islamist forces in Yemen from 2002 through November 2011. In the first known strike, in November 2002, a CIA drone-launched missile killed Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a Yemeni suspected of masterminding the bombing of the USS Cole, which had claimed the lives of 17 US sailors two years earlier. The other known strikes were carried out under the Obama administration, mostly in 2011. These strikes, attributed to the CIA and US special operations forces, have reportedly killed scores of people. Lack of access to the attack sites has prevented independent verification of the strikes, including whether those targeted were lawfully subject to attack, the numbers of civilians killed or wounded, and the circumstances of the civilian casualties. A Yemeni parliamentary inquiry found that a US cruise missile strike in December 2009 killed at least 41 local residents, including 14 women and 21 children. It allegedly involved cluster munitions, a weapon that poses unacceptable risks in civilian areas because of its indiscriminate nature. In September 2011 the US reportedly began launching drone strikes on targets in Yemen from a new CIA base in an undisclosed location on the Arabian Peninsula.
9. How has the US carried out targeted killings in Somalia?
The US government has conducted targeted airstrikes against alleged al Qaeda members in Somalia since 2006. At his confirmation hearing in June 2011, Vice Adm. William McRaven of the US Special Operations Command saidthat there was a need for greater use of drones in Somalia to enhance the chance of successful strikes. Beginning that month, the US initiated drone attacks on suspected members of the Islamist armed group al-Shabaab, which is fighting the US-backed Transitional Federal Government. On June 23, in the only publicly acknowledged attack, the US conducted a drone strike targeting two high-ranking members of al-Shabaab who allegedly had “direct ties” to American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen (see below). There have been reports of new drone attacks since June, yet corroborating these reports has been particularly difficult because all have been reported in al-Shabaab-controlled areas where access and communication is severely restricted. The US confirmed that it has refurbished an airbase at Arba Minch in southern Ethiopia for the purpose of launching drones to fly over Somalia, although it claimed the flights were for surveillance purposes only. The US also reportedly operates drone missions over Somalia from a base in the Seychelles, an archipelago in the Indian Ocean.
10. What has been the US rationale for targeted killings?
Through public statements by senior officials, the Obama administration has provided an outline of its legal authority for conducting targeted killings. The essence of its argument is that targeted killings of those associated with al Qaeda are lawful in general, because the US is justified in going to war in self-defense (an argument about the legal justification for war). However, the administration has yet to clearly explain how it would assess the legality of any specific attack against a particular individual under international humanitarian law (the law governing the conduct of war).
State Department legal adviser Harold Koh told the American Society of International Law in March 2010 that the United States is in an ongoing armed conflict with al Qaeda, and so has the authority under the laws of war to use lethal force against al Qaeda members and associated forces. He noted that whether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location would depend upon specific considerations, including “the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses.” Koh said that in targeted killings and other operations against al Qaeda and its affiliates, “great care is taken to adhere to [international humanitarian law] principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage [civilian casualties] is kept to a minimum.”
John Brennan, the administration’s counterterrorism advisor, expanded on these arguments in a speech at Harvard University in September 2011. He argued for “a more flexible understanding of ‘imminence’” to justify a military response to the threat posed by terrorist groups. He said that being at war with al Qaeda “does not mean we can use military force whenever we want, wherever we want”; respect for a state’s sovereignty and the laws of war also restrict the way force is used abroad.
Neither Koh nor Brennan provided details that would lend insight into the process for determining whether specific strikes met international legal standards, particularly with respect to CIA-led operations. They also did not set out the administration’s definition of “associated forces,” and no mention was made of the constraints imposed by international human rights law.
The administration’s approach, while ostensibly rejecting the “global war on terror” pronounced by President Bush, appears to tacitly accept the concept in conducting targeted killings. Asserting that all such attacks – regardless of the locale or the target’s lawfulness – necessarily fall within the rubric of international humanitarian law is problematic. The applicability of international humanitarian law, which requires an armed conflict situation, must be determined on a case-by case basis. This may be clear on a traditional battlefield, but where that is not the case, the determination will be more complex. For a government to act on the assumption that international humanitarian law always applies – effectively making all the world a battlefield and summarily rejecting international human rights law – will undermine international legal protections.
11. Was the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen lawful?
In September 2011, US drone-launched missiles killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen of Yemeni descent, and three other alleged al Qaeda members who were traveling by car in northern Yemen’s al Jawf province. Awlaki had been sought by Yemeni authorities since November 2010 for plotting to kill foreigners and being a member of al Qaeda. Also killed in the attack was Samir Khan, a US citizen who was the editor of al Qaeda’s English-language magazine, Inspire. In a separate drone incident two weeks later, Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, Abdelrahman al-Awlaki, was killed in an attack targeting another alleged al Qaeda militant.
After the attack, President Obama for the first time referred to Awlaki as the “leader of external operations” for al Qaeda in Yemen, but US authorities had never charged him with any terrorism-related crime. A senior Obama administration official reportedly said that the killing of Awlaki was important both because he had become al Qaeda’s greatest English-language propagandist and because he had emerged as one of its top operational planners. “First and foremost, we’ve been looking at his important operational role,” the official said. “To the extent he’s no longer playing that role is all to the good.”
The United States may be engaged in an armed conflict in Yemen during which it would be permitted to target combatants. However, even if that were the case, the attack on Awlaki might not have been lawful because under the laws of war a “propagandist” is not a valid military target and attacking him on that basis would be prohibited. On the other hand, an individual actively involved in operational planning would be a valid military target – but not if he played an operational role only in the past. The US should make clear what information supported its rationale that Awlaki was playing an ongoing operational role in a battle zone and thus could be lawfully attacked.
The New York Times reported that the Obama administration considered the killing of Awlaki to be consistent with a legal opinion drafted in mid-2010 by the Office of Legal Counsel, the section of the Justice Department that provides legal advice to the executive branch. The administration should release the legal opinion, or otherwise disclose its analysis of the applicable international law in targeted killings and the manner by which individuals are determined to be lawful targets of attack. To date, the administration has refused to confirm or deny the existence of the legal opinion.
12. Does the US citizenship of those targeted affect the legality of attacks?
The US citizenship of Anwar al-Awlaki and other Americans killed in targeted strikes is not relevant as a matter of international law. Neither international humanitarian law nor international human rights law makes a distinction regarding nationality with respect to targeting or the use of force. Awlaki’s citizenship may have offered him greater US constitutional protections, an issue reportedly addressed in the Justice Department legal memo. In August 2010, the Center for Constitutional Rights and the American Civil Liberties Union brought a suit in US federal court on behalf of Awlaki’s father contesting the lawfulness of the Obama administration’s inclusion of Awlaki on a CIA “hit list.” The court threw out the case on procedural grounds but indicated it would have dismissed the petitioner’s claim in any event because it raised political questions not subject to the court’s review.
13. What steps should the US take to reduce the likelihood of unlawful targeted killings?
The US government should both clarify its general legal approach to targeted killings and provide information on individual attacks. That would mean releasing Justice Department legal memos on targeted killings, such as the reported Justice Department memo accepting the inclusion of Anwar al-Awlaki on the US “hit list.” Evidence from specific attacks, such as drone videotapes, after-action reports and other information that would be relevant to the legality of an attack should also be released. Information should be redacted only as necessary to protect intelligence methods and sources.
The US government should make not only pre-strike but also post-strike assessments of civilian harm, factor those assessments into planning for future strikes, and publicly acknowledge responsibility for harm when it occurs. Where there is a finding of wrongdoing, individuals responsible for conducting or ordering unlawful attacks should be promptly investigated and disciplined or prosecuted as appropriate.
14. What concerns are raised by the CIA’s involvement in targeted killings?
The CIA was involved early on in the US targeted killing program after 9/11. Its role has increased with the Obama administration’s expansion of the use of drone attacks in northern Pakistan and other countries. While openly referring to CIA involvement, the US government continues to consider it classified and therefore will not acknowledge CIA participation in attacks. This widened CIA role in what are considered to be military operations governed by the laws of war has been controversial. In 2004 the independent 9/11 Commission specifically recommended that “[l]ead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department,” where the “training, direction, and execution of such operations” are already being consolidated under a single military command.
International humanitarian law does not prohibit intelligence agencies from participating in combat operations during armed conflicts. Parties to an armed conflict, however, have an obligation to investigate credible allegations of war crimes and provide redress for victims. Because the US government routinely “neither confirms nor denies” the CIA’s well-known participation in targeted killings, there is no transparency in its operations. In 2009, then-CIA chief Leon Panetta unusually acknowledged the airstrikes against al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan as being “very effective” because they are “very precise” and “very limited in terms of collateral damage” [civilian casualties]. However, he also said he would not provide more details about the operations, highlighting the government’s unwillingness to divulge information about CIA operations.
The CIA, like all US government agencies, is bound by international human rights and humanitarian law. Unlike the US armed forces, the CIA has provided little or no information regarding the training and composition of its drone teams, or the procedures and rules it follows in conducting targeted killings. Nor has the government provided information as to whether the CIA has conducted any investigations into possible international law violations and their outcomes. As a result there is no basis for determining whether the US government is actually meeting its international legal obligations with respect to CIA targeting operations or providing redress for victims of unlawful attacks. Repeated assertions by senior US officials that all US agencies are operating in compliance with international law – without providing information that would corroborate such claims – is wholly inadequate.
The only known domestic investigation into the CIA role in targeted killings appears intended to reduce transparency. In November 2011, the media reportedthat the Justice Department was investigating former CIA general counsel John Rizzo for allegedly revealing classified information in a February Newsweek interviewabout the CIA’s targeted killing program. This inquiry is likely only to curtail needed public discussion of CIA practices.
So long as the US government is unwilling to demonstrate that the CIA is held to international legal requirements for accountability and redress, the use of drones in attacks should be exclusively within the command responsibility of the US armed forces.
15. What is the US military’s record for ensuring accountability in airstrikes? In recent years the US military and other foreign forces in Afghanistan have succeeded in reducing the proportion of civilian casualties in their operations, but because of increased operations the total number of civilian deaths has only showed a small decline. The US has provided inadequate or inaccurate information regarding incidents in which large numbers of civilian casualties were reported, particularly aerial attacks involving US ground forces. In a number of cases US forces had immediately claimed, before there could be any serious investigation of the incident, that all those killed were Taliban combatants. Only after information gathered on the ground by local and international human rights organizations and journalists was presented to US authorities did the Defense Department conduct more credible investigations.
Afghan government and popular outrage led the US military to acknowledge the harm to US policy caused by civilian casualties. Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in 2010 that “civilian casualty incidents such as those we’ve recently seen in Afghanistan will hurt us more in the long run than any tactical success we may achieve against the enemy.” Unlike the CIA, the US armed forces have a known internal disciplinary system that can enforce compliance with international humanitarian law and a conventional chain of command for investigating credible allegations of laws-of-war violations.
16. What are the global implications of the US targeted killing program?
In asserting that targeted attacks on alleged anti-US militants anywhere in the world are lawful, the US undermines the international rules it helped craft over the past half-century that bar extra-legal killings. This sets a dangerous precedent for abusive regimes around the globe to conduct drone attacks or other strikes against anyone they label as terrorists or militants and undercuts the ability of the US to criticize such attacks.
Administration counterterrorism advisor John Brennan’s Harvard speech made a distinction between the US and its allies over the geographic scope of the conflict against al Qaeda. He said that while some US allies believe the conflict against al Qaeda is limited geographically to “hot” battlefields, the US considers the conflict to be without geographic limits. His assertion that the US restricts such attacks to countries that are unwilling or unable to apprehend those on their territory deemed to be al Qaeda militants is not recognizing a constraint under law but merely an expression of US policy.
Were the US rationale for its global battlefield for targeted killings to be applied by other countries, China might declare an ethnic Uighur activist living in New York City an “enemy combatant” and, if the US were unwilling to apprehend that person, order a lethal strike on US soil. Russia could assert the legality of fatally poisoning someone living in London whom it claims is linked to Chechen militants. While the Obama administration would oppose such actions, it has yet to lay out a legal rationale for drone strikes or other deliberate uses of lethal force in countries such as Yemen and Pakistan that would distinguish them from targeted killings widely considered unlawful. The US should not carry out lethal strikes that it would object to if another country conducted such a strike under analogous circumstances with a similar rationale.
EINDE ARTIKEL HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
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4. What is the international human rights law on targeted killings?
International human rights law permits the use of lethal force outside of armed conflict situations if it is strictly and directly necessary to save human life. In particular, the use of lethal force is lawful if the targeted individual presents an imminent threat to life and less extreme means, such as capture or non-lethal incapacitation, are insufficient to address that threat”
”Human Rights Watch recognizes that the US government has a responsibility to respond to national security threats. We recognize that the deliberate use of lethal force can be legal in operations involving a combatant on a genuine battlefield, or in a law enforcement action in which the threat to life is imminent and there is no reasonable alternative.”
We write to ask that your administration provide greater clarity about its legal rationale for targeted killings, including the use of Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems (drones), and the procedural safeguards it is taking to minimize harm to civilians.
US history shows that once such a program is initiated, even if in response to a specific contingency like the threat posed by al Qaeda in Yemen, it generally becomes a permanent feature of the national security landscape. You will not be the last US president to claim the authority to conduct such strikes. And the United States is not the only country in the world with the ability and motivation to kill its enemies beyond its borders. While such operations may be lawful under certain circumstances, absent clear boundaries they risk setting an example that any US president-and the leader of any other country-could cite to evade the most fundamental legal restrictions on the power to kill.
Your administration has dramatically expanded the use of targeted killings outside of traditional battlefields following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The US government asserts that it has authority under international law to use lethal force outside of clearly defined war zones because it is engaged in a global armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated forces.
A US district court judge’s dismissal today of a targeted killings lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds highlights the need for the Obama administration to publicly clarify its position on this issue. As Judge John Bates of the district court in the District of Columbia noted in his dismissal, the merits of the case, which he said raise “vital considerations of national security and of military and foreign affairs,” as well as “fundamental questions of separation of powers,” remain unaddressed.
Human Rights Watch recognizes that the US government has a responsibility to respond to national security threats. We recognize that the deliberate use of lethal force can be legal in operations involving a combatant on a genuine battlefield, or in a law enforcement action in which the threat to life is imminent and there is no reasonable alternative. We also recognize the challenge that your government faces in trying to address potential threats that are not in a traditional conflict zone yet are also beyond the reach of any law enforcement. The notion, however, that the entire world is a battleground in which the laws of war are applicable undermines the protections of international law. Such a concept invites the application of lethal force by other countries in situations where the US would strongly object to its use.
In March 2010, State Department legal advisor Harold Koh took a step in the right direction by explaining the US government’s targeted killing program in general terms and affirming its commitment to conduct these strikes in accordance with international law and the Constitution. The administration, however, has not yet clearly explained where it draws the line between lawful and unlawful targeted killings. We believe that it is both its obligation and in its self-interest to do so.
With these concerns in mind, we offer the following detailed recommendations:
Do not define all operations as part of a “global armed conflict”
Whether or not a targeted killing is legal under international law depends, in part, on the whether it is carried out in the context of an armed conflict. In justifying its combat operations outside of traditional war zones, US officials have asserted that the United States is engaged in a global armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and vaguely defined “associated forces” and is exercising its inherent right to self-defense.
While the United States is a party to armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and could become a party to armed conflicts elsewhere, the notion that the entire world is automatically by extension a battleground in which the laws of war are applicable is contrary to international law. How does the administration define the “global battlefield” and what is the legal basis for that definition? What, if any, limits exist on ordering targeted killings within it? Does it view the battlefield as global in a literal sense, allowing lethal force to be used, in accordance with the laws of war, against a suspected terrorist in an apartment in Paris, a shopping mall in London, or a bus station in Iowa City? Do the rules governing targeted killing vary from one place to another-for example, are different criteria used in Yemen and Pakistan?
Define who may be legally targeted
We are also concerned about US practices that may seek to expand the category of who may legally be targeted and under what conditions. What process is used to determine whether a person may be targeted for killing rather than afforded due process? Legal advisor Koh has emphasized that the decision to target someone for killing outside traditional combat zones depends on “considerations specific to each case,” as well as the “imminence of the threat,” but how does your administration define these terms? Must the target be planning an armed attack, or is it sufficient to be a likely participant? Can an individual be targeted solely for past acts, absent specific evidence of involvement in planning future attacks? Are the standards for targeting US citizens-for example American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who is hiding in Yemen-the same as for individuals of other nationalities? How does your administration define “associated forces” that may be targeted and how does it measure their support for groups such as al Qaeda?
Ensure compliance with the laws of war
As the US acknowledges, even targeted killings within conflict zones must be carried out in compliance with the laws of war, including the requirements of distinction and proportionality. During armed conflict, only combatants or civilians who are directly or actively participating in hostilities may be lawfully targeted. The killings must be of military necessity, the expected military gain must outweigh anticipated harm to civilians and civilian objects, and all feasible measures must be taken to minimize civilian harm. The US government states that “great care” has been taken to adhere to these principles, but it has not provided sufficient information on its targeting decisions thus far to allow an impartial determination as to whether these requirements have been met. For example, it has not explained how it designates targets as militants or measures proportionality in areas such as northwest Pakistan, where the CIA has reportedly conducted more than 120 drone strikes that have killed more than 800 people, including an unknown number of civilians.
Ensure compliance with international human rights law
International human rights law permits the use of lethal force outside of zones of armed conflict if it is strictly and directly necessary to save life. In particular, the use of lethal force is lawful if the targeted individual presents an imminent threat to life and less extreme means, such as capture or non-lethal incapacitation, are insufficient to address that threat. For strikes outside of conflict zones, the US should fully explain the clear and imminent threat to life that the targeted individual represents and the circumstances that prevented less-than-lethal force from being applied. Even in combat zones, it may in some circumstances be prudent for the US to attempt to capture rather than to kill a legitimate target-not only to gain intelligence, but also to delegitimize terrorists as criminals rather than elevating them to the status of warriors.
Improve transparency and accountability
The US has in part refused to fully define the legal limits of its targeted killing program by citing the need to keep sensitive national security information secret. Your administration has been particularly reticent to disclose details of targeted killings by the CIA drone strikes in northwest Pakistan. However, providing a fuller explanation would not require the US to divulge information of operational value. It would simply help establish that this administration recognizes that there are legal limits on its actions and good strategic reasons to embrace those limits.
The information we would urge your administration to make public includes: How many people are estimated to have been killed in US targeted killings since 2001? In which countries have the killings occurred? How many of these people are believed to have been civilians? What differences, if any, do the CIA and Defense Department apply in making targeting decisions? What kind of review is conducted after a targeted killing? (The Israeli Supreme Court, in an important ruling on targeted killings, in 2006 instructed Israeli forces to carry out a thorough and independent investigation in the wake of every such killing.) If a targeted killing violated international law, what mechanisms exist to investigate and if necessary discipline or prosecute those responsible? What measures have been taken to hold accountable military personnel, CIA officers, and private contractors for targeted killings that violated international law?
Minimize harm to civilians
Even lawful drone strikes can alienate populations and hand insurgents a propaganda tool if they result in high civilian casualties. The US military learned that lesson the hard way in Afghanistan, where its July 2009 tactical directive regarding civilian protection sounds an important cautionary note: “We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories-but suffering strategic defeats-by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people.” It is witnessing a similar backlash today in Pakistan and Yemen.
This lesson acquires further importance as the US contemplates expansions of its drone program to kill targeted militants. When used appropriately, drones offer certain advantages over manned aircraft or cruise missiles that can help the military minimize civilian casualties in combat operations. Because of drones’ enhanced surveillance capabilities, drone operators are better equipped to distinguish between combatants and individuals directly participating in hostilities-persons who can be legitimately targeted during armed conflict-and civilians who are immune from attack.
Nevertheless, the ability of US forces to direct drones with surgical precision in areas outside traditional battlefields may be hampered by a lack of ground presence, increasing the risk of poor intelligence and of local actors manipulating international forces.
Because of the inherent difficulty in measuring proportionality in such areas, we urge that the US government use all the resources at its disposal to make not only pre-strike but also post-strike assessments of civilian harm, factor those assessments into planning for future strikes, and publicly acknowledge responsibility for harm when it occurs.
The United States also should provide timely and adequate compensation to all civilian victims of drone strikes or other targeted killings, even if the harm incurred is legally justified, just as it does when US forces inadvertently kill civilians in conflict areas such as Afghanistan or Iraq.
Avoid dangerous precedents
In asserting that targeted attacks on alleged terrorists anywhere in the world are lawful, the US undermines the international rules it helped craft over the past half-century that bar extrajudicial executions. This sets a dangerous precedent for abusive regimes around the globe to conduct drone attacks or other strikes against persons who they describe in vague or overly broad terms as terrorists-and undercuts the ability of the US to criticize such attacks.
Could China lawfully declare an ethnic Uighur activist living in New York a “terrorist” and, if the US were unwilling to extradite that person, order a lethal strike on US soil? Could Russia lawfully poison to death someone living in London whom they claim is linked to Chechen militants? Clearly, the United States would oppose such actions. But the administration has not laid out a legal rationale for drone strikes or other deliberate uses of lethal force in countries such as Yemen and Pakistan that would distinguish them from targeted killings that reasonable people would consider unlawful. The US should not carry out a lethal strike if it would object to another country conducting such a strike under similar circumstances and a similar rationale.
In conclusion, Mr. President, your targeted killing policy will have profound ramifications for future commanders-in-chief in both the US and other countries for years to come. Governments’ coercive power, especially the awesome power to deprive people of liberty and life, must be exercised within limits defined by laws that protect due process and human rights. Only by acting in accordance with those limits will the US set an example for the rest of the world.
You yourself reaffirmed this notion when you accepted the Nobel Peace Prize. “Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules … the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war,” you noted. “That is what makes us different from those whom we fight. That is the source of our strength.” With this letter, we ask that you provide the legal framework to uphold these words.
Thank you for your attention to this important matter. We would be happy to provide additional information on any of the issues noted in this letter.
Sincerely,
Kenneth Roth
Cc: Secretary of State Clinton
Secretary of Defense Gates
CIA Director Panetta
TWEEDE BRIEF AAN PRESIDENT OBAMA
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
LETTER TO PRESIDENT OBAMA: TARGETED KILLINGS BY THE US GOVERNMENT
We previously wrote to you on December 7, 2010, to express our concerns regarding the US targeted killing program. We made recommendations that would minimize harm to civilians and ensure US policies and practices were in line with the country’s international legal obligations. Since then, the use by the United States of Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems (drones) to conduct targeted killings has expanded rapidly in Pakistan and other countries. Yet, your administration has taken few steps to provide greater transparency and accountability in conducting targeted killings, intensifying concerns both in the US and abroad about the lawfulness of these attacks.
Human Rights Watch recognizes that the US government has a responsibility to address threats to national security. The deliberate use of lethal force against a specific target can be legal in operations against a combatant on a genuine battlefield, or in a law enforcement situation in which there is an imminent threat to life and there is no reasonable alternative. We also recognize the challenges faced in trying to address potential threats that are not in a traditional conflict zone yet are also beyond the reach of any law enforcement.
We have read the statements from administration officials – most recently the September talk at Harvard University by counterterrorism advisor John Brennan – which posits the legal basis for the overall use of force but do not clearly provide one for conducting specific targeted killings and the legal limits on such strikes. Among the questions raised:
Where does your administration draw the line between lawful and unlawful targeted killings? Are international human rights law considerations taken into account?
John Brennan has argued for a more flexible definition of “imminence” to justify the use of force. Is this in the context of self-defense as provided under the United Nations Charter or in the law enforcement context, which requires an imminent threat to life for lethal force to be used?
The administration suggests that targeted killings can be conducted without geographic limits, making the entire world a battlefield. What is different about the US government rationale for targeted killings that would not apply to other countries, such as Russia or China, that assert threats from terrorists?
The US government should clarify fully and publicly its legal rationale for conducting targeted killings and the legal limits on such strikes. Your administration has yet to explain clearly where it draws the line between lawful and unlawful targeted killings. The government should also explain why it believes that its attacks are in conformity with international law and make public information, including video footage, on how particular attacks comply with that standard. To ensure compliance with international law, the United States should conduct investigations of targeted killings where there is credible evidence of wrongdoing, provide compensation to all victims of illegal strikes, and discipline or prosecute as appropriate those responsible for conducting or ordering unlawful attacks.
We are particularly concerned about the expanded involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the targeted killings program. International humanitarian law does not prohibit intelligence agencies from participating in combat operations during armed conflicts. However, parties to an armed conflict have obligations to investigate credible allegations of war crimes and provide redress for victims. Because the US government routinely neither confirms nor denies the CIA’s well-known participation in targeted killings in northern Pakistan and elsewhere, there is no transparency in its operations. In 2009, then-CIA chief Leon Panetta unusually acknowledged the US airstrikes against al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan as being “very effective” because they are “very precise” and “very limited in terms of collateral damage.” However, he also said he would not provide more details, highlighting the government’s unwillingness to divulge information about CIA operations.
The CIA, like all US government agencies, is bound by international human rights and humanitarian law. Unlike the US armed forces, the CIA provides little or no information regarding the training and composition of its drone teams, or the procedures and rules it follows in conducting targeted killings. Nor has the government provided information as to whether the CIA has conducted any investigations into possible international law violations and their outcomes. As a result there is no basis for determining whether the US government is actually meeting its international legal obligations with respect to its targeting operations or providing redress for victims of unlawful attacks. Repeated assertions by senior officials within your administration that all US agencies are operating in compliance with international law – without providing information that would corroborate such claims – are wholly inadequate.
Human Rights Watch believes that so long as the US government cannot demonstrate a readiness to hold the CIA to international legal requirements for accountability and redress, the use of drones in targeted killings should be exclusively within the command responsibility of the US armed forces. This would be consistent with the findings of the independent 9/11 Commission, which in 2004 specifically recommended that “[l]ead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department.” Such a recommendation has been made more recently by former director of national intelligence Dennis Blair, among others. At the same time, while the US military has a more transparent chain of command and operational procedures, it too needs to ensure compliance with the laws of war, and provide accountability of redress when violations occur.
We again ask you to consider these concerns in light of your own words when you accepted the Nobel Peace Prize: “Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules … the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war,” stating, “that is what makes us different from those whom we fight. That is the source of our strength.” We respectfully urge that you provide the legal framework to uphold these words.
We have enclosed our December 2010 letter and a recent Q&A addressing these issues. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.
Sincerely,
Kenneth Roth Executive Director
Cc:
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
CIA Director David Petraeus
Reacties uitgeschakeld voor Noten 16 t/m 20/Kritiek op twee Volkskrant artikelen
”Van zijn persoonlijke leven is weinig meer bekend dan dat hij vier keer is getrouwd. Zijn eerste vrouw, met wie hij zes kinderen had, kwam in december 2001 om bij een Amerikaanse droneaanslag in het Afghaanse Kandahar”
VOLKSKRANT
POSTUUM: AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI
ZELFS IN EIGEN KRING WERD AL-ZAWAHIRI, MET ZIJN BELEREND
ZWAAIENDE WIJSVINGER, ALS STEKELIG EN PEDANT ERVAREN
The laws of war permit attacks only against military objectives, such as enemy fighters or weapons and ammunition. Civilians are immune from attack, except those individuals “directly participating in the hostilities.” While the phrase “directly participating in hostilities” has various interpretations, it is generally accepted to include not only persons currently engaged in fighting, but also individuals actively planning or directing future military operations. For a specific attack on a military objective to be lawful, it must discriminate between combatants and civilians, and the expected loss of civilian life or property cannot be disproportionate to the anticipated military gain of the attack. Therefore, not all attacks that cause civilian deaths violate the laws of war, only those that target civilians, are indiscriminate or cause disproportionate civilian loss.
Parties to a conflict have a duty to investigate serious violations of the laws of war. The Geneva Conventions state that “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” Where there is credible evidence that an attack has violated the laws of war, the responsible party is obligated to investigate for possible war crimes and appropriately prosecute the perpetrators, or extradite them for prosecution elsewhere.
International human rights law permits the use of lethal force outside of armed conflict situations if it is strictly and directly necessary to save human life. In particular, the use of lethal force is lawful if the targeted individual presents an imminent threat to life and less extreme means, such as capture or non-lethal incapacitation, are insufficient to address that threat. The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides that the “intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.” This standard permits using firearms only in self-defense or defense of others “against the imminent threat of death or serious injury” or “to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life” and “only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives.” Under this standard, individuals cannot be targeted for lethal attack merely because of past unlawful behavior, but only for imminent or other grave threats to life when arrest is not a reasonable possibility.
Where there is evidence that a targeted killing might have violated international human rights standards, a state has an obligation to investigate. For instance, the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions state that “[t]here shall be thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of all suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions, including cases where complaints by relatives or other reliable reports suggest unnatural death.”
Following the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush began a campaign of “targeted killings” against suspected members of al Qaeda and other armed groups. It has continued under the administration of President Barack Obama.
This Q&A focuses on legal and policy issues related to targeted killings, primarily attacks using unmanned aerial vehicles, known as drones, conducted by the US Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Human Rights Watch raised many of the issues addressed here in a December 2010 letter to President Obama.
Human Rights Watch calls upon the US government to clarify fully and publicly its legal rationale for conducting targeted killings and the legal limits on such strikes. To date it has not done so, which raises broader concerns, including among US allies, about the lawfulness of its actions and creates a dangerous model that may be followed by abusive governments. The government should explain why its attacks are in conformity with all applicable international law and make public information, including video footage, on how particular attacks comply with those standards. To ensure compliance with international law, the US government should conduct investigations of targeted killings where there is credible evidence of wrongdoing, provide compensation to all victims of unlawful attacks, and discipline or prosecute as appropriate those responsible for conducting or ordering illegal strikes. So long as the US does not demonstrate a readiness to hold the CIA to international legal requirements for accountability and redress, only the US armed forces should have command responsibility to conduct attacks using drones.
In recent years the phrase “targeted killing” has commonly been used to refer to a deliberate lethal attack by government forces against a specific individual not in custody under the color of law. It is not a technical legal term. Depending on the circumstances, a particular targeted killing may or may not be lawful under international law. For instance, a sniper shooting at an enemy general on the battlefield would normally be a lawful targeted killing. Targeted killings should be considered distinctly from the summary execution of anyone in custody, which is never lawful.
2. What international law is applicable to targeted killings?
The lawfulness of a targeted killing hinges in part on the applicable law, which is determined by the context in which it takes place. International humanitarian law (also known as the laws of war) is applicable during armed conflicts, whether between states or between a state and non-state armed groups. Hostilities between a state and an armed group are generally considered to be an armed conflict when violence reaches a significant threshold and the armed group has the capacity to abide by the laws of war. Rules of international humanitarian law are found in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its two Additional Protocols, the 1907 Hague Regulations, and the customary laws of war. Among other things, these rules regulate the conduct of hostilities, including the targeting of combatants, in all armed conflicts.
International human rights law is applicable at all times, but during armed conflict it may be superseded by the laws of war. International human rights law can be found in treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and authoritative standards such as the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Human rights law upholds the right to life and provides rules for law enforcement on when the use of lethal force is permissible. Outside of armed conflict, lethal force may only be used when strictly necessary to prevent imminent harm to life, when arrest is not reasonably possible.
3. What are the laws of war on targeted killings?
The laws of war permit attacks only against military objectives, such as enemy fighters or weapons and ammunition. Civilians are immune from attack, except those individuals “directly participating in the hostilities.” While the phrase “directly participating in hostilities” has various interpretations, it is generally accepted to include not only persons currently engaged in fighting, but also individuals actively planning or directing future military operations. For a specific attack on a military objective to be lawful, it must discriminate between combatants and civilians, and the expected loss of civilian life or property cannot be disproportionate to the anticipated military gain of the attack. Therefore, not all attacks that cause civilian deaths violate the laws of war, only those that target civilians, are indiscriminate or cause disproportionate civilian loss.
Parties to a conflict have a duty to investigate serious violations of the laws of war. The Geneva Conventions state that “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” Where there is credible evidence that an attack has violated the laws of war, the responsible party is obligated to investigate for possible war crimes and appropriately prosecute the perpetrators, or extradite them for prosecution elsewhere.
4. What is the international human rights law on targeted killings?
International human rights law permits the use of lethal force outside of armed conflict situations if it is strictly and directly necessary to save human life. In particular, the use of lethal force is lawful if the targeted individual presents an imminent threat to life and less extreme means, such as capture or non-lethal incapacitation, are insufficient to address that threat. The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides that the “intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.” This standard permits using firearms only in self-defense or defense of others “against the imminent threat of death or serious injury” or “to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life” and “only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives.” Under this standard, individuals cannot be targeted for lethal attack merely because of past unlawful behavior, but only for imminent or other grave threats to life when arrest is not a reasonable possibility.
Where there is evidence that a targeted killing might have violated international human rights standards, a state has an obligation to investigate. For instance, the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions state that “[t]here shall be thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of all suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions, including cases where complaints by relatives or other reliable reports suggest unnatural death.”
5. How many people have US forces killed in targeted killings in recent years?
There is no concrete, verifiable number of deaths from US targeted killings. The New America Foundation, which bases its figures on local and international media accounts, conducted a study of reported US drone strikes in northern Pakistan from 2004 to 2011, and concluded that the attacks killed between 1,680 and 2,634 alleged militants and civilians. Other independent monitors, such as the Bureau for Investigative Journalism, have provided similar figures.
US counterterrorism officials stated in May 2010 that since 2008 roughly 530 people had been killed in Pakistan by drone strikes, of whom more than 500 were “militants,” and “no more than 30” were civilians. This figure does not include US targeted killings before 2008; those in Yemen, where the media and Yemeni and US officials have reported dozens killed in at least 20 drone or other airstrikes since 2002; and those killed in other countries, such as Afghanistan and Somalia. In an August 2011 news article, unidentified CIA officers reportedly said that since May 2010 drones had killed more than 600 militants. Earlier in the year, John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, announced without corroborating information that in the preceding 12 months there had not been a single civilian death in drone strikes because of the “exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities we’ve been able to develop.”
6. Does using aerial drones in targeted killings affect the legal regime involved?
The use of unmanned aircraft or drones for targeted killings does not directly affect the legal analysis of a particular attack. Drones themselves and their weaponry of missiles and laser-guided bombs are not illegal weapons under the laws of war – they can be used lawfully or unlawfully depending on the circumstances. When used appropriately, drones offer certain advantages over manned aircraft or cruise missiles that can help to minimize civilian casualties in combat operations. Drones have enhanced surveillance capabilities that allow them to linger with a view of the target for long periods without risk to human operators. Drone operators are thus in theory better equipped to distinguish valid military targets from civilians who are immune from attack. As with other aerial attacks, drone operations may be hampered by poor intelligence or local actors’ manipulation, especially when operating outside of areas where US ground forces can direct them.
To date, the United States is known to have carried out targeted killings using drones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Some 40 other countries also possess basic drone technology, and the number is expected to expand significantly in coming years. Those drones are primarily used for surveillance. China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Russia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom either have or are currently seeking drones with attack capacity.
7. How has the US carried out targeted killings in Pakistan?
Aerial drone strikes by the US on suspected members of al Qaeda and the Taliban in northern Pakistan have been conducted at least since 2004, although the US does not officially acknowledge them. They escalated in 2011, with some 60 strikes taking place through the end of September. These strikes were carried out primarily by the CIA. It is not known to what extent they are hitting military targets in battle zones, causing disproportionate civilian loss compared to the expected military gain, or using lethal force in what are more properly law enforcement situations. As in previous years, these strikes were often accompanied by claims from local sources of large numbers of civilian casualties, but a lack of secure access to the areas has prevented independent verification. At the same time, the US government has made unverified claims that there have been no civilian casualties in the attacks. The US has not provided information – such as videotapes taken by drones of attacks – that would demonstrate the lawfulness of the attacks or refute claims of civilian casualties.
8. How has the US carried out targeted killings in Yemen?
The US reportedly has conducted at least 20 drone strikes and other aerial attacks against alleged al Qaeda militants and other Islamist forces in Yemen from 2002 through November 2011. In the first known strike, in November 2002, a CIA drone-launched missile killed Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a Yemeni suspected of masterminding the bombing of the USS Cole, which had claimed the lives of 17 US sailors two years earlier. The other known strikes were carried out under the Obama administration, mostly in 2011. These strikes, attributed to the CIA and US special operations forces, have reportedly killed scores of people. Lack of access to the attack sites has prevented independent verification of the strikes, including whether those targeted were lawfully subject to attack, the numbers of civilians killed or wounded, and the circumstances of the civilian casualties. A Yemeni parliamentary inquiry found that a US cruise missile strike in December 2009 killed at least 41 local residents, including 14 women and 21 children. It allegedly involved cluster munitions, a weapon that poses unacceptable risks in civilian areas because of its indiscriminate nature. In September 2011 the US reportedly began launching drone strikes on targets in Yemen from a new CIA base in an undisclosed location on the Arabian Peninsula.
9. How has the US carried out targeted killings in Somalia?
The US government has conducted targeted airstrikes against alleged al Qaeda members in Somalia since 2006. At his confirmation hearing in June 2011, Vice Adm. William McRaven of the US Special Operations Command saidthat there was a need for greater use of drones in Somalia to enhance the chance of successful strikes. Beginning that month, the US initiated drone attacks on suspected members of the Islamist armed group al-Shabaab, which is fighting the US-backed Transitional Federal Government. On June 23, in the only publicly acknowledged attack, the US conducted a drone strike targeting two high-ranking members of al-Shabaab who allegedly had “direct ties” to American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen (see below). There have been reports of new drone attacks since June, yet corroborating these reports has been particularly difficult because all have been reported in al-Shabaab-controlled areas where access and communication is severely restricted. The US confirmed that it has refurbished an airbase at Arba Minch in southern Ethiopia for the purpose of launching drones to fly over Somalia, although it claimed the flights were for surveillance purposes only. The US also reportedly operates drone missions over Somalia from a base in the Seychelles, an archipelago in the Indian Ocean.
10. What has been the US rationale for targeted killings?
Through public statements by senior officials, the Obama administration has provided an outline of its legal authority for conducting targeted killings. The essence of its argument is that targeted killings of those associated with al Qaeda are lawful in general, because the US is justified in going to war in self-defense (an argument about the legal justification for war). However, the administration has yet to clearly explain how it would assess the legality of any specific attack against a particular individual under international humanitarian law (the law governing the conduct of war).
State Department legal adviser Harold Koh told the American Society of International Law in March 2010 that the United States is in an ongoing armed conflict with al Qaeda, and so has the authority under the laws of war to use lethal force against al Qaeda members and associated forces. He noted that whether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location would depend upon specific considerations, including “the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses.” Koh said that in targeted killings and other operations against al Qaeda and its affiliates, “great care is taken to adhere to [international humanitarian law] principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage [civilian casualties] is kept to a minimum.”
John Brennan, the administration’s counterterrorism advisor, expanded on these arguments in a speech at Harvard University in September 2011. He argued for “a more flexible understanding of ‘imminence’” to justify a military response to the threat posed by terrorist groups. He said that being at war with al Qaeda “does not mean we can use military force whenever we want, wherever we want”; respect for a state’s sovereignty and the laws of war also restrict the way force is used abroad.
Neither Koh nor Brennan provided details that would lend insight into the process for determining whether specific strikes met international legal standards, particularly with respect to CIA-led operations. They also did not set out the administration’s definition of “associated forces,” and no mention was made of the constraints imposed by international human rights law.
The administration’s approach, while ostensibly rejecting the “global war on terror” pronounced by President Bush, appears to tacitly accept the concept in conducting targeted killings. Asserting that all such attacks – regardless of the locale or the target’s lawfulness – necessarily fall within the rubric of international humanitarian law is problematic. The applicability of international humanitarian law, which requires an armed conflict situation, must be determined on a case-by case basis. This may be clear on a traditional battlefield, but where that is not the case, the determination will be more complex. For a government to act on the assumption that international humanitarian law always applies – effectively making all the world a battlefield and summarily rejecting international human rights law – will undermine international legal protections.
11. Was the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen lawful?
In September 2011, US drone-launched missiles killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen of Yemeni descent, and three other alleged al Qaeda members who were traveling by car in northern Yemen’s al Jawf province. Awlaki had been sought by Yemeni authorities since November 2010 for plotting to kill foreigners and being a member of al Qaeda. Also killed in the attack was Samir Khan, a US citizen who was the editor of al Qaeda’s English-language magazine, Inspire. In a separate drone incident two weeks later, Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, Abdelrahman al-Awlaki, was killed in an attack targeting another alleged al Qaeda militant.
After the attack, President Obama for the first time referred to Awlaki as the “leader of external operations” for al Qaeda in Yemen, but US authorities had never charged him with any terrorism-related crime. A senior Obama administration official reportedly said that the killing of Awlaki was important both because he had become al Qaeda’s greatest English-language propagandist and because he had emerged as one of its top operational planners. “First and foremost, we’ve been looking at his important operational role,” the official said. “To the extent he’s no longer playing that role is all to the good.”
The United States may be engaged in an armed conflict in Yemen during which it would be permitted to target combatants. However, even if that were the case, the attack on Awlaki might not have been lawful because under the laws of war a “propagandist” is not a valid military target and attacking him on that basis would be prohibited. On the other hand, an individual actively involved in operational planning would be a valid military target – but not if he played an operational role only in the past. The US should make clear what information supported its rationale that Awlaki was playing an ongoing operational role in a battle zone and thus could be lawfully attacked.
The New York Times reported that the Obama administration considered the killing of Awlaki to be consistent with a legal opinion drafted in mid-2010 by the Office of Legal Counsel, the section of the Justice Department that provides legal advice to the executive branch. The administration should release the legal opinion, or otherwise disclose its analysis of the applicable international law in targeted killings and the manner by which individuals are determined to be lawful targets of attack. To date, the administration has refused to confirm or deny the existence of the legal opinion.
12. Does the US citizenship of those targeted affect the legality of attacks?
The US citizenship of Anwar al-Awlaki and other Americans killed in targeted strikes is not relevant as a matter of international law. Neither international humanitarian law nor international human rights law makes a distinction regarding nationality with respect to targeting or the use of force. Awlaki’s citizenship may have offered him greater US constitutional protections, an issue reportedly addressed in the Justice Department legal memo. In August 2010, the Center for Constitutional Rights and the American Civil Liberties Union brought a suit in US federal court on behalf of Awlaki’s father contesting the lawfulness of the Obama administration’s inclusion of Awlaki on a CIA “hit list.” The court threw out the case on procedural grounds but indicated it would have dismissed the petitioner’s claim in any event because it raised political questions not subject to the court’s review.
13. What steps should the US take to reduce the likelihood of unlawful targeted killings?
The US government should both clarify its general legal approach to targeted killings and provide information on individual attacks. That would mean releasing Justice Department legal memos on targeted killings, such as the reported Justice Department memo accepting the inclusion of Anwar al-Awlaki on the US “hit list.” Evidence from specific attacks, such as drone videotapes, after-action reports and other information that would be relevant to the legality of an attack should also be released. Information should be redacted only as necessary to protect intelligence methods and sources.
The US government should make not only pre-strike but also post-strike assessments of civilian harm, factor those assessments into planning for future strikes, and publicly acknowledge responsibility for harm when it occurs. Where there is a finding of wrongdoing, individuals responsible for conducting or ordering unlawful attacks should be promptly investigated and disciplined or prosecuted as appropriate.
14. What concerns are raised by the CIA’s involvement in targeted killings?
The CIA was involved early on in the US targeted killing program after 9/11. Its role has increased with the Obama administration’s expansion of the use of drone attacks in northern Pakistan and other countries. While openly referring to CIA involvement, the US government continues to consider it classified and therefore will not acknowledge CIA participation in attacks. This widened CIA role in what are considered to be military operations governed by the laws of war has been controversial. In 2004 the independent 9/11 Commission specifically recommended that “[l]ead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department,” where the “training, direction, and execution of such operations” are already being consolidated under a single military command.
International humanitarian law does not prohibit intelligence agencies from participating in combat operations during armed conflicts. Parties to an armed conflict, however, have an obligation to investigate credible allegations of war crimes and provide redress for victims. Because the US government routinely “neither confirms nor denies” the CIA’s well-known participation in targeted killings, there is no transparency in its operations. In 2009, then-CIA chief Leon Panetta unusually acknowledged the airstrikes against al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan as being “very effective” because they are “very precise” and “very limited in terms of collateral damage” [civilian casualties]. However, he also said he would not provide more details about the operations, highlighting the government’s unwillingness to divulge information about CIA operations.
The CIA, like all US government agencies, is bound by international human rights and humanitarian law. Unlike the US armed forces, the CIA has provided little or no information regarding the training and composition of its drone teams, or the procedures and rules it follows in conducting targeted killings. Nor has the government provided information as to whether the CIA has conducted any investigations into possible international law violations and their outcomes. As a result there is no basis for determining whether the US government is actually meeting its international legal obligations with respect to CIA targeting operations or providing redress for victims of unlawful attacks. Repeated assertions by senior US officials that all US agencies are operating in compliance with international law – without providing information that would corroborate such claims – is wholly inadequate.
The only known domestic investigation into the CIA role in targeted killings appears intended to reduce transparency. In November 2011, the media reportedthat the Justice Department was investigating former CIA general counsel John Rizzo for allegedly revealing classified information in a February Newsweek interviewabout the CIA’s targeted killing program. This inquiry is likely only to curtail needed public discussion of CIA practices.
So long as the US government is unwilling to demonstrate that the CIA is held to international legal requirements for accountability and redress, the use of drones in attacks should be exclusively within the command responsibility of the US armed forces.
15. What is the US military’s record for ensuring accountability in airstrikes? In recent years the US military and other foreign forces in Afghanistan have succeeded in reducing the proportion of civilian casualties in their operations, but because of increased operations the total number of civilian deaths has only showed a small decline. The US has provided inadequate or inaccurate information regarding incidents in which large numbers of civilian casualties were reported, particularly aerial attacks involving US ground forces. In a number of cases US forces had immediately claimed, before there could be any serious investigation of the incident, that all those killed were Taliban combatants. Only after information gathered on the ground by local and international human rights organizations and journalists was presented to US authorities did the Defense Department conduct more credible investigations.
Afghan government and popular outrage led the US military to acknowledge the harm to US policy caused by civilian casualties. Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in 2010 that “civilian casualty incidents such as those we’ve recently seen in Afghanistan will hurt us more in the long run than any tactical success we may achieve against the enemy.” Unlike the CIA, the US armed forces have a known internal disciplinary system that can enforce compliance with international humanitarian law and a conventional chain of command for investigating credible allegations of laws-of-war violations.
16. What are the global implications of the US targeted killing program?
In asserting that targeted attacks on alleged anti-US militants anywhere in the world are lawful, the US undermines the international rules it helped craft over the past half-century that bar extra-legal killings. This sets a dangerous precedent for abusive regimes around the globe to conduct drone attacks or other strikes against anyone they label as terrorists or militants and undercuts the ability of the US to criticize such attacks.
Administration counterterrorism advisor John Brennan’s Harvard speech made a distinction between the US and its allies over the geographic scope of the conflict against al Qaeda. He said that while some US allies believe the conflict against al Qaeda is limited geographically to “hot” battlefields, the US considers the conflict to be without geographic limits. His assertion that the US restricts such attacks to countries that are unwilling or unable to apprehend those on their territory deemed to be al Qaeda militants is not recognizing a constraint under law but merely an expression of US policy.
Were the US rationale for its global battlefield for targeted killings to be applied by other countries, China might declare an ethnic Uighur activist living in New York City an “enemy combatant” and, if the US were unwilling to apprehend that person, order a lethal strike on US soil. Russia could assert the legality of fatally poisoning someone living in London whom it claims is linked to Chechen militants. While the Obama administration would oppose such actions, it has yet to lay out a legal rationale for drone strikes or other deliberate uses of lethal force in countries such as Yemen and Pakistan that would distinguish them from targeted killings widely considered unlawful. The US should not carry out lethal strikes that it would object to if another country conducted such a strike under analogous circumstances with a similar rationale.
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Founder of al-Qaida with Osama bin Laden who went on to succeed him as its leader
After nearly two decades in hiding, the Egyptian terrorist Ayman al-Zawahiri, successor to Osama bin Laden as head of al-Qaida, has died aged 71. He was killed by two missiles fired from a US drone at his home in central Kabul. Zawahiri provided the arguments and the systematic organisation that persuaded Bin Laden, six years his junior, to operate on an international scale, culminating in the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US that resulted in more than 3,000 deaths. However, after Bin Laden was killed by US forces in Pakistan in 2011, Zawahiri made threats, but never repeated atrocities against the west on the scale of 9/11.
Once leader, he steered an al-Qaida demoralised by Bin Laden’s death, and later by the emergence in Iraq of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS) movement. Though the rival jihadis rapidly outdid al-Qaida in brutality, after five years they were largely crushed, leaving Zawahiri’s now more decentralised operation intact, and spreading.
The extent to which Zawahiri had shaped al-Qaida showed in the 9/11 attacks. He placed Egyptian allies in key positions, improved the organisation’s use of media and introduced the blind-cell structure he had used in Egyptian jihadi circles, with lethal results.
Bin Laden and Zawahiri both came from privileged backgrounds. The former was the son of a wealthy Saudi building contractor; the latter a product of Egypt’s educated class. Each was raised in religious but not especially radical households. Both gave up their chosen career paths – medicine in Zawahiri’s case, engineering in Bin Laden’s – to fight a global jihad against what they perceived as enemies of Islam.
Zawahiri officially became leader of al-Qaida in June 2011, six weeks after US Navy Seals killed Bin Laden in Abbottabad. Al-Qaida affiliates from Yemen to Iraq, Pakistan to Malaysia, soon swore their allegiance to him. Zawahiri had formally been Bin Laden’s deputy since 1998 and chaired al-Qaida’s consultative council, and its religious committee, which issued fatwas. As a spokesperson, he often appeared on video; seven weeks after the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005, for instance, he hailed “the blessed London battle … a slap to the face of the tyrannical, crusader British arrogance”.
Nonetheless, delays in choosing Bin Laden’s successor suggested schisms at the top and coincided with setbacks for the group. Starting in December 2010 in Tunisia and January 2011 in Egypt, young, mainly secular, protesters ousted two longstanding authoritarian Arab presidents. Al-Qaida, by contrast, had used violence for decades yet had not toppled a single ruler. Zawahiri’s claims rang hollow when in September 2011 he broadcast an hour-long oration about how 9/11 had prepared the way for what became known as the Arab spring, or what he called “Arab volcano”. By contrast with the charismatic Bin Laden, he seemed austere and less inspirational.
Zawahiri was born in Maadi, a comfortable suburb of Cairo, in the year before the Free Officers overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in 1952. His father, Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri, was a professor of pharmacology at Cairo University. His mother, Umayma Azzam, came from a political family. Ayman’s paternal grandfather had been grand imam of al-Azhar University, the world’s most respected seat of Sunni Muslim learning. His uncle chaired the Egyptian Labour party and his grand-uncle Abdel-Rahman Azzam was the first secretary-general of the Arab League.
From a state school Zawahiri went to Cairo University, and in 1974 graduated as a doctor. Proficient in English, French and Arabic, he took a master’s degree in surgery four years later and practised in the Egyptian military.
At the age of 15 he was arrested for belonging to the banned Muslim Brotherhood. He called secular pan-Arabism a false panacea and in his book A Bitter Harvest (1991) rejected the Brotherhood’s ameliorative approach.
From Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian ideologue killed in an Egyptian jail in 1966, he accepted millenarian ideas that the world was in a state of ignorance, that all leaders of Muslim countries deserved denunciation as apostates, and that only armed struggle and sharia (religious law) could restore past Islamic glories. Zawahiri called democracy “a new religion that deifies humans and gives them the authority to formulate their own laws … while Islam gives the right to legislate exclusively to Allah”. More than anything, he wrote, Egypt’s rapid defeat in the June 1967 war persuaded him that existing Arab structures were bankrupt.
In 1978, he married Azza Nowari, and soon travelled to Pakistan, where from 1980 he treated those injured in the Soviet invasion in neighbouring Afghanistan. Witnessing battlefield horrors fuelled his rage, and on returning home he galvanised the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and a wing of the ultra-violent Takfir wal Hijra (Denunciation and Migration).
In October 1981 extremists assassinated the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, and when Cairo authorities could not prove Zawahiri’s direct complicity they charged him with illegal possession of arms. He was confined to a tiny cell and reportedly beaten every day, allegedly betraying associates under electric torture.
After his release in 1984, the following year he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia and then Pakistan, never to return. He treated Afghan mujahideen, recruited and trained Arab volunteers to fight Russia’s Red Army, and met Bin Laden in Peshawar in 1986. Both men were inspired by the Palestinian jihadist Abdullah Azzam, with whom Bin Laden had set up the Afghan Services Bureau, Maktab al-Khidamat, in 1984. While Azzam wanted to attack Israel, Zawahiri’s chief target was Cairo.
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After Azzam was murdered in 1989, Zawahiri became Bin Laden’s new mentor, personal physician, spokesperson and arms procurer. Many credit him with steering Bin Laden towards dreams of global conquest, alongside Omar Abdel-Rahman, an Egyptian cleric who died in a US jail in 2017.
Bin Laden and Zawahiri accused the Saudi royal family – “brothers of Satan” – of betraying Islam through deference to a Jewish-controlled west. After the 1991 Gulf war they charged the US with stealing Arab oil, propping up corrupt regimes, persecuting Palestinians and Iraqis, and occupying the holy soil of Arabia.
In 1992, Zawahiri’s EIJ and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) initiated a bloody campaign against state officials and Coptic Christians in Egypt. An EIJ attempt in 1993 on the life of the Egyptian prime minister Atef Sidqi backfired, when he survived; a schoolgirl was killed. As popular support ebbed and police harassment grew in Egypt, Zawahiri began to focus more on international operations. In June 1995, EIJ gunmen fired at the Egyptian presidentHosni Mubarak, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; in November the faction bombed the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad.
Zawahiri also helped plan the massacre near Luxor in which 58 tourists and four Egyptians were killed in November 1997. He was sentenced to death in absentia in April 1999, along with his brother Mohammed, an EIJ military commander. By now, indigenous EIJ leaders had disowned him and renounced violence, feeling he had acted peremptorily by absorbing them into Bin Laden’s coalition in 1998.
Zawahiri was granted asylum in Denmark in 1991, visited Dagestan, Yemen and Switzerland, held Dutch, Swiss and French passports and used a variety of names and considered founding a television channel in the Netherlands. He even gained a US green card and toured American mosques in 1993, ostensibly seeking charity for indigent Afghan orphans.
Bin Laden moved his headquarters to Sudan late that year and Zawahiri followed. From his vast farm north of Khartoum he promoted al-Qaida’s expanding business interests, deepened ties with Sudan’s political elite, pioneered suicide attacks in Egypt and in 1996 set up Islamist sleeper cells in Bosnia.
But infighting among militants, penetration by Egyptian spies and pressure from Washington led Sudan to expel al-Qaida. Zawahiri sought a new haven: in December 1996 Russian authorities, not realising his true identity, jailed him for six months after he tried to enter Chechnya. The next year he returned to Afghanistan, where in 1998 he co-signed with Bin Laden a fatwa that launched what they called the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, known as al-Qaida.
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Zawahiri urged Muslims to kill US soldiers and civilians and plunder their wealth. On 6 August that year, he warned Americans of “a response which we will write, with God’s help, in a language they will understand”. The next day, terrorists bombed two US embassies in east Africa, killing more than 200 people. The FBI offered $5m for his capture, later raised to $25m.
In 2000, Zawahiri was blamed for the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen. In 2001, he hired the Malaysian biochemist Yazid Sufaat to cultivate anthrax in a laboratory near Kandahar airport. Then came the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, atrocities consistent with Zawahiri’s approach. Interpol sought his arrest.
That December, Zawahiri’s wife Azza and at least one of his childrenwere killed in an American bombing raid in Afghanistan. The defeat of the country’s Taliban government severely hampered al-Qaida’s global effectiveness.
In 2005, Zawahiri pleaded with Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaida in post-Saddam Iraq, to stop killing Shia civilians and Sunni foes in such numbers. Muslim support for al-Qaida fell until Zarqawi’s death the following year. Zawahiri further inflamed intra-Muslim tensions when he accused Iran – and by extension, Shias – of being “religion-sellers” who helped the UK and US bring down the Taliban.
Even before Bin Laden’s death, Zawahiri had established links with groups in Algeria, Mali, Libya, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, Indonesia and Egyptian Sinai around 2006, and with al-Shabaab in Somalia in 2008. In 2009, Zawahiri approved the merger of Saudi and Yemeni militants into Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, which proved to be the most loyal and effective of franchises. By this stage, US intelligence called Zawahiri al-Qaida’s strategic commander, relegating Bin Laden to ideological figurehead.
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However, the killing by US drone strikes of 14 AQAP senior leaders between 2011 and 2020 damaged al-Qaida, as did the rise of Zarqawi’s fanatical heirs. In April 2013 the former leader of al-Qaida in Mesopotamia, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, announced the birth of IS in Raqqa, Syria. Soon his zealots were fighting al-Qaida’s official Syrian subsidiary, the al-Nusra Front. They attracted Nusra deserters and younger foreign recruits, including from Britain, France, the US and Australia. Unlike al-Qaida, IS conquered actual territory. They ultimately ruled an area as large as Britain between eastern Syria and northern Iraq. From Mosul’s al-Nuri mosque, Baghdadi declared a caliphate in July 2014 – something else Zawahiri had never done – and started marching on Baghdad.
Zawahiri furiously rejected Baghdadi’s demand for allegiance. In January 2017 he called IS cowardly killers and power-hungry liars who “exceeded the limits of extremism” and “misused the enthusiasm of youth”. Eventually an unlikely alliance of Shia and Kurdish militias, Iranian land forces and US air power defeated IS. Al-Baghdadi was killed in 2019.’
By then Zawahiri was the “defining authority” of Hurras al-Din, a coalition of seven factions fighting moderate Syrian rebels, US forces and the Assad regime. But a rebranded Nusra Front disavowed ties with al-Qaida in 2017.
In 2014, Zawahiri launched al-Qaida in the Indian subcontinent to counter IS in Asia. In 2020, UN monitors admitted that al-Qaida was “deeply embedded” with the Taliban, and Zawahiri had directly advised them in talks with Washington. Al-Qaida cooperated in particular with the Taliban’s radical Haqqani network.
Al-Qaida benefited from the 2020 US-Taliban Doha agreement, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan starting in April 2021, and especially the Taliban conquest of Afghanistan the following August. In 2016, Zawahiri had declared loyalty to Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban’s then new amir al-mu’minin (commander of the faithful). Five years later he was delighted when the elusive Akhundzada became Afghanistan’s de facto leader.
Clearly, the Taliban had broken their 2020 promise to the Trump administration to sever ties with al-Qaida. A June 2022 UN report noted increased al-Qaida communications, spoke of influence over Taliban ministers, and warned that Afghanistan might become a base for resumed al-Qaida long-range attacks.
Zawahiri soon moved from the Pakistani borderlands to join his family in the affluent Sherpur neighbourhood of Kabul.
He is survived by three wives and a number of children.
Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri, terrorist leader, born 19 June 1951; died 31 July 2022
De geslaagde Amerikaanse operatie om Al Qaida-leider Ayman al-Zawahiri uit te schakelen is een flinke opsteker voor president Biden. Maar het nieuws van de droneaanval in de Afghaanse hoofdstad Kabul heeft ook zijn schaduwzijde.
‘Gerechtigheid is geschied. Deze terroristenleider leeft niet meer’, zo kondigde de Amerikaanse president tevreden aan dat Al-Zawahiri was gedood bij een droneaanval op zijn schuiladres in Kabul. Het succes van de CIA-operatie is een meevaller die Biden goed kan gebruiken, nu zijn populariteit gevaarlijk diep is gezakt, als gevolg van de stijgende prijzen en de haperende economie.
Veel Amerikanen beschouwen de 79-jarige president als een zwakke leider, dus legde het Witte Huis er veel nadruk op dat Biden zelf actief betrokken was bij het voorbereiden van de droneaanval op het huis waar de opvolger van Al Qaida-oprichter Osama bin Laden zich schuilhield. Niks nieuws overigens: ook zijn voorgangers Barack Obama en Donald Trump waren niet te beroerd om hun rol bij het uitschakelen van Bin Laden (2011) en IS-leider Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (2019) te belichten.
Met de operatie revancheerde Biden zich niet alleen voor de aanslagen van 11 september, waarbij Al-Zawahiri een belangrijke rol speelde, maar ook voor de vernederende aftocht van de Amerikaanse troepen uit Afghanistan, bijna een jaar geleden. Het chaotische verloop daarvan kwam Biden op het verwijt te staan dat hij het imago van de VS onherstelbare schade had toegebracht door de Afghaanse bondgenoten in de steek te laten.
De precisieaanval op Zawahiri toont Witte Huis-medewerkers aan dat de Verenigde Staten, zoals Biden vorig jaar beloofde, ook na hun vertrek uit Afghanistan nog greep kunnen houden op bedreigingen vanuit het land, met ‘operaties van over de horizon’, zoals dat heet.
Bescherming van Taliban
Het lijkt erop dat de CIA bij de droneaanval op de schuilplaats van Al-Zawahiri hulp heeft gekregen van informanten ter plaatse. Dat zou goed nieuws zijn voor de VS. Maar het feit dat de Al Qaida-leider zich schuilhield in een huis in een villawijk waar tal van hoge Taliban-functionarissen en militaire commandanten wonen, is pijnlijk voor Biden.
Het toont duidelijk aan dat de Taliban zich niet houden aan hun belofte dat zij geen onderdak meer zullen bieden aan terreurgroepen die een bedreiging voor de VS vormen. Het staat wel vast dat Al-Zawahiri daar onder bescherming van de Taliban woonde.
Bidens Republikeinse tegenstanders grepen dat meteen aan om zijn zegerondje te verstoren. Zawahiri’s aanwezigheid in Kabul toont volgens de Republikeinse senator James Inhofe de ‘totale mislukking van het Afghanistan-beleid van de regering-Biden aan’. Het Republikeinse Congreslid Michael McCaul beschuldigde de president ervan dat hij het Amerikaanse volk ‘heeft voorgelogen’. ‘Al Qaida is niet weg uit Afghanistan, zoals Biden vorig jaar valselijk beweerde.’
Nog in juni dit jaar waarschuwden experts van de Verenigde Naties in een rapport dat Al Qaida sinds het vertrek van de Amerikaanse soldaten weer steeds meer bewegingsruimte heeft gekregen onder het Taliban-regime. Het rapport wees er ook al op dat tal van Al Qaida-figuren zouden zijn neergestreken in de vroegere diplomatieke wijk in Kabul, al dachten zij toen nog dat Al-Zawahiri in het onherbergzame gebied langs de grens met Pakistan zou zitten.
Eerder waarschuwde het Soufan Center in New York, dat zich bezighoudt met terroristische groeperingen, al dat Al Qaida na de Amerikaanse terugtrekking bezig was zich te hergroeperen en te bewapenen. Honderden Al Qaida-strijders zouden in de provincie Helmand training krijgen van de Taliban en buitenlandse jihadisten.
Doha-akkoord
Voor Al Qaida betekent de dood van de ervaren Al-Zawahiri, een man die nog met Osama bin Laden zelf heeft gewerkt, ongetwijfeld een zware slag. Toch waarschuwen Afghanistan-experts dat het zeker niet het einde van de terreurgroep zal betekenen. Vooralsnog vertonen de Taliban geen enkele neiging de banden met Al Qaida te verbreken, ondanks de beloften die zij deden in het Doha-akkoord uit 2020 met de VS onder president Trump.
President Biden verzekerde gisteren nog eens dat de VS niet zullen tolereren dat Afghanistan onder de Taliban opnieuw een uitvalsbasis voor terroristische groeperingen zal worden. Maar zijn probleem is dat het Taliban-bewind, waarbinnen de radicale vleugel de overhand heeft gekregen, daar niet erg van onder indruk zal zijn. De Taliban weten dat er onder de Amerikanen geen animo is voor een nieuw militair avontuur in Afghanistan, en al zeker niet bij Biden zelf.
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POSTUUM: AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI
ZELFS IN EIGEN KRING WERD AL-ZAWAHIRI, MET ZIJN BELEREND
ZWAAIENDE WIJSVINGER, ALS STEKELIG EN PEDANT ERVAREN
Ayman al-Zawahiri werd afgelopen weekend gedood door een Amerikaanse droneaanval. Het brein achter de aanslagen op 11 september en de opvolger van Osama bin Laden werd al op jonge leeftijd gegrepen door de ideeën van de radicale islam. Wie was hij precies?
‘Het is de plicht voor elke moslim, waar ook ter wereld, om Amerikanen en hun bondgenoten te vermoorden.’ Ayman al-Zawahiri, de opvolger en rechterhand van Al Qaida-leider Osama bin Laden, schreef deze woorden in 1998. Drie jaar later volgde de aanslag op het World Trade Center in New York, die bijna 3 duizend burgers het leven kostte.
De 71-jarige Al-Zawahiri, die dit weekend in de Afghaanse hoofdstad Kabul met een gerichte Amerikaanse droneaanval werd gedood, was de architect van de aanslagen op 11 september in 2001, waarmee de westerse wereld genadeloos geconfronteerd werd met radicaal-islamitische terreur op eigen bodem. Al-Zawahiri had toen al een imposant trackrecord als terrorist opgebouwd elders in de wereld. Zo was hij onder meer verantwoordelijk voor de aanslagen op Amerikaanse ambassades in Kenia en Tanzania in 1998, die meer dan 200 mensen het leven kostten, en de aanslag op toeristen in het Egyptische Luxor in 1997, met 62 doden tot gevolg.
Zaadjes voor radicalisering
De Egyptische Al-Zawahiri groeide op in een gegoed milieu in een buitenwijk van Caïro. Zijn vader was hoogleraar farmacie en zijn grootvader was een zeer vooraanstaand imam aan de belangrijke Al-Azhar-universiteit in Caïro. Al-Zawahiri werd al jong gegrepen door de radicale islam. Hij werd onder meer geïnspireerd door de bekende filosoof en dichter Sayyid Qutb, die gezien wordt als de grondlegger van de radicale politieke islam. Hij raakte als onopvallende en leergierige jonge man overtuigd van diens ideologie moslims te ‘bevrijden’ van het westerse imperialisme en de ‘ontrouwe’ Arabische regimes te vervangen door een staat waarin de ware islamitische leer zou worden toegepast.
Al-Zawahiri sloot zich op 14-jarige leeftijd aan bij de Moslimbroederschap. De executie van Qutb in 1966 door de Egyptische autoriteiten gaf hem op 15-jarige leeftijd het laatste duwtje richting de jihad: hij richtte een radicale ondergrondse beweging op, die later uitgroeide tot de Egyptische Islamitische Jihad. Ook voltooide hij als ijverige student zijn studie medicijnen en vestigde zich als chirurg in een door de Moslimbroederschap gefinancierde kliniek in Caïro. In 1980 werd hij uitgenodigd om te komen werken in een kliniek van het Rode Kruis in Peshawar in Pakistan, waar mujahedin-strijders werden verpleegd die in Afghanistan vochten tegen de Russische bezetters.
In die tijd ontmoette hij voor het eerst de charismatische Osama bin Laden, wiens latere lijfarts en strategisch mastermind hij werd. Bin Laden zou enorm tegen Al-Zawahiri hebben opgekeken, schrijven diverse media. ‘Aymen was het brein voor het lichaam van Bin Laden’, zo omschreef Montassar al-Zayat, een Egyptische advocaat die hem kende, de relatie tegen de Arabische nieuwszender Al Jazeera.
Heilige oorlog
Al-Zawahiri werd eind 1981 in Egypte gearresteerd en drie jaar vastgezet wegens betrokkenheid bij de moord op de voormalige Egyptische president Anwar al-Sadat. Sadat werd door radicale moslims zoals al-Zawahiri gehaat wegens de nauwe banden die hij onderhield met Israël, maar de Egyptische aanklagers konden niet bewijzen dat Al-Zawahiri achter de aanslag zat, waarop hij werd vrijgelaten. Na zijn gevangenisstraf, waar hij ernstig zou zijn gemarteld en verder geradicaliseerd, keerde hij terug naar Afghanistan en vestigde zich later met Bin Laden in Soedan, waar hij zich bekwaamde in het rekruteren van jonge jihadisten en het werven van fondsen voor de ‘heilige oorlog’.
Zo zou hij in 1993 nog onder een valse naam naar de VS zijn gereisd om bij Californische moskeeën geld in te zamelen voor Afghaanse kinderen die door Sovjet-mijnen zijn verminkt. In 1999 schreef de Britse krant The Guardian in een stuk met de titel ‘De Frankenstein die de CIA heeft gecreëerd’ dat Al-Zawahiri direct had geprofiteerd van Amerikaanse fondsen om buitenlandse jihadstrijders op te leiden. De CIA zou tussen 1985 en 1992 een half miljard dollar hebben uitgegeven aan trainingskampen waar uiteindelijk zo’n 15 duizend buitenlandse strijders zijn opgeleid om in Afghanistan tegen de Russen te vechten, maar die zich later tegen de ‘ongelovige en imperialistische‘ Amerikanen keerden.
Persoonlijke leven
Van zijn persoonlijke leven is weinig meer bekend dan dat hij vier keer is getrouwd. Zijn eerste vrouw, met wie hij zes kinderen had, kwam in december 2001 om bij een Amerikaanse droneaanslag in het Afghaanse Kandahar. Hij was toen al samen met Bin Laden ondergedoken omdat er een prijs van 25 miljoen dollar op hun hoofd was gezet, wegens hun rol in de aanslagen van 11 september.
Na de dood van Bin Laden in 2011 was Al-Zawahiri zijn gedoodverfde opvolger, maar hij miste diens charisma en zachtmoedige overtuigingskracht. ‘De jihad tegen Amerika stopt niet met de dood van een commandant of leider’, zo waarschuwde Al-Zawahiri drie maanden na Bin Ladens dood. Met zijn video-toespraken, waar hij met zijn typerend dikke brillenglazen, volle grijze baard en kenmerkende bult op het voorhoofd met belerend zwaaiende wijsvinger hel en verdoemenis predikte, maakte hij weinig vrienden. Ook in eigen kring werd hij als stekelig en pedant omschreven, zo schrijft The Guardian.
De Arabische Lente van 2011, waarin een reeks dictators door volksopstanden van de troon werd gestoten, was als een klap in het gezicht voor Al Qaida. ‘Hiermee werd duidelijk dat de jihad niet de enige manier was om af te komen van Arabische autocraten’, aldus The Guardian in een analyse. Al-Zawahiri probeerde invloed terug te winnen door samen te werken met de radicaal-islamitische bewegingen die de opstand in Syrië en Irak hadden gekaapt, maar die distantiëren zich van het voormalige Al Qaida-hoofdkwartier of gingen op in het veel extremere Islamitische Staat (IS). In zijn laatste jaren was Al-Zawahiri vrij onzichtbaar. Hij zou ernstig ziek zijn, totdat hij onlangs weer werd gesignaleerd op een balkon van een huis in de voormalige diplomatenwijk van Kabul. Op dat balkon werd hij afgelopen weekend getroffen door een drone, terwijl zijn gezin binnen was en de aanslag overleefde.
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THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, on Saturday, at my direction, the United States successfully concluded an airstrike in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed the emir of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
You know, al-Zawahiri was bin Laden’s leader. He was with him all the — the whole time. He was his number-two man, his deputy at the time of the terrorist attack of 9/11. He was deeply involved in the planning of 9/11, one of the most responsible for the attacks that murdered 2,977 people on American soil.
For decades, he was a mastermind behind attacks against Americans, including the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, which killed 17 American sailors and wounded dozens more.
He played a key role — a key role in the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 and wounding over 4,500 others.
He carved a trail of murder and violence against American citizens, American service members, American diplomats, and American interests. And since the United States delivered justice to bin Laden 11 years ago, Zawahiri has been a leader of al Qaeda — the leader.
From hiding, he coordinated al Qaeda’s branches and all around the world — including setting priorities, for providing operational guidance that called for and inspired attacks against U.S. targets.
He made videos, including in recent weeks, calling for his followers to attack the United States and our allies.
Now justice has been delivered, and this terrorist leader is no more.
People around the world no longer need to fear the vicious and determined killer. The United States continues to demonstrate our resolve and our capacity to defend the American people against those who seek to do us harm.
You know, we — we make it clear again tonight that no matter how long it takes, no matter where you hide, if you are a threat to our people, the United States will find you and take you out.
After relentlessly seeking Zawahiri for years under Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump, our intelligence community located Zawahiri earlier this year. He had moved to downtown Kabul to reunite with members of his immediate family.
After carefully considering the clear and convincing evidence of his location, I authorized a precision strike that would remove him from the battlefield once and for all.
This mission was carefully planned and rigorously minimized the risk of harm to other civilians. And one week ago, after being advised that the conditions were optimal, I gave the final approval to go get him, and the mission was a success. None of his family members were hurt, and there were no civilian casualties.
I’m sharing this news with the American people now, after confirming the mission’s total success through the painstaking work of our counterterrorism community and key allies and partners.
My administration has kept congressional leaders informed as well.
When I ended our military mission in Afghanistan almost a year ago, I made the decision that after 20 years of war, the United States no longer needed thousands of boots on the ground in Afghanistan to protect America from terrorists who seek to do us harm.
And I made a promise to the American people that we’d continue to conduct effective counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and beyond.
We’ve done just that.
In February, our forces conducted a daring mission in Syria that eliminated the emir of ISIS.
Last month, we took out another key ISIS leader. Now we have eliminated the emir of al Qaeda. He will never again — never again allow Afghanistan to become a terrorist safe haven because he is gone, and we’re going to make sure that nothing else happens. You know, it can’t be a launching pad against the United States. We’re going to see to it that won’t happen.
This operation is a clear demonstration that we will, we can, and we’ll always make good on the sol- — solemn pledge.
My administration will continue to vigilantly monitor and address threats from al Qaeda, no matter where they emanate from.
As Commander-in-Chief, it is my solemn responsibility to make America safe in a dangerous world. The United States did not seek this war against terror. It came to us, and we answered with the same principles and resolve that have shaped us for generation upon generation: to protect the innocent, defend liberty, and we keep the light of freedom burning — a beacon for the rest of the entire world.
Because this is the great and defining truth about our nation and our people: We do not break. We never give in. We never back down.
Last year, on September 11th, I once more paid my respects to Ground Zero in New York City, at that quiet field in Shanksville, at the Pentagon — and at the Pentagon.
Standing at the memorial at Ground Zero, seeing the names of those who died forever etched in bronze, is a powerful reminder of the sacred promise we made as a nation: We will never forget.
The memorial also bears a quotation from Virgil: “No day shall erase you from the memory of time.” “No day shall erase you from the memory of time.”
So we continue to mourn every innocent life that was stolen on 9/11 and honor their memories.
To the families who lost fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, friends and co-workers on that searing September day, it is my hope that this decisive action will bring one more measure of closure. No day shall erase them from the memory of time.
Today and every day, I am so grateful to the superb patriots who serve the United States intelligence community and counterterrorism communities. They never forget. Those dedicated women and men who tirelessly worked every single day to keep our country safe and to prevent future tragedies — it is thanks to their extraordinary persistence and skill that this operation was a success. They have made us all safer.
And to those around the world who continue to seek to harm the United States, hear me now: We will always remain vigilant, and we will act. And we will always do what is necessary to ensure the safety and security of Americans at home and around the globe.
Today, we remember the lost. We commit ourselves to the safety of the living. And we pledge that we shall never waver from defending our nation and its people.
Thank you, all. And may God protect our troops and all those who serve in harm’s way.
We will never — we will never give up.
7:40 P.M. EDT
[2]
WIKIPEDIA
ALBERT EINSTEIN
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein
WIKIPEDIA
THE SCOTTSBORO BOYS
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scottsboro_Boys
”1. Shortly before moving to America, Einstein backed a campaign to defend the Scottsboro Boys, nine Alabama teenagers who were falsely accused of rape in 1931.”
Albert Einstein earned international fame for his general theory of relativity, which was published 100 years ago. The landmark theory redefined how people thought about space, time and gravity, but in the last 20 years of his life, Einstein parlayed his public admiration into promoting causes outside of physics that were dear to his heart.
Most people know that Einstein was an anti-war activist, but after moving to the United States in 1933 and becoming a U.S. citizen, the iconic scientist also confronted American racism. According to the authors of “Einstein on Race and Racism,” (Rutgers University Press, 2006), Einstein was keenly aware of the similarities between American segregation and the treatment of Jews in Germany.
Before moving to Princeton, New Jersey, Einstein was harassed and denounced by the Nazis. But when he got to his new hometown in the United States, he found that it was also strictly segregated, with separate schools and movie theaters for blacks and whites. And at the time, Princeton University wouldn’t admit black students. [10 Historically Significant Political Protests]
Some of Einstein’s most significant efforts for civil rights took place in 1946, a year in which a wave of anti-black violence swept the United States. African-American World War II veterans were attacked and lynched throughout America. Yet the mainstream media often ignored Einstein’s speeches and writings on civil rights during this time, leaving little public record of his efforts.
While celebrating the general theory of relativity’s 100th anniversary, it’s also worth remembering Einstein’s lesser-known advocacy work. Here are six ways Albert Einstein supported the civil rights movement in America.
1. Shortly before moving to America, Einstein backed a campaign to defend the Scottsboro Boys, nine Alabama teenagers who were falsely accused of rape in 1931.
2. When Princeton’s Nassau Inn refused to rent a room to contralto opera star Marian Anderson because of her skin color, Einstein invited the singer home as his guest. Their friendship lasted from 1937 until his death in 1955, and Anderson stayed with the Einsteins whenever she visited Princeton.
3. In 1946, Einstein gave a rare speech at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, a historically black university, where he also accepted an honorary degree. The appearance was significant because Einstein made a habit of turning down all requests to speak at universities. During his speech, he called racism “a disease of white people.”
4. Einstein was a friend and supporter of African-American actor and singer Paul Robeson, who was blacklisted because of his civil rights work. The pair worked together in 1946 on an anti-lynching petition campaign. In 1952, when Robeson’s career had bottomed out because of the blacklisting, Einstein invited Robeson to Princeton as a rebuke to the performer’s public castigation.
5. For decades, Einstein offered public encouragement to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and its founder, W. E. B. Du Bois. And in 1951, when the federal government indicted the 83-year-old Du Bois as a “foreign agent,” Einstein offered to appear as a character witness during the trial. The potential publicity convinced the judge to drop the case.
6. In January 1946, Einstein published an essay, “The Negro Question,” in Pageant magazine in which he called racism America’s “worst disease.” Here is an excerpt from that essay.
“There is, however, a somber point in the social outlook of Americans. Their sense of equality and human dignity is mainly limited to men of white skins. Even among these there are prejudices of which I as a Jew am clearly conscious; but they are unimportant in comparison with the attitude of the “Whites” toward their fellow-citizens of darker complexion, particularly toward Negroes. The more I feel an American, the more this situation pains me. I can escape the feeling of complicity in it only by speaking out…
Your ancestors dragged these black people from their homes by force; and in the white man’s quest for wealth and an easy life they have been ruthlessly suppressed and exploited, degraded into slavery. The modern prejudice against Negroes is the result of the desire to maintain this unworthy condition.”
” An overflowing letter campaign from ordinary citizens all over the country, that included impassioned pleas from Thomas Mann, H.G. Wells and Albert Einstein, overwhelmed the Alabama officials after the first trials.”
“The lesson to black people, to my children, to everybody, is that you should always fight for your rights, even if it costs you your life. Stand up for your rights, even if it kills you. That’s all that life consists of.”
– Clarence Norris after his pardon in 1976
Initially, the NAACP was reluctant to champion the Scottsboro Boys’ case. The organization was barely solvent after the Great Depression and had limited resources in the South; Secretary Walter White did not want to harm the Association’s hard-earned reputation or alienate its powerful political and philanthropic allies on behalf of nine uneducated teenagers. They hoped to keep their involvement quiet and work behind the scenes to help the youths by retaining Clarence Darrow, the nation’s foremost attorney. However, after the deeply unpopular Communist Party threw the spotlight onto the Boys’ story using aggressive tactics that alienated the very Southerners the NAACP hoped to recruit, the organization entered the fray. Their more measured and slow response was met by furious disapproval from Langston Hughes, who chose to publish his Scottsboro poems in Communist papers in response. It also alienated the Boys’ parents, who instead put their trust in the Communists and convinced their sons to retain the ILD as counsel. As the trials wore on and they found more support, the NAACP took on a more public role.
Seeing an opportunity to promote their party’s ideas, the Communist Party built an intense grassroots movement to save the Scottsboro Boys. They encouraged meetings, rallies, marches, postcard and letter-writing campaigns and a heavy presence in the black neighborhoods of Northern cities through the black press and churches. They took the Boys’ mothers on a national and international publicity tour, aggressive tactics which thrust the story into the national spotlight. An overflowing letter campaign from ordinary citizens all over the country, that included impassioned pleas from Thomas Mann, H.G. Wells and Albert Einstein, overwhelmed the Alabama officials after the first trials. Public response to the Communist Party’s tactics were divided: some thought their loud and brash tactics were helpful, and others found them harmful as they infuriated the Southerners who saw them as radicals.
Upon the second trial’s guilty verdicts, with the aid of the mainstream press, the demonstrations became more widespread and took a newly political turn. Twenty-four hours after the verdict, over twenty-five thousand people sent telegrams to the governor of Alabama. Three thousand gathered at New York’s Penn Station to meet defense attorney Samuel Leibowitz at the train. Four thousand people heard him speak at Salem Methodist Episcopal Church. Ten thousand went to Union Square to hear Janie Patterson, Haywood Patterson’s mother, speak.
On May 8, 1933 four thousand marchers converged on Washington, DC. Among them was accuser Ruby Bates, who by then had recanted her story. She marched alongside Janie Patterson and Ada Wright, Andy and Roy Wright’s mother. When the marchers reached the White House, President Franklin Roosevelt refused to meet with them, insisting this was a state issue rather than a federal one. They presented a petition signed by 145,000 people as they were turned away.
The media and these grassroots efforts were largely influential in educating Northerners about the Jim Crow South. The constant headlines from the trials turned the Boys into a symbol of American injustice, forcing their story into the spotlight and people’s consciousness. The length of their imprisonment and the number of their trials over several years constantly kept them in the news. The two Supreme Court verdicts affirmed every person’s right to a due process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment.
EINDE ARTIKEL
TELEGRAM FROM THE COMMITTEE FOR DELIVERANCE OF
THE VICTIMS OF SCOTTSBORO IN BERLIN, GERMANY, TO GOVERNOR
Telegram from the Committee for Deliverance of the Victims of Scottsboro in Berlin, Germany, to Governeur Miller in Montogomery, Alabama.
Subject
Scottsboro Trial, Scottsboro, Ala., 1931; African Americans–Civil rights–Alabama; African Americans–Imprisonment–Alabama; Miller, Benjamin Meek, 1864-1944; Committee for Deliverance of the Victims of Scottsboro (Berlin, Germany); Einstein, Albert, 1879-1955; Mann, Thomas, 1875-1955; Kollwitz, Käthe, 1867-1945; Goldschmidt, Alfons, 1879-1940; Feuchtwanger, Lion, 1884-1958; Ossietzky, Carl von, 1889-1938
Description
This telegram from the Committee for Deliverance of the Victims of Scottsboro is signed by a group of Berlin-based intellectuals–“Professor Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, Kaete Collwitz, Alfons Goldschmidt, Lion Feuchtwanger, and Karl von Ossietzky.” The committee asks Governor Miller to “reserve the execution” of the Scottsboro Boys following the 1931 trial and stay of execution pending the Alabama Supreme Court review.
Creator
Committee for Deliverance of the Victims of Scottsboro (Berlin, Germany)
Source
Alabama Governor, Scottsboro Case appeals to the Governor, SG004235, Folder 2, Alabama Dept. of Archives and History
Cluster bombs became a matter of international attention once again when the United States began its air campaign in Afghanistan in October 2001. The United States had used them previously and extensively in the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 NATO campaign in Yugoslavia, leading to discussion about the pros and cons of a weapon containing submunitions. The Afghan conflict renewed this debate. The U.S. military considered cluster bombs a valuable part of their Afghan arsenal. In 232 strikes during the first six months of the war, the United States dropped about 1,228 CBUs with 248,056 bomblets.60 Their use, however, generated wartime criticism from governments and NGOs and gave new life to the push for cluster bomb regulation.
The War in Afghanistan The U.S. air war in Afghanistan, a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, began on October 7, 2001.61 The first few days of the war consisted of “strategic” attacks on fixed military targets and were followed by weeks of “tactical” attacks on moving targets and command-and-control activities. As part of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. planes dropped bombs daily on military bases, airfields, terrorist training camps, communication facilities, and other targets. On October 19, a small number of U.S. ground troops were deployed to help work with and coordinate air strikes with Afghan proxy forces. With help from the skies, these anti-Taliban forces fought their way toward the country’s major urban centers. During the second week of November, they captured Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan in the north, Herat in the northwest, and Jalalabad in the east. The string of successes included the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, on November 13. Kunduz and Kandahar, the last Taliban strongholds, fell on November 25 and December 7, respectively. On December 22, interim Chairman Hamid Karzai and the new government took office.
In December, the United States shifted its attention to Afghanistan’s mountain caves where Taliban and al-Qaeda troops were hiding. It began a month-long bombardment of the mountains around Tora Bora on November 30. Operation Anaconda, which lasted from March 2 to March 18, 2002, targeted pockets of al-Qaeda in the Shahi-Kot area south of Gardez. As of November 2002, U.S. forces continued to carry out operations in the mountain regions and in central Afghanistan.
Cluster bombs played a role throughout the U.S. air campaign. In the first week alone, Air Force B-1 bombers reportedly dropped fifty CBU-87s, containing 10,100 bomblets, in five missions.62 The first widely publicized case of cluster bomb use occurred on October 22 when at least one weapon apparently went astray near Herat.63 The United Nations reported that eight people died during a strike on Qala Shater and a ninth died from an unexploded bomblet after the attack. The bomblets also injured fourteen others and completely or partially destroyed twenty of the village’s forty-five homes.64 U.S. officials acknowledged the use of cluster bombs but would not comment on the specific strike. “As we said before, we’re going to use the entire spectrum of our conventional weaponry. And . . . yes, we have used cluster-bomb units,” Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at an October 25 press briefing.65 The Qala Shater incident attracted great media attention and started a public debate over the use of cluster bombs in Afghanistan.66
As the war progressed, journalists tracked cluster bomb use across the country. The United States dropped CBUs near Herat at the end of October and against frontline troops near Mazar67 and in the Shomali Plain north of Kabul shortly thereafter.68 Reporters witnessed cluster bomb strikes outside Kunduz around the time of its fall in late November.69 After that, use seemed to shift to the south as the United States and its allies moved in on Kandahar.70 By the end of November, journalists began writing regularly about the aftereffects of cluster strikes-civilians killed by unexploded bomblets that littered the country, especially in the Shomali Plain and near Herat and Khanabad.71
The United States also used cluster bombs extensively in its cave campaigns near Tora Bora and Shahi-Kot.72 Forty-six of the reported 232 strikes fell on these regions.73 Reporters who arrived at an al-Qaeda camp in mid-December described the aftermath of a cluster strike, including denuded trees, shredded clothing, “twisted cooking pots,” torn religious books, and dead al-Qaeda fighters.74 Nearby they found CBU casings with messages painted on them by U.S. troops. “For those `dreams taken,’ have a few nightmares. D.,” said one. “This is going to shine like a diamond in a goat’s ass. Gary,” read another.75 Since Operation Anaconda, there has been little, or no, use of cluster bombs.
Public Debate over Cluster Bombs The use of cluster bombs and reports of civilian casualties caused great debate during the war. NGOs and some governments criticized the use of cluster bombs in Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch as well as other NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the European Parliament called for an immediate stop to the use of cluster bombs in Afghanistan.76 The Taliban tried to capitalize on this sentiment. “They are contaminating our farm lands and destroying our villages. It is very dangerous for civilians to try and remove these bombs,” Taliban Education Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said the day after the Qala Shater incident.77 He asked human rights groups to push the United States to suspend cluster attacks.78
Most organizations focused on the dangers cluster bombs posed to Afghan civilians. Some groups highlighted the inherent inaccuracy of CBUs. Landmine Action said they are “prone to miss their targets.”79 Anti-mine NGOs emphasized the dud rate and long-term effects of unexploded bomblets. “Politicians must tell the military that they do not have the right to use arms they know have dramatic consequences against civilian populations, even after a conflict is over,” said the director of Handicap International.80 Landmine Action noted that the duds both endangered civilians’ lives and kept the already starving population from farming their land.81 Seeking to minimize the aftereffects of these duds, several critics called for the U.S. government to take responsibility for post-war cleanup.82
Opponents argued the bombs were not only dangerous but also ineffective, especially in a war against terrorism where winning civilian support was crucial. “You will not win the hearts and minds of a people if, in your effort to provide them with a better future, your real legacy is to be associated with hidden deaths and hideous wounds for years to come,” said a Church of England spokesman.83 Christian Aid and others said the use of cluster bombs countered the U.S. claim that it intended to minimize civilian casualties.84
The U.S. cluster bomb attacks drew criticism from governments and intergovernmental organizations as well as NGOs. In a December resolution prompted by the events in Afghanistan, the European Parliament called for an “immediate moratorium” on cluster bombs until an international agreement was reached.85 The Parliament said it was “extremely concerned at the difficulty in accurately targeting cluster bombs during conflict, the high proportion of cluster bomblets which are found to have failed to detonate on impact, and the wide area of coverage of the bomblets, all of which means they pose a serious long-term threat to the civilian populations.”86
Meanwhile, U.N. officials asked the U.S. military for information on the “nature, timing and targets of daily bombing runs so that innocent civilians would not be needlessly injured.”87 They also called on the United States to provide technical advice and assist with BLU clearance in Afghanistan.88 The U.N. organization that oversees demining in Afghanistan said its local deminers put themselves at risk when clearing BLUs because they were unfamiliar with this kind of submunition.89 A Pentagon official responded that the U.S. military does not assume responsibility for clearing unexploded ordnance.90
The United States defended its use of cluster munitions in Afghanistan. Officials argued that the weapons were militarily effective and legal under international law.91 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem highlighted their use against frontline al-Qaeda and Taliban troops92 while others said they were useful for attacking military facilities.93 The Pentagon did not deny the claims of civilian side effects but emphasized that it limited the use of cluster bombs to certain circumstances. “[I]t goes back to the basic issue of targeteering and weaponeering the particular target. We take great pains to do that. And we only use the cluster munitions when they are the most effective weapon for the intended target,” Myers said after the Qala Shater incident.94 Myers said that the military considered IHL and the minimization of civilian casualties as part of this calculus. He explained, “We are trying to be very careful in the way we plan this particular conflict. Probably only the U.S. and its allies could do it in such a way that we minimize civilian casualties. If we match up a specific weapon to a specific target and we make the judgment that it’s in accordance with the law of armed conflict, and we’ve worked this very, very carefully, then we’ll use that weapon.”95
While the care taken in targeting shows that the United States was concerned about potential civilian casualties, the Pentagon placed these casualties in the larger context of the war on terrorism. “We’re now being threatened with weapons that could kill tens of thousands of people. We’re trying to avoid killing innocent people, but we have to win this war and we’ll use the weapons we need to in this war,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said in response to a question about cluster bombs.96 When asked about the civilian casualties CBUs cause, Pentagon officials said that they were more concerned with the thousands who were intentionally killed on September 11. “In some cases, [matching the weapon to a target] means cluster bombs. And we understand the impact of those. I would take you back to September 11. We also understand the impact of that,” Myers said.97 With such comments, the military highlighted the distinction between civilians killed as an unintentional side effect of war and civilians intentionally targeted.
Through much of this public debate, the Department of Defense did itself a disservice. First, Human Rights Watch discussions with military officials illuminated the elaborate targeting process they followed for air strikes, but the Defense Department never publicized the details of this process. Second, while identifying an important distinction in the cause of civilian deaths, its comparison to September 11 suggested insensitivity to deaths of innocent Afghans. Finally, it refused to comment on specific incidents where civilians died. When asked about the widely reported Qala Shater incident, Myers said he had not heard of it.98 His inability to comment was in part due to the Pentagon’s lack of information from the ground, but he made no effort to explain that or follow up with more information later.
The lack of “ground truth” made the wartime debate over cluster bombs provocative but limited. Because they could not investigate the weapon’s effects on the ground during the height of the bombing, cluster bomb opponents based their criticism on their general knowledge of cluster bombs, experiences in Yugoslavia and the Gulf, and press accounts of casualties in Afghanistan. The press frequently relied on second- or third-hand sources, leading to inaccurate tallies or duplicate reports.99 Even the U.S. military was unable to assess thoroughly the effects of its bombing. It relied on aerial photos, which proved ineffective in assessing cluster bomb use because the wide dispersal of bomblets and relatively small explosions they produce make it difficult to see civilian effects from high altitudes.100
ORIGINELE BRON
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
UNITED STATES-AFGHANISTAN
FATALLY FLAWED:
CLUSTERBOMBS AND THEIR USE BY THE UNITED STATES IN
Russische en Oekraïense strijdkrachten bestoken elkaar niet alleen op het slagveld. De partijen beschuldigen elkaar er de afgelopen dagen vaker van het oorlogsrecht te schenden. Ook wie oorlog voert, moet zich aan regels houden.
Oekraïne zou afweergeschut expres in woonwijken plaatsen, zegt Rusland. De Russen worden er op hun beurt door Oekraïne van beschuldigd burgerobjecten te bestoken met nietsontziende wapens. “Het plegen van oorlogsmisdrijven heeft op de tegenstander vaak een afschrikwekkende werking”, zegt hoogleraar Militair Recht Marten Zwanenburg, die zich specialiseert in het oorlogsrecht.
Internationale regels voor oorlogvoering
Wat strijdende partijen wel en vooral niet mogen tijdens een oorlog staat grotendeels beschreven in de Verdragen van Genève uit 1949 en de twee aanvullende Protocollen uit 1977. Hier staat onder andere in wat de rechten zijn van gewonden, zieken en gevangenen tijdens een oorlog. Alle landen ter wereld hebben de verdragen ondertekend.
Het is vooral het eerste van de twee aanvullende protocollen dat relevant is in het conflict tussen Rusland en Oekraïne. Dat bevat namelijk aanvullende regels voor internationale conflicten. Rusland en Oekraïne hebben dit verdrag geratificeerd, officieel bekrachtigd, en zijn dus gebonden aan de regels die bijvoorbeeld het gebruik van wapens beperken.
Gifgas altijd verboden
Zwanenburg wijst naar wapens die op zichzelf verboden zijn en wapens die op zichzelf niet verboden zijn, maar wel bij bepaald gebruik. Zo is het gebruik van gifgas in alle situaties verboden.
Raketten met explosieven zijn op zichzelf niet verboden, maar wel wanneer die niet specifiek gericht kunnen worden op een militair doel. “Als Russen of Oekraïners raketten inzetten en die niet richten op zo’n doel, dan is dat niet toegestaan.”
Alleen militaire doelen bestoken
Dat heeft te maken met een ander fundamenteel grondbeginsel van het oorlogsrecht: het zogenoemde ‘beginsel van onderscheid’. “Strijdkrachten mogen alleen doelen bestoken die voldoen aan de definitie van een militair doel in het oorlogsrecht”, vertelt Zwanenburg.
“Daarvoor moet een object onder andere een bijdrage leveren aan de militaire inspanningen van de tegenstander. Bovendien moet een aanval een duidelijk militair voordeel opleveren. Een ziekenhuis of school bestoken valt daar niet onder. Maar als het pand wordt gebruikt voor de gewapende strijd, dan is de situatie anders.”
‘Steeds meer aanvallen op burgerdoelen’
Premier Mark Rutte zei donderdag dat Russische aanvallen zich steeds meer lijken te richten op burgerdoelen. Ook Amnesty International en Human Rights Watch zijn kritisch op de Russische aanvallen in Oekraïne.
Na bestudering van verschillende incidenten, kwamen de mensenrechtenorganisaties tot de conclusie dat Rusland ‘willekeurige aanvallen uitvoert in burgergebieden’. “Dat is in strijd met het oorlogsrecht”, zeggen ze.
‘Staten zelf verantwoordelijk’
Een onderzoeksteam van het Internationaal Strafhof begint een onderzoek naar de aantijgingen. Aangezien Rusland de rechtsmacht van het Internationaal Strafhof niet erkent, is het niet realistisch dat mogelijke verdachten uiteindelijk in Den Haag berecht worden, zegt hoogleraar Zwanenburg.
“Er is verder geen centrale autoriteit die toeziet op de naleving van het oorlogsrecht. Staten zijn in eerste instantie zelf verantwoordelijk voor de naleving van het oorlogsrecht.”
Aanleiding voor sancties
Heeft zo’n onderzoek van het Internationaal Strafhof dan wel zin? Ja, zegt Zwanenburg. Want de resultaten kunnen voor andere landen aanleiding zijn om een land op z’n daden aan te spreken bij de Verenigde Naties, of om sancties in te stellen.
“Dat is ook gebeurd nadat VN-commissies onderzoek deden naar vermeende oorlogsmisdrijven in Syrië en Myanmar.”
Sommige landen terughoudend
Wel zegt de hoogleraar erbij dat het belangrijk is om welk land het gaat. “Je ziet dat bewezen schendingen van het oorlogsrecht aanleiding vormen voor politieke druk.”
“Maar Rusland is geopolitiek gezien een belangrijker land dan Syrië en Myanmar en heeft bovendien vetorecht in de VN-Veiligheidsraad. Dat maakt dat sommige landen terughoudender zijn in hun veroordelingen.”
Veroordeeld dankzij social media
In hoeverre Oekraïense of Russische strijdkrachten momenteel het oorlogsrecht schenden, is moeilijk in te schatten. Premier Rutte dringt aan op een database om mogelijke oorlogsmisdrijven in Oekraïne in kaart te brengen. Zwanenburg voelt wel wat voor zo’n database. “Zo komt meer informatie beschikbaar om onderzoek te doen naar vermeende misdrijven tijdens de oorlog en dat kan helpen.”
Hij wijst op een recente veroordeling van een oorlogsmisdadiger door het Internationaal Strafhof, die werd veroordeeld mede op basis van beelden die op social media rondgingen. “Tegenwoordig heeft iedereen mobiel. Amateurbeelden worden steeds belangrijker bij het documenteren van oorlogsmisdrijven.”
Clustermunitie en een vacuümbom
Nederland constateerde dat Rusland omstreden clustermunitie heeft ingezet in de strijd in Oekraïne. Het verdrag dat het gebruik hiervan verbiedt, is niet ondertekend door Rusland, zegt Zwanenburg.
Ook over de inzet van een vacuümbom, die lucht onttrekt uit de nabije omgeving, heeft Rusland geen verdragen getekend. Als een partij zulke wapens gebruikt, speelt vooral het ‘proportionaliteitsbeginsel’ een grote rol.
Gevolgen voor burgers
Dat beginsel is belangrijk in het oorlogsrecht, legt hoogleraar Zwanenburg uit. “Kort samengevat: de verwachte gevolgen van een aanval op een militair doel voor burgers en burgerobjecten mogen niet buitensporig zijn ten opzichte van het verwachte militaire voordeel van die aanval.”
“Dat wil zeggen dat de nevenschade – het aantal gewonde of gedode burgers en beschadigde burgerdoelen – redelijkerwijs opweegt tegen het militaire voordeel van een aanval. Hoe groter het voordeel, hoe meer nevenschade er mag zijn”, zegt hij. “Al klinkt dat natuurlijk wel een beetje cru.” De inschatting van de nevenschade en het militaire voordeel moet vooraf worden gemaakt. “Blijkt er achteraf toch sprake van meer nevenschade dan gedacht, dan is de aanval niet meteen buitenproportioneel. Dat hangt af van de inschatting vooraf.”
Meestal worden regels nageleefd
Tot nu toe worden in veel gevallen de oorlogsregels in grote lijnen nageleefd, weet Zwanenburg. “Je hoort het pas wanneer het niet zo is, want dat is nieuws. Vaak is het zo dat een individu één regel niet naleeft.”
“Het beleid van staten is in oorlogen vaak gericht op het naleven van het oorlogsrecht, maar soms sturen autoriteiten wel eens bewust aan op de schending ervan.”
Gifgasaanvallen
Als recent voorbeeld noemt de hoogleraar Syrië. Volgens rapporten van de Verenigde Naties heeft de Syrische overheid zich tijdens de nog altijd lopende burgeroorlog schuldig gemaakt aan gifgasaanvallen. Ook zouden duizenden gevangenen in een militaire gevangenis zijn opgehangen.
“Mijn persoonlijke inschatting is dat machthebbers zoiets doen met de achterliggende gedachte om af te schrikken. Onderdeel van een oorlog is vaak om de tegenstander zo te intimideren dat die niet meer wil vechten.”
ELMAU (ANP/DPA/AFP) – De Europese Unie zal zich waarschijnlijk aansluiten bij een boycot op Russisch goud. Charles Michel, voorzitter van de Europese Raad, bevestigde zondag bij de G7-top in het Duitse Schloss Elmau dat hij de oorlogskas van Rusland zo verder hoopt te raken.
De landen van de G7, een groep van rijke industrielanden, stellen volgens de Amerikaanse president Joe Biden ook een importverbod voor Russisch goud in. Een officiële aankondiging zou later deze week komen.
De goudexport leverde Rusland vorig jaar omgerekend zo’n 14,6 miljard euro op. Het edelmetaal is naast fossiele energiebronnen als olie, gas en kolen een belangrijk exportproduct van Rusland.
Michel zei dat een importverbod voor goud op een manier moet worden ingesteld dat het “de economie van Rusland raakt, en niet onszelf”.
Op de G7-top vinden ook gesprekken plaats over het instellen van een prijsplafond voor Russische olie. Michel zei dat daarover nog veel details besproken moeten worden en waarschuwde dat hij instemming nodig heeft van alle 27 lidstaten voordat de EU zo’n maatregel kan nemen. “Het doel is Rusland te raken, en niet om ons leven nog gecompliceerder te maken.”
Frankrijk toonde zich bereid om een mechanisme voor een maximale prijs voor Russische olie te steunen. Maar president Emmanuel Macron zou liever willen dat olieproducerende landen een bovengrens instellen voor olieprijzen, om zo de inflatie te beteugelen. Dat zou effectiever zijn.
Groot-Brittannië, de Verenigde Staten, Japan en Canada gaan de import van Russisch goud aan banden leggen als sanctie vanwege de oorlog in Oekraïne. Het importverbod moet binnenkort van kracht worden en zal van toepassing zijn op nieuw gewonnen en geraffineerd goud.
Volgens de Britse premier Boris Johnson heeft de strafmaatregel direct gevolgen voor Russische oligarchen en “de oorlogsmachine van Poetin”. Veel oligarchen zetten bezittingen om in goud. Op die manier proberen ze de gevolgen van de strenge internationale sancties tegen Moskou het hoofd te bieden.
De maatregel zal Russisch goud effectief van de wereldgoudmarkt weren, zegt Johnson, aangezien Londen een centrale rol speelt in de internationale goudhandel en ook de drie andere grootmachten de import blokkeren. De goudexport leverde de Russische economie vorig jaar omgerekend zo’n 14,6 miljard euro op.
De andere G7-landen gaan volgens de Amerikaanse president Joe Biden ook een verbod instellen. Dat hebben de andere landen zelf nog niet bevestigd. Biden spreekt op Twitter van “ongekende kosten” voor president Vladimir Poetin en de financiering van de Russische inval in Oekraïne.
De sanctie wordt officieel gepresenteerd tijdens de G7-top in het Duitse Elmau. De grote industrielanden van de wereld overleggen daar de komende dagen over onder meer de gevolgen van de oorlog in Oekraïne. Volgens een Amerikaanse overheidsfunctionaris wordt het importverbod dinsdag toegelicht.
De Europese Unie zal waarschijnlijk ook aansluiten bij de boycot. Voorzitter van de Europese Raad Charles Michel hoopt zo de oorlogskas van Rusland verder te raken. Hij zegt dat een importverbod voor goud op een manier moet worden ingesteld dat het “de economie van Rusland raakt, en niet onszelf”.
Op 3 juni 2022 heeft de Europese Unie (EU) het zesde sanctiepakket tegen Rusland aangenomen. De sancties zijn ingesteld vanwege de aanhoudende Russische agressie tegen Oekraïne. De nieuwe sancties zijn onder andere gericht tegen de import van olie, tegen Russische banken, mediabedrijven, de defensie- en veiligheidssector, en verantwoordelijke personen en entiteiten. Ook de sancties tegen Belarus (Wit-Rusland) worden aangescherpt.
Nieuwe sancties tegen Rusland en Belarus
De EU heeft het zesde sanctiepakket tegen Rusland aangenomen. Het doel hiervan is om de druk op de verantwoordelijke personen te verhogen en het Rusland nog moeilijker te maken om de oorlog in Oekraïne te bekostigen. Net als in vorige sanctiepakketten worden ook maatregelen tegen Belarus genomen, vanwege de betrokkenheid van het land bij de oorlog.
De belangrijkste maatregelen in het kort:
Olie
Er komt in de EU een verbod op de aankoop, invoer en overdracht van ruwe olie (binnen 6 maanden) en geraffineerde olieproducten (binnen 8 maanden) uit Rusland. Er is een tijdelijke uitzondering voor EU-lidstaten die door hun ligging afhankelijk zijn van Russische voorraden en geen andere haalbare mogelijkheden hebben.
Banken
Drie extra Russische banken (Sberbank, Credit Bank of Moscow en Russian Agricultural Bank) worden afgesloten van het internationale betalingssysteem SWIFT. Dat geldt ook voor een Belarussische bank (Belarusian Bank For Development And Reconstruction).
Media
Een aantal Russische mediabedrijven mag niet meer in de EU uitzenden, om propaganda en nepnieuws tegen te gaan (Rossiya RTR/RTR Planeta, Rossiya 24/Russia 24 en TV Centre International).
Export
De EU breidt het exportverbod uit voor dual-use goederen (goederen die ook voor militaire doeleinden kunnen worden gebruikt) en technologie die door de Russische en Belarussische defensie- en veiligheidssectoren kunnen worden gebruikt.
Zakelijke diensten
Er komt een verbod op het verlenen van een aantal zakelijke diensten aan Rusland, zoals boekhouding, publieke relaties, consultancy en clouddiensten.
Sanctielijst
Er worden meer Russische en Belarussische personen en entiteiten op de sanctielijst geplaatst. Diegenen die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de Russische wandaden in Marioepol en Boetsja, vooraanstaande zakenlieden, politici, familieleden van oligarchen en bedrijven die het Russische leger bevoorraden.
Olieboycot tegen Rusland
Een boycot van Russische olie is een ingrijpende maatregel en heeft grote gevolgen. Niet alleen voor Rusland, maar ook voor de EU. Omdat Polen en Duitsland zullen afzien van Russische olie die zij nu nog per pijpleiding krijgen, zal de Russische olie-export naar de EU dit jaar waarschijnlijk afnemen met 80 tot 90 procent.
EU-landen in Centraal- en Oost-Europa die afhankelijker zijn van Russische olie krijgen langer de tijd om die afhankelijkheid af te bouwen. Het kabinet zet er nog steeds op in dat Nederland voor het einde van het jaar onafhankelijk is van Russische fossiele brandstoffen.
De Europese Unie blijft zich inzetten om Oekraïne te steunen in het recht op zelfverdediging tegen de Russische agressie. En om een vreedzame, democratische en welvarende toekomst op te bouwen. Een compleet overzicht van de sancties vind je op de sanctiepagina van de EU (pagina wordt bijgewerkt). Zie ook de EU-tijdlijn van de sancties tegen Rusland.
De EU heeft Rusland een reeks nieuwe sancties opgelegd sinds het land op 21 februari 2022 de niet onder Oekraïens gezag vallende gebieden van Donetsk en Loehansk erkende en op 24 februari 2022 zonder aanleiding of grond Oekraïne binnenviel.
De sancties komen bovenop de maatregelen die in 2014 tegen Rusland zijn ingesteld wegens de annexatie van de Krim en het niet uitvoeren van de akkoorden van Minsk.
Op deze pagina worden de volgende vragen beantwoord:
welke sancties heeft de EU tot dusver opgelegd, tegen wie en wat betekenen ze in de praktijk?
wat betekenen de sancties tegen de Russische banken en de Nationale Centrale Bank van Rusland in de praktijk?
welke sancties gelden er voor het wegvervoer en de lucht- en zeevaart?
wat zijn de gevolgen van de sancties voor de handel met Rusland en welke in- en uitvoerbeperkingen gelden er?
zijn EU-sancties in overeenstemming met het internationaal recht en wordt er samengewerkt met partners?
Welke sancties heeft de EU tot dusver aangenomen?
Sinds februari heeft de EU Rusland 6 sanctiepakketten opgelegd, waaronder individuele sancties, economische sancties en diplomatieke maatregelen.
De EU heeft ook sancties aangenomen tegen Belarus vanwege zijn betrokkenheid bij de invasie van Oekraïne.
De economische sancties moeten ervoor zorgen dat het militaire optreden Rusland zuur opbreekt en dat zijn aanvalsoorlog wordt gefnuikt.
De individuele sancties zijn gericht tegen personen die verantwoordelijk zijn voor het ondersteunen, financieren of uitvoeren van acties die de territoriale integriteit, de soevereiniteit en de onafhankelijkheid van Oekraïne ondermijnen of die van deze acties profiteren.
In totaal heeft de EU, inclusief de eerdere sancties wegens de annexatie van de Krim in 2014, tot dusver maatregelen genomen tegen 98 entiteiten en 1158 personen. Op de sanctielijst staan:
president Vladimir Poetin
minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Sergej Lavrov
oligarchen die banden hebben met het Kremlin, zoals Roman Abramovitsj
351 leden van de Doema (het Russische lagerhuis) die op 15 februari 2022 vóór de erkenning van Donetsk en Loehansk hebben gestemd
leden van de Nationale Veiligheidsraad
hoge ambtenaren en militairen
prominente zakenlieden (personen in de Russische staalindustrie en anderen die financiële diensten, militaire producten en technologie leveren aan de Russische staat)
propagandisten en actoren op het gebied van desinformatie
personen die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de gruweldaden in Boetsja en Marioepol
welbepaalde verwanten van een aantal van de bovengenoemde personen
Wat betekenen individuele sancties in de praktijk?
De sancties tegen personen zijn het reisverbod en de bevriezing van tegoeden. Een reisverbod belet dat personen het grondgebied van de EU nog binnenkomen of erdoor reizen, of dat nu over land, door de lucht of over de zee is.
Een bevriezing van tegoeden betekent dat alle rekeningen van een persoon of entiteit worden geblokkeerd. Het is daarmee verboden hun tegoeden of activa direct of indirect ter beschikking te stellen.
Zo kunnen ze hun geld niet langer gebruiken om het Russische regime te ondersteunen of om een veilig onderkomen in de EU te vinden.
Welke sancties gelden er voor de handel met Rusland?
De economische sancties omvatten onder meer een aantal beperkingen op de in- en uitvoer van producten naar en uit Rusland. Dit betekent dat Europese bedrijven bepaalde producten niet mogen uitvoeren naar Rusland (uitvoerbeperkingen) of invoeren uit Rusland (invoerbeperkingen).
Doel van de lijst met verboden producten is de Russische economie zo hard mogelijk te raken, maar de gevolgen voor Europese bedrijven en burgers te beperken. Om de Russische bevolking geen schade te berokkenen, staan producten die hoofdzakelijk bestemd zijn voor consumptie en gezondheids-, farmaceutische en landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen niet op de lijst.
De douaneautoriteiten in de EU controleren deze in- en uitvoerbeperkingen.
Bovendien heeft de EU, in samenwerking met gelijkgestemde partners, een verklaring aangenomen waarin zij zich het recht voorbehoudt om Rusland niet langer als meest begunstigde natie (een categorie in WTO-kader) te behandelen. De EU heeft ervoor gekozen om de invoertarieven niet te verhogen, maar wel een reeks beperkende maatregelen aan te nemen met onder meer een verbod op de in- en uitvoer van bepaalde goederen. De EU en haar partners hebben ook alle werkzaamheden voor de toetreding van Belarus tot de WTO opgeschort.
Welke goederen mogen niet worden uitgevoerd naar Rusland vanuit de EU?
Op de sanctielijst staan onder meer:
geavanceerde technologie (bijv. kwantumcomputers en geavanceerde halfgeleiders, elektronica en software)
bepaalde soorten machines en transportmiddelen
specifieke goederen en technologie voor petroleumraffinage
apparatuur, technologie en diensten voor de energiesector
goederen en technologie voor de luchtvaart- en ruimtevaartindustrie (bijv. vliegtuigen, reserveonderdelen of andere materialen voor vliegtuigen en helikopters, reactiemotorbrandstof)
goederen en radiocommunicatietechnologie voor de zeescheepvaart
een aantal producten voor tweeërlei gebruik (die kunnen worden gebruikt voor zowel civiele als militaire doeleinden), zoals software voor drones, drones zelf en encryptieapparatuur
luxegoederen (bijv. dure auto’s, horloges en juwelen)
Welke goederen mogen niet worden ingevoerd uit Rusland naar de EU?
Op de sanctielijst staan onder meer:
ruwe aardolie en geraffineerde aardolieproducten, met beperkte uitzonderingen (uitfasering in 6 tot 8 maanden)
steenkool en andere vaste fossiele brandstoffen (vanaf augustus 2022 i.v.m. afbouwperiode voor bestaande contracten)
staal en ijzer
hout, cement en bepaalde meststoffen
vis, schaal- en schelpdieren en sterke drank (bijv. kaviaar en wodka)
Wat betekent het olie-embargo in de praktijk?
In juni 2022 nam de Raad een zesde pakket sancties aan, dat onder meer de aankoop, invoer en overdracht van ruwe aardolie en bepaalde aardolieproducten uit Rusland naar de EU verbiedt. Deze maatregelen zullen geleidelijk ingaan: binnen 6 maanden voor ruwe aardolie en binnen 8 maanden voor geraffineerde aardolieproducten.
Er geldt een tijdelijke uitzondering voor de invoer van ruwe olie via pijpleidingen naar EU-lidstaten die vanwege hun geografische ligging specifiek afhankelijk zijn van Russische leveringen en geen haalbare alternatieven hebben.
Ook geldt er voor Bulgarije een tijdelijke uitzondering wat betreft de invoer van Russische ruwe olie over zee, en voor Kroatië wat betreft de invoer van vacuümgasolie.
Aangezien het grootste deel van de Russische olie over zee wordt vervoerd naar de EU, zorgt deze maatregel ervoor dat voor het einde van het jaar bijna 90% van alle invoer van Russische olie naar Europa wordt geboycot. Rusland zal dus aanzienlijk minder winst maken.
Welke sancties gelden er voor het wegvervoer?
De EU heeft afgesproken dat Russische en Belarussisch wegvervoerders de EU niet meer in mogen, ook niet voor goederen in doorvoer.
Zo kan Rusland minder gemakkelijk belangrijke goederen aankopen en wordt de handel over land van en naar Rusland verstoord. De EU-landen kunnen echter een uitzondering maken voor:
vervoer van energie
vervoer van farmaceutische, medische, landbouw- en voedingsproducten
humanitaire hulp
vervoer in verband met de diplomatieke en consulaire vertegenwoordiging van de EU en haar lidstaten in Rusland, of internationale organisaties in Rusland die overeenkomstig het internationaal recht immuniteiten genieten
overdracht aan of uitvoer naar Rusland van culturele goederen die in bruikleen zijn gegeven in het kader van een formele culturele samenwerking met Rusland
De maatregel geldt niet voor post en goederen in doorvoer tussen de oblast Kaliningrad en Rusland.
Wat betekenen de sancties in de luchtvaartsector?
In februari 2022 heeft de EU alle Russische luchtvaartmaatschappijen de toegang tot EU-luchthavens ontzegd en hen verboden nog over EU-grondgebied te vliegen. Het gaat om vliegtuigen die in Rusland of elders zijn geregistreerd en door een Russische burger of entiteit worden gehuurd of gecharterd. Het verbod geldt ook voor privévliegtuigen, zoals privéjets voor zakelijk gebruik.
Daarnaast verbiedt de EU dat er nog goederen en technologie voor de lucht- en ruimtevaartindustrie naar Rusland worden uitgevoerd.
Ook verzekeringen, onderhoudsdiensten en technische bijstand voor deze goederen en technologie zijn verboden. De Verenigde Staten, Canada en het Verenigd Koninkrijk hanteren soortgelijke beperkingen.
Dit betekent dat Russische luchtvaartmaatschappijen geen vliegtuigen, reserveonderdelen of uitrusting voor hun vloot kunnen kopen en niet de nodige reparaties of technische inspecties kunnen uitvoeren. Aangezien driekwart van Ruslands commerciële vliegtuigen in de EU, de VS of Canada is geproduceerd, zal het verbod er mettertijd mogelijk toe leiden dat een aanzienlijk deel van de Russische burgerluchtvaart aan de grond zal blijven, zelfs voor binnenlandse vluchten.
De EU heeft haar havens gesloten voor de gehele handelsvloot van Rusland (meer dan 2 800 schepen). De maatregel geldt echter niet voor schepen die de volgende zaken vervoeren:
energie
farmaceutische, medische, landbouw- en voedingsproducten
humanitaire hulpgoederen
splijtstof en andere goederen die nodig zijn voor de werking van civiele nucleaire vermogens
steenkool (tot 10 augustus 2022, daarna is de invoer van steenkool in de EU niet langer toegestaan)
De maatregel geldt ook niet voor schepen in nood die hulp zoeken, of schepen die een noodstop maken bij een haven om redenen van maritieme veiligheid of om mensenlevens op zee te redden.
De maatregel geldt wel voor vaartuigen die proberen de sancties te omzeilen door niet langer onder de Russische vlag te varen of zich te registreren in een andere staat. Havenautoriteiten kunnen dit nagaan door het IMO-nummer van een schip te controleren (een uniek identificatienummer dat wordt toegewezen namens de Internationale Maritieme Organisatie).
Wat betekent het Swift-verbod voor Russische en Belarussische banken?
Dankzij het verbod kunnen 10 Russische en 4 Belarussische banken geen internationale betalingen meer verrichten of ontvangen via het Swift-systeem.
Swift is een berichtendienst die de uitwisseling van informatie tussen banken en andere financiële instellingen aanzienlijk vergemakkelijkt. Wereldwijd zijn er meer dan 11 000 entiteiten op aangesloten.
Concreet kunnen de gestrafte banken geen buitenlandse valuta meer ontvangen en kunnen ze geen activa meer naar het buitenland overmaken. Dat is slecht voor de Russische en de Belarussische economie.
Theoretisch gezien zouden banken internationale transacties kunnen uitvoeren zonder Swift, maar dat is duur en complex en vereist wederzijds vertrouwen tussen de financiële instellingen. Betalen moet dan immers weer zoals vanouds: elke transactie moet per telefoon en fax worden bevestigd.
Wat betekenen de sancties tegen de Nationale Centrale Bank van Rusland in de praktijk?
De Europese Unie verbiedt alle transacties met de Nationale Centrale Bank van Rusland die te maken hebben met het beheer van haar reserves en activa. Doordat de tegoeden van de centrale bank bevroren zijn, heeft ze geen toegang meer tot de activa die ze bij centrale banken en particuliere instellingen in de EU heeft staan.
In februari 2022 bedroegen de internationale reserves van Rusland $ 643 miljard (€ 579 miljard). Reserves in vreemde valuta aanhouden draagt er onder meer toe bij dat de wisselkoers van de eigen valuta van een land stabiel blijft.
Nu transacties vanuit de EU en andere landen verboden zijn, staat naar schatting meer dan de helft van de Russische reserves geblokkeerd. Ook andere landen waar Rusland reserves heeft staan, zoals de VS, Canada en het VK, hebben zo’n verbod.
Rusland kan deze buffer dus niet gebruiken om zijn banken van zuurstof te voorzien en zo de gevolgen van andere sancties te beperken. Zelfs de goudreserves die in Rusland zijn opgeslagen, lijken nu moeilijker te verkopen.
De EU heeft ook een verbod ingesteld op de verkoop, levering, overdracht en uitvoer van eurobankbiljetten naar Rusland. Dat moet voorkomen dat de Russische regering, de centrale bank en natuurlijke of rechtspersonen in Rusland de sancties omzeilen door contante euro’s te bemachtigen.
Soortgelijke sancties gelden voor Belarus.
Waarom heeft de EU de omroepactiviteiten van 5 Russische mediakanalen opgeschort?
Met zijn stelselmatige internationale campagne van desinformatie, informatiemanipulatie en verdraaiing van feiten wil Rusland zowel de eigen buurlanden als de EU en de EU-lidstaten uit evenwicht brengen.
Om dit tegen te gaan heeft de EU de omroepactiviteiten in de EU van 5 Russische staatszenders opgeschort:
Sputnik
Russia Today
Rossiya RTR/RTR Planeta
Rossiya 24/Russia 24
TV Centre International
Het Kremlin gebruikt deze staatsmedia om propaganda te verspreiden en desinformatiecampagnes te voeren, onder meer over zijn aanvalsoorlog tegen Oekraïne.
De maatregelen tegen Sputnik en Russia Today (en hun dochterondernemingen, zoals RT English, RT Germany, RT France en RT Spanish) gelden sinds 2 maart 2022. De andere drie mediakanalen staan sinds 4 juni 2022 op de lijst.
Het gaat om alle omroepactiviteiten in of voor de EU-lidstaten: via kabel, satelliet, IPTV, platforms, websites en apps.
In overeenstemming met het Handvest van de grondrechten weerhouden de maatregelen er deze mediakanalen en hun personeel niet van om zich in de EU met andere dan omroepactiviteiten bezig te houden, zoals met onderzoek en interviews.
Stemt de EU de sancties af met haar partners?
Sancties hebben meer effect als een grote groep internationale partners meedoet. De EU heeft de afgelopen weken nauw samengewerkt met gelijkgestemde partners zoals de Verenigde Staten om samen sancties op te leggen.
De EU werkt samen met de Wereldbankgroep, de Europese Bank voor Wederopbouw en Ontwikkeling (EBWO), de Organisatie voor Economische Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling (OESO) en andere internationale partners om te voorkomen dat Rusland nog financiering van dergelijke instellingen verkrijgt.
Om deze internationale inspanning te coördineren, is onlangs de Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force opgericht. Deze taskforce stelt de EU in staat samen te werken met de G7-landen – Canada, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Italië, Japan, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de Verenigde Staten – en met Australië, om ervoor te zorgen dat de sancties worden toegepast.
Hoewel de EU met heel wat partners nauw samenwerkt, beslist elk van deze niet-EU-landen nog altijd zelf welke sancties het zal opleggen.
Vallen de EU-sancties onder het internationaal recht?
Jazeker. Alle EU-sancties stroken geheel met de verplichtingen van het internationaal recht, en eerbiedigen de mensenrechten en de fundamentele vrijheden.
Zodra tussen de EU-lidstaten een politiek akkoord is bereikt, bereiden de Europese Dienst voor extern optreden en/of de Europese Commissie de nodige rechtshandelingen voor en worden deze ter aanneming voorgelegd aan de Raad.
Verordeningen en besluiten van de Raad zijn, als rechtshandelingen van algemene strekking, bindend voor alle personen en entiteiten die onder de jurisdictie van de EU vallen. Dit betekent elke persoon en entiteit binnen de EU, elke EU-onderdaan ongeacht waar, en alle bedrijven en organisaties die naar het recht van een EU-lidstaat zijn opgericht.
EINDE BERICHT
Reacties uitgeschakeld voor Noten 1 t/m 5/Kritiek op twee Volkskrant artikelen
Schokkend, schandalig, een aanval op de solidariteit. Daar komt het weghalen van tentjes in Ter Apel op neer. In die tentjes probeerden vluchtelingen bij het aanmeldcentrum in Ter Apel te verblijven. Een ondernemer die niet enkel een verdienmodel had, maar ook nog een hart en een geweten, had die tentjes via crowdfunding geregeld en aan de vluchtelingen gegeven. Dat vond het Verachtelijk Gezag niet goed. Dus verwijderden agenten van de Mobiele Eenheid ter plekke de fragiele onderkomens. Iets met veiligheid. Slapen in de open lucht, dat mocht dan nog weer wel.(1)
De hele akelig vertoning is een zoveelste episode van het drama dat zich rond Ter Apel voltrekt. Vluchtelingen melden zich daar voor de opvang waar ze legaal gewoon recht op hebben. De capaciteit van die opvang schiet – door bewust beleid, niet door onvermogen – zodanig te kort dat de vluchtelingen bij herhaling op straat moesten slapen. Af en toe waren r veechtpartijeen van tot het uiterste getergde, van opvang verstoken en in onzekerheid gelaten vluchtelingen. De al genoemde ondernemer kon het niet meer aanzien en is die tentjes gaan regelen. Waren eer maar meer mensen zoals hij, want het is de hulpvaardigheid en solidariteit van mensen die tegenover de hardvochtige vluchtelingen welbwust treiternde overheid noodzakelijk is.
Wat bezielde de ME om die tentjes weg te halen en zulke kwetsbare en getraumatiseerde mensen zelfs van dat schamel en tijdelijke onderkomen te beroven? Simpel: orders van hogerhand. Dat politieagenten zelfs de bruutste orders bereid zijn uit te voeren, juist ook dat maakt ze politieagenten. Vanwaar de orders tot ontruiming? De functionarissen van de veiligheidsregio, waarmee de ondernemer met zijn tentjes eerder probeerde de zaak af te stemmen, vonden dat die met dit soort initiatief het vinden van een oplossing juist moeilijker maakte. De ondernemer wachtte dus eventjes, zodat de autoriteiten aan iets structureels konden werken. Die kwam niet, dus is hij de tentjes toch maar gaan leveren. ‘We zijn ontvangen met veel blijdschap, niemand was agressief. Heb alleen maar vriendelijk, dankbare mensen gezien.’
Maar het mocht dus niet. Brandveiligheid, wel vaker het excuus van gezagsdragers als ze iets willen ontruimen of slopen. En, zoals de ondernemer al eerder te horen had gekregen don die met zijn idee kwam ‘We weten niet wat zich in die tentjes afspeelt’. Nooit van privacy gehoord, deze functionarissen.
Wat zit er achter deze bruutheid? Streven naar veiligheid voor de vluchtelingen? Laat me niet lachen! Als dat de overheid echt interesseerde, had die allang fatsoenlijk opvang geregeld. Nee, het is angst van overheidswege! Waarvoor? Niet voor de vluchtelingen op zichzelf, daar heeft de staat eerder minachting voor. Wel voor de solidariteit die deze vluchtelingen kunnen organiseren en oproepen bij andere mensen. Vluchtelingen die relatief weerloos op straat slapen is tot daar aan toe. Vluchtelingen die een soort kamp kunnen inrichten staan al veel sterker. En voor je het weet gaan andere mensen het voorbeeld van de ondernemer volgen en komen aanzetten bij dat kampement met eten, drinken en vriendelijkheid. Voor je het weet groeit de solidariteit, uitgerekend voor de dichte deuren van het opvangcentrum dat overduidelijk die mensen niet opvangt. Voor je het weet staat het gzag te kijk in al haar onmenselijkheid, onverschilligheid – en overbodigheid, want mensen blijken zaken buiten die overheid om zelf te kunne regelen.
Wat de staat eventueel kan tolereren van haar burgers is medelijden met zielig mensen, zolang ze maar zielig en afhankelijk blijven. Wat de staat niet kan hebben is ondersteuning waardoor de mensen zich iets sterker kunnen gaan voelen. Wat de staat helemaal niet kan hebben is een plek waar vluchtelingen samen kunnen zijn, waar solidaire omwonenden en anderen naar toe kunnen komen om steun te betuigen en hulpverlening op touw te helpen zetten.
Dat afpakken van die tenten was een gore aanval van overheidswege op hulpvaardigheid en op solidariteit. Waar solidariteit een hulpvaardigheid werkelijk ruimte krijgen en nemen, daar staat de overheid te kijk in al haar bureaucratische onmenselijkheid en overbodigheid. De strijd van en met vluchtelingen, allereerst voor fatsoenlijke opvang maar principieel voor de vrijheid om te blijven zonder bang voor uitzetting te hoeven zijn, is dus tegelijk een strijd tegen een overheid die solidariteit en hulpvaardigheid repressief bejegent als als de gezagsondermijning die het uiteindelijk ook is.
